

CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH

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Why is it so hard to make lasting changes in our companies, in our communities, and in our own lives?

The primary obstacle is a conflict that's built into our brains, say Chip and Dan Heath, authors of the critically acclaimed bestseller *Made to Stick*. Psychologists have discovered that our minds are ruled by two different systems—the rational mind and the emotional mind—that compete for control. The rational mind wants a great beach body; the emotional mind wants that Oreo cookie. The rational mind wants to change something at work; the emotional mind loves the comfort of the existing routine. This tension can doom a change effort—but if it is overcome, change can come quickly.

In *Switch*, the Heaths show how everyday people---employees and managers, parents and nurses—have united both minds and, as a result, achieved dramatic results:

- The lowly medical interns who managed to defeat an entrenched, decades-old medical practice that was endangering patients (see page 242)
- The home-organizing guru who developed a simple technique for overcoming the dread of housekeeping (see page 130)
- The manager who transformed a lackadaisical customer-support team into service zealots by *removing* a standard tool of customer service (see page 199)

In a compelling, story-driven narrative, the Heaths bring together decades of counterintuitive research in psychology, sociology, and other fields to shed new light on how we can

(continued on back flap)

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effect transformative change. *Switch* shows that successful changes follow a pattern, a pattern you can use to make the changes that matter to you, whether your interest is in changing the world or changing your waistline.



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SWITCH

HOW TO CHANGE THINGS WHEN CHANGE IS HARD

CHIP HEATH and DAN HEATH

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Three Surprises About Change

1.

One Saturday in 2000, some unsuspecting moviegoers showed up at a suburban theater in Chicago to catch a 1:05 p.m. matinee of Mel Gibson's action flick *Payback*. They were handed a soft drink and a free bucket of popcorn and were asked to stick around after the movie to answer a few questions about the concession stand. These movie fans were unwitting participants in a study of irrational eating behavior.

There was something unusual about the popcorn they received. It was wretched. In fact, it had been carefully engineered to be wretched. It had been popped five days earlier and was so stale that it squeaked when you ate it. One moviegoer later compared it to Styrofoam packing peanuts, and two others, forgetting that they'd received the popcorn for free, demanded their money back.

Some of them got their free popcorn in a medium-size bucket,

and others got a large bucket—the sort of huge tub that looks like it might once have been an above-ground swimming pool. Every person got a bucket so there'd be no need to share. The researchers responsible for the study were interested in a simple question: Would the people with bigger buckets eat more?

Both buckets were so big that none of the moviegoers could finish their individual portions. So the actual research question was a bit more specific: Would somebody with a larger inexhaustible supply of popcorn eat more than someone with a smaller inexhaustible supply?

The sneaky researchers weighed the buckets before and after the movie, so they were able to measure precisely how much popcorn each person ate. The results were stunning: People with the large buckets ate 53 percent more popcorn than people with the medium size. That's the equivalent of 173 more calories and approximately 21 extra hand-dips into the bucket.

Brian Wansink, the author of the study, runs the Food and Brand Lab at Cornell University, and he described the results in his book *Mindless Eating:* "We've run other popcorn studies, and the results were always the same, however we tweaked the details. It didn't matter if our moviegoers were in Pennsylvania, Illinois, or Iowa, and it didn't matter what kind of movie was showing; all of our popcorn studies led to the same conclusion. People eat more when you give them a bigger container. Period."

No other theory explains the behavior. These people weren't eating for pleasure. (The popcorn was so stale it squeaked!) They weren't driven by a desire to finish their portion. (Both buckets were too big to finish.) It didn't matter whether they were hungry or full. The equation is unyielding: Bigger container = more eating.

Best of all, people refused to believe the results. After the movie, the researchers told the moviegoers about the two bucket sizes and the findings of their past research. The researchers asked,

Do you think you ate more because of the larger size? The majority scoffed at the idea, saying, "Things like that don't trick me," or, "I'm pretty good at knowing when I'm full."

Whoops.

2.

Imagine that someone showed you the data from the popcorn-eating study but didn't mention the bucket sizes. On your data summary, you could quickly scan the results and see how much popcorn different people ate—some people ate a little, some ate a lot, and some seemed to be testing the physical limits of the human stomach. Armed with a data set like that, you would find it easy to jump to conclusions. *Some people are Reasonable Snackers, and others are Big Gluttons.*

A public-health expert, studying that data alongside you, would likely get very worried about the Gluttons. *We need to motivate these people to adopt healthier snacking behaviors! Let's find ways to show them the health hazards of eating so much!*

But wait a second. If you want people to eat less popcorn, the solution is pretty simple: Give them smaller buckets. You don't have to worry about their knowledge or their attitudes.

You can see how easy it would be to turn an easy change problem (shrinking people's buckets) into a hard change problem (convincing people to think differently). And that's the first surprise about change: What looks like a people problem is often a situation problem.

3.

This is a book to help you change things. We consider change at every level—individual, organizational, and societal. Maybe you

want to help your brother beat his gambling addiction. Maybe you need your team at work to act more frugally because of market conditions. Maybe you wish more of your neighbors would bike to work.

Usually these topics are treated separately—there is "change management" advice for executives and "self-help" advice for individuals and "change the world" advice for activists. That's a shame, because all change efforts have something in common: For anything to change, someone has to start acting differently. Your brother has got to stay out of the casino; your employees have got to start booking coach fares. Ultimately, all change efforts boil down to the same mission: Can you get people to start behaving in a new way?

We know what you're thinking—people resist change. But it's not quite that easy. Babies are born every day to parents who, inexplicably, welcome the change. Think about the sheer magnitude of that change! Would anyone agree to work for a boss who'd wake you up twice a night, screaming, for trivial administrative duties? (And what if, every time you wore a new piece of clothing, the boss spit up on it?) Yet people don't resist this massive change—they volunteer for it.

In our lives, we embrace lots of big changes—not only babies, but marriages and new homes and new technologies and new job duties. Meanwhile, other behaviors are maddeningly intractable. Smokers keep smoking and kids grow fatter and your husband can't ever seem to get his dirty shirts into a hamper.

So there are hard changes and easy changes. What distinguishes one from the other? In this book, we argue that successful changes share a common pattern. They require the leader of the change to do three things at once. We've already mentioned one of those three things: To change someone's behavior, you've got to change that person's situation.

The situation isn't the whole game, of course. You can send an alcoholic to rehab, where the new environment will help him go dry. But what happens when he leaves and loses that influence? You might see a boost in productivity from your sales reps when the sales manager shadows them, but what happens afterward when the situation returns to normal? For individuals' behavior to change, you've got to influence not only their environment but their hearts and minds.

The problem is this: Often the heart and mind disagree. Fervently.

4.

Consider the Clocky, an alarm clock invented by an MIT student, Gauri Nanda. It's no ordinary alarm clock—it has wheels. You set it at night, and in the morning when the alarm goes off, it rolls off your nightstand and scurries around the room, forcing you to chase it down. Picture the scene: You're crawling around the bedroom in your underwear, stalking and cursing a runaway clock.

Clocky ensures that you won't snooze-button your way to disaster. And apparently that's a common fear, since about 35,000 units were purchased, at $50 each, in Clocky's first two years on the market (despite minimal marketing).

The success of this invention reveals a lot about human psychology. What it shows, fundamentally, is that we are schizophrenic. Part of us—our rational side—wants to get up at 5:45 a.m., allowing ourselves plenty of time for a quick jog before we leave for the office. The other part of us—the emotional side—wakes up in the darkness of the early morning, snoozing inside a warm cocoon of sheets and blankets, and wants nothing in the world so much as a few more minutes of sleep. If, like us, your

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plan, to think beyond the moment (all those things that your pet can't do).

But what may surprise you is that the Elephant also has enormous strengths and that the Rider has crippling weaknesses. The Elephant isn't always the bad guy. Emotion is the Elephant's turf—love and compassion and sympathy and loyalty. That fierce instinct you have to protect your kids against harm—that's the Elephant. That spine-stiffening you feel when you need to stand up for yourself—that's the Elephant.

And even more important if you're contemplating a change, the Elephant is the one who gets things done. To make progress toward a goal, whether it's noble or crass, requires the energy and drive of the Elephant. And this strength is the mirror image of the Rider's great weakness: spinning his wheels. The Rider tends to overanalyze and overthink things. Chances are, you know people with Rider problems: your friend who can agonize for twenty minutes about what to eat for dinner; your colleague who can brainstorm about new ideas for hours but can't ever seem to make a decision.

If you want to change things, you've got to appeal to both. The Rider provides the planning and direction, and the Elephant provides the energy. So if you reach the Riders of your team but not the Elephants, team members will have understanding without motivation. If you reach their Elephants but not their Riders, they'll have passion without direction. In both cases, the flaws can be paralyzing. A reluctant Elephant and a wheel-spinning Rider can both ensure that nothing changes. But when Elephants and Riders move together, change can come easily.

5.

When Rider and Elephant disagree about which way to move, you've got a problem. The Rider can get his way temporarily—he

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Self-control is an exhaustible resource. bimh' mho' drsdroo' raoomryols nmett' eadosha' giat' ga' noov' oeesn' 'shaocisdetc reWec'ga' eet'tc' paot'

the narrow sense of the word, as in the willpower needed to fight vice (smokes, cookies, alcohol). We're talking about a broader kind of self-supervision. Think of the way your mind works when you're giving negative feedback to an employee, or assembling a new bookshelf, or learning a new dance. You are careful and deliberate with your words or movements. It feels like there's a supervisor on duty. That's self-control, too.

Contrast that with all the situations in which your behavior doesn't feel "supervised"—for instance, the sensation while you're driving that you can't remember the last few miles of road, or the easy, unthinking way you take a shower or make your morning coffee. Much of our daily behavior, in fact, is more automatic than supervised, and that's a good thing because the supervised behavior is the hard stuff. It's draining.

Dozens of studies have demonstrated the exhausting nature of self-supervision. For instance, people who were asked to make tricky choices and trade-offs—such as setting up a wedding registry or ordering a new computer—were worse at focusing and solving problems than others who hadn't made the tough choices. In one study, some people were asked to restrain their emotions while watching a sad movie about sick animals. Afterward, they exhibited less physical endurance than others who'd let the tears flow freely. The research shows that we burn up self-control in a wide variety of situations: managing the impression we're making on others; coping with fears; controlling our spending; trying to focus on simple instructions such as "Don't think of a white bear"; and many, many others.

Here's why this matters for change: When people try to change things, they're usually tinkering with behaviors that have become automatic, and changing those behaviors requires careful supervision by the Rider. The bigger the change you're suggesting, the more it will sap people's self-control.

And when people exhaust their self-control, what they're exhausting are the mental muscles needed to think creatively, to focus, to inhibit their impulses, and to persist in the face of frustration or failure. In other words, they're exhausting precisely the mental muscles needed to make a big change.

So when you hear people say that change is hard because people are lazy or resistant, that's just flat wrong. In fact, the opposite is true: Change is hard because people wear themselves out. And that's the second surprise about change: What looks like laziness is often exhaustion.

6.

Jon Stegner believed the company he worked for, a large manufacturer, was wasting vast sums of money. "I thought we had an opportunity to drive down purchasing costs not by 2 percent but by something on the order of 3f; billion over the next five years," said Stegner, who is quoted in John Kotter and Dan Cohen's essential book *The Heart of Change.*

To reap these savings, a big process shift would be required, and for that shift to occur, Stegner knew that he'd have to convince his bosses. He also knew that they'd never embrace such a big shift unless they believed in the opportunity, and for the most part, they didn't.

Seeking a compelling example of the company's poor purchasing habits, Stegner assigned a summer student intern to investigate a single item—work gloves, which workers in most of the company's factories wore. The student embarked on a mission to identify all the types of gloves used in all the company's factories and then trace back what the company was paying for them.

The intrepid intern soon reported that the factories were

purchasing 424 different kinds of gloves! Furthermore, they were using different glove suppliers, and they were all negotiating their own prices. The same pair of gloves that cost $5 at one factory might cost $17 at another.

At Stegner's request, the student collected a specimen of every one of the 424 different types of gloves and tagged each with the price paid. Then all the gloves were gathered up, brought to the boardroom, and piled up on the conference table. Stegner invited all the division presidents to come visit the Glove Shrine. He recalled the scene:

> What they saw was a large expensive table, normally clean or with a t—Cpapers, now stacked high with gloves. Each of our executives stared at this display for a minute. Then each said something like, "We really buy all these different kinds of gloves?" Well, as a matter of fact, yes we do. "Really?" Yes, really. Then they walked around the table. . . . They could see the prices. They looked at two gloves that seemed exactly alike, yet one was marked $3.22 and the other $10.55. It's a rare event when these people don't have anything to say. But that day, they just stood with their mouths gaping.

The gloves exhibit soon became a traveling road show, visiting dozens of plants. The reaction was visceral: *This is crazy. We're crazy. And we've got to make sure this stops happening.* Soon Stegner had exactly the mandate for change that he'd sought. The company changed its purchasing process and saved a great deal of money. This was exactly the happy ending everyone wanted (except, of course, for the glove salesmen who'd managed to sell the $5 gloves for $17).

7.

We're crazy! *We can fix this.* *yelling,*

with the able help of a summer intern. It focused on a single product. The scope of the presentation didn't correspond in any way to the scope of the proposal. Yet Stegner's strategy worked.

That's the power of speaking to both the Rider and the Elephant.

8.

It's true that an unmotivated Elephant can doom a change effort, but let's not forget that the Rider has his own issues. He's a navel-gazer, an analyzer, a wheel-spinner. If the Rider isn't sure exactly what direction to go, he tends to lead the Elephant in circles. And as we'll see, that tendency explains the third and final surprise about change: What looks like resistance is often a lack of clarity.

Two health researchers, Steve Booth-Butterfield and Bill Reger, professors at West Virginia University, were contemplating ways to persuade people to eat a healthier diet. From past research, they knew that people were more likely to change when the new behavior expected of them was crystal clear, but unfortunately, "eating a healthier diet" was anything but.

Where to begin? Which foods should people stop (or start) eating? Should they change their eating behavior at breakfast, lunch, or dinner? At home or in restaurants? The number of ways to "eat healthier" is limitless, especially given the starting place of the average American diet. This is exactly the kind of situation in which the Rider will spin his wheels, analyzing and agonizing and never moving forward.

As the two researchers brainstormed, their thoughts kept coming back to milk. Most Americans drink milk, and we all know that milk is a great source of calcium. But milk is also the single largest source of saturated fat in the typical American's diet. In fact, calculations showed something remarkable: If Americans

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It's so the Rider doesn't spin his wheels. If you tell people to "act healthier," think of how many ways they can interpret that—imagine their Riders contemplating the options endlessly. (Do I eat more grains and less meat? Or vice versa? Do I start taking vitamins? Would it be a good trade-off if I exercise more and bribe myself with ice cream? Should I switch to Diet Coke, or is the artificial sweetener worse than the calories?)

What looks like resistance is often a lack of clarity. Before this study, we might have looked at these West Virginians and concluded they were the kind of people who don't care about their health. But if they were indeed "that kind" of people, why was it so easy to shift their behavior?

If you want people to change, you don't ask them to "act healthier." You say, "Next time you're in the dairy aisle of the grocery store, reach for a jug of 1% milk instead of whole milk."

9.

Now you've had a glimpse of the basic three-part framework we will unpack in this book, one that can guide you in any situation where you need to change behavior:

- *Direct the Rider.* What looks like resistance is often a lack of clarity. So provide crystal-clear direction. (Think 1% milk.)

- *Motivate the Elephant.* What looks like laziness is often exhaustion. The Rider can't get his way by force for very long. So it's critical that you engage people's emotional side—get their Elephants on the path and cooperative. (Think of the cookies and radishes study and the boardroom conference table full of gloves.)

- *Shape the Path.* What looks like a people problem is often a situation problem. We call the situation (including the surrounding environment) the "Path." When you shape the Path, you make change more likely, no matter what's happening with the Rider and Elephant. (Think of the effect of shrinking movie popcorn buckets.)

We created this framework to be useful for people who don't have scads of authority or resources. Some people can get their way by fiat. CEOs, for instance, can sell off divisions, hire people, fire people, change incentive systems, merge teams, and so on. Politicians can pass laws or impose punishments to change behavior. The rest of us don't have these tools (though, admittedly, they would make life easier: "Son, if you don't take out the trash tonight, you're fired"). In this book, we don't talk a lot about these structural methods.

As helpful as we hope this framework will be to you, we're well aware, and you should be, too, that this framework is no panacea. For one thing, it's incomplete. We've deliberately left out lots of great thinking on change in the interests of creating a framework that's simple enough to be practical. For another, there's a good reason why change can be difficult: The world doesn't always want what you want. You want to change how others are acting, but they get a vote. You can cajole, influence, inspire, and motivate—but sometimes an employee would rather lose his job than move out of his comfortable routines. Sometimes the alcoholic will want another drink no matter what the consequences.

So we don't promise that we're going to make change easy, but at least we can make it *easier.* Our goal is to teach you a framework, based on decades of scientific research, that is simple enough to remember and flexible enough to use in many different situations—family, work, community, and otherwise.

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have had their heads in the sand on this issue, and it's time to do the right thing. It's as simple as that."

IHI made joining the campaign easy: It required only a one-page form signed by a hospital CEO. By two months after Berwick's speech, over a thousand hospitals had enrolled. Once a hospital enrolled, the IHI team helped the hospital embrace the new interventions. Team members provided research, step-by-step instruction guides, and training. They arranged conference calls for hospital leaders to share their victories and struggles with one another. They encouraged hospitals with early successes to become "mentors" to hospitals just joining the campaign.

The friction in the system was substantial. Adopting the IHI interventions required hospitals to overcome decades' worth of habits and routines. Many doctors were irritated by the new procedures, which they perceived as constricting. But the adopting hospitals were seeing dramatic results, and their visible successes attracted more hospitals to join the campaign.

Eighteen months later, at the exact moment he'd promised to return—June 14, 2006, at 9 a.m.—Berwick took the stage again to announce the results: "Hospitals enrolled in the 100,000 Lives Campaign have collectively prevented an estimated 122,300 avoidable deaths and, as importantly, have begun to institutionalize new standards of care that will continue to save lives and improve health outcomes into the future."

The crowd was euphoric. Don Berwick, with his 75-person team at IHI, had convinced thousands of hospitals to change their behavior, and collectively, they'd saved 122,300 lives—the equivalent of throwing a life preserver to every man, woman, and child in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

This outcome was the fulfillment of the vision Berwick had articulated as he closed his speech eighteen months earlier, about

how the world would look when hospitals achieved the 100,000 lives goal:

> And, we will celebrate. Starting with pizza, and ending with champagne. We will celebrate the importance of what we have undertaken to do, the courage of honesty, the joy of companionship, the cleverness of a field operation, and the results we will achieve. We will celebrate ourselves, because the patients whose lives we save cannot join us, because their names can never be known. Our contribution will be what did not happen to them. And, though they are unknown, we will know that mothers and fathers are at graduations and weddings they would have missed, and that grandchildren will know grandparents they might never have known, and holidays will be taken, and work completed, and books read, and symphonies heard, and gardens tended that, without our work, would have been only beds of weeds.

11.

Big changes can happen.

Don Berwick and his team catalyzed a change that saved 100,000 lives, yet Berwick himself wielded no power. He couldn't change the law. He couldn't fire hospital leaders who didn't agree with him. He couldn't pay bonuses to hospitals that accepted his proposals.

Berwick had the same tools the rest of us have. First, he directed his audience's Riders. The destination was crystal clear: *Some is not a number; soon is not a time. Here's the number:*

100,000. Here's the time: June 14, 2006—9 a.m. But that wasn't enough. He had to help hospitals figure out how to get there, and he couldn't simply say, "Try harder." (Remember "act healthier" versus "buy 1% milk.") So he proposed six specific interventions, such as elevating the heads of patients on ventilators, that were known to save lives. By staying laser-focused on these six interventions, Berwick made sure not to exhaust the Riders of his audience with endless behavioral changes.

Second, he motivated his audience's Elephants. He made them *feel* the need for change. Many of the people in the audience already knew the facts, but knowing was not enough. (Remember, knowing wasn't enough for executives at Jon Stegner's company. It took a stack of gloves to get their Elephants engaged.) Berwick had to get beyond knowing, so he brought his audience face-to-face with the mother of the girl who'd been killed by a medical error: "I know that if this campaign had been in place four or five years ago, that Josie would be fine." Berwick was also careful to motivate the people who hadn't been in the room for his presentation. He didn't challenge people to "overhaul medicine" or "bring TQM to health care." He challenged them to save 100,000 lives. That speaks to anyone's Elephant.

Third, he shaped the Path. He made it easier for the hospitals to embrace the change. Think of the one-page enrollment form, the step-by-step instructions, the training, the support groups, the mentors. He was designing an environment that made it more likely for hospital administrators to reform. Berwick also knew that behavior was contagious. He used peer pressure to persuade hospitals to join the campaign. *(Your rival hospital across town just signed on to help save 100,000 lives. Do you really want them to have the moral high ground?)* He also connected people—he matched up people who were struggling to implement the changes with people who had mastered them, almost like the "mentors" found

in Alcoholics Anonymous. Berwick was creating a support group for health care reform.

In this book, you'll learn about people like Berwick who've created sweeping change despite having few resources and little structural authority. You'll learn about an entrepreneur who saved his small company by turning his skeptical employees into customer-service zealots; a student fresh out of college who saved an endangered species from extinction; a manager who plotted a way to get his colleague to stop acting like a jerk; and a therapist who reformed a group of child abusers.

Whether the switch you seek is in your family, in your charity, in your organization, or in society at large, you'll get there by making three things happen. You'll direct the Rider, motivate the Elephant, and shape the Path.


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was the result of an intertwined set of problems: Sanitation was poor. Poverty was nearly universal. Clean water was not readily available. The rural people tended to be ignorant about nutrition.

In Sternin's judgment, all of this analysis was "TBU"—true but useless. "Millions of kids can't wait for those issues to be addressed," he said. If addressing malnutrition required ending poverty and purifying water and building sanitation systems, then it would never happen. Especially in six months, with almost no money to spend.

Sternin had a better idea. He traveled to rural villages and met with groups of local mothers. The mothers divided into teams and went out to weigh and measure every child in their village. They then pored over the results together.

Sternin asked them, "Did you find any very, very poor kids who are bigger and healthier than the typical child?" The women, scanning the data, nodded and said, *"Có, có, có."* (Yes, yes, yes.)

Sternin said, "You mean it's possible today in this village for a very poor family to have a well-nourished child?"

"Có, có, có."

"Then let's go see what they're doing."

Sternin's strategy was to search the community for *bright spots*—successful efforts worth emulating. If some kids were healthy despite their disadvantages, that meant malnourishment was not inevitable. Furthermore, the mere existence of healthy kids provided hope for a practical, short-term solution. Sternin knew he couldn't ,u the thorny "root causes." But if a handful of kids were staying healthy against the odds, why couldn't every kid be healthy?

Notice that Sternin was trying to focus the mothers' Riders. The overall topic—what can you do to make your child healthier?—is simply too big and loaded to take on at once. The mothers needed direction, not motivation. After all, every mother's

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They were even encouraged to eat when they were sick, which was not the norm.

Perhaps most interesting, the healthy kids were eating different kinds of food. The bright-spot mothers were collecting tiny shrimp and crabs from the rice paddies and mixing them in with their kids' rice. Shrimp and crabs were eaten by adults but generally weren't considered appropriate food for kids. The mothers also tossed in sweet-potato greens, which were considered a low-class food. These dietary improvisations, however strange or "low class," were doing something precious: adding sorely needed protein and vitamins to the children's diet.

As an outsider, Sternin never could have foreseen these practices. He knew nothing about sweet-potato greens. The solution was a native one, emerging from the real-world experience of the villagers, and for that reason it was inherently realistic and inherently sustainable. But knowing the solution wasn't enough. For anything to change, lots of mothers needed to adopt the new cooking habits.

Most people in Sternin's situation would have been itching to make an announcement, to call the village together and unveil a set of recommendations. *Gather 'round, everyone: I've studied your problem and now I have the answer! Here are Sternin's 5 Rules for Fighting Malnutrition.*

But Sternin refused to make a formal announcement. "Knowledge does not change behavior," he said. "We have all encountered crazy shrinks and obese doctors and divorced marriage counselors." He knew that telling the mothers about nutrition wouldn't change their behavior. They'd have to practice it.

The community designed a program in which fifty malnourished families, in groups of ten, would meet at a hut each day and prepare food. The families were required to bring shrimp, crabs, and sweet-potato greens. The mothers washed their hands

with soap and cooked the meal together. Sternin said that the moms were "acting their way into a new way of thinking." Most important, it was *their* change, something that arose from the local wisdom of the village. Sternin's role was only to help them see that they could do it, that they could conquer malnutrition on their own.

By organizing these cooking groups, Sternin was addressing both the Rider and the Elephant. The mothers' Riders got highly specific instructions: *Here's how to cook a tasty lunch with shrimp and sweet-potato greens.* And their Elephants got a feeling: hope. *There really is a way to make my daughter healthier. And it's not very hard—it's something I can do!* Notice that the Path played a role, too. When so many of the mothers were doing something, there was strong social pressure to go along. The cooking classes, in effect, were changing the culture of the village.

Best of all, bright spots solve the "Not Invented Here" problem. Some people have a knee-jerk skeptical response to "imported" solutions. Imagine the public outcry if an American politician proposed that the United States adopt the French health care system. (Or vice versa.) We all think our group is the smartest.

By looking for bright spots within the very village he was trying to change, Sternin ensured that the solution would be a native one. He would have faced a much more difficult quest if he'd brought in a plan from a different village. The local mothers would have bristled: *Those people aren't like us. Our situation is more complicated than that. Those ideas wouldn't work here.*

Finding bright spots, then, solves many different problems at once. That's no surprise; successful change efforts involve connecting all three parts of the framework: Rider, Elephant, and Path. (Although in this book we explain one part of the framework at a time, we'll continue to remind you that even an

example in the "Rider" chapters will influence the Elephant and Path. Concepts are rarely exclusive.)

Six months after Sternin had come to the Vietnamese village, 65 percent of the kids were better nourished and stayed that way. Later, when researchers from Emory University's School of Public Health came to Vietnam to gather independent data, they found that even children who hadn't been born when Sternin left the villages were as healthy as the kids Sternin had reached directly. That discovery provided proof that the changes had stuck.

Sternin's success began to spread. "We took the first 14 villages in different phases of the program and turned them into a social laboratory. People who wanted to replicate the nutrition model came from different parts of Vietnam. Every day, they would go to this living university, to these villages, touching, smelling, sniffing, watching, listening. They would 'graduate,' go to their villages, and implement the process until they got it right. . . . The program reached 2.2 million Vietnamese people in 265 villages. Our living university has become a national model for teaching villagers to reduce drastically malnutrition in Vietnam," Sternin said.

Stories don't come much more heroic than this. Sternin and his small team of believers, working with a shoestring budget, managed to make a big dent in malnutrition. What makes it more remarkable is that they weren't experts. They didn't walk in with the answers. All they had was a deep faith in the power of bright spots.

2.

The Rider part of our minds has many strengths. The Rider is a thinker and a planner and can plot a course for a better future. But as we've seen, the Rider has a terrible weakness—the tendency to spin his wheels. The Rider loves to contemplate and analyze, and, making matters worse, his analysis is almost always

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,0. .0.03As10tA910..2 09AstAsa0t.As1As3160As01AAs16As0
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Bobby's home life was just as chaotic. He'd been shuffled in and out of foster homes and special facilities for kids with behavioral problems. He and his father were on the waiting list for family counseling. The local social service agency in Covington, Kentucky, was keeping tabs on Bobby. By the time he showed up for his session with Murphy, he was in danger of being placed in another special facility because of his problems at school.

Murphy was almost powerless in the situation. The counselor had no way to improve Bobby's situation at home, and time was working against him—at best, he'd see Bobby for an hour here, an hour there. Murphy couldn't reward Bobby if he behaved well or punish him if he behaved poorly. (Not that punishment would have worked. Bobby usually ended up in the principal's office by mid-morning for disciplinary issues, but his behavior never changed.)

Ignoring the "school stinks" comment, Murphy began talking to Bobby and posed a series of unusual questions. So began the first of a handful of conversations between Murphy and Bobby.

Now, fast-forward to three months later: A dramatic change had occurred. The number of days Bobby was sent to the principal's office had declined by 80 percent. Bobby hadn't become an Eagle Scout, mind you, but the improvement was strong enough to keep social services from having to transfer him to the school for troubled kids. Bobby, a chronic offender, had become an occasional offender. And it happened because of a few hours of talking with a counselor.

What, exactly, happened in those conversations?

4.

John Murphy is a practitioner of solutions-focused brief therapy ("solutions-focused therapy" for short). Solutions-focused therapy

was invented in the late 1970s by a husband-and-wife therapist team, Steve de Shazer and Insoo Kim Berg, and their colleagues at the Brief Family Therapy Center in Milwaukee. Solutions-focused therapy is radically different from traditional therapy. In classical psychotherapy (think Tony Soprano and Dr. Melfi), you and your therapist explore your problem. What are its roots? Does it trace back to something in your childhood? There's a sense of archaeological excavation: You're digging around your mind for a buried nugget of insight, something that may explain why you behave the way you do. Excavating the past takes time. A standard Freudian psychoanalysis might take five years of work, with sessions once or twice a week. (And after five years and $50,000, you discover it's all your mom's fault.)

Solutions-focused therapists, in contrast, couldn't care less about archaeology. They don't dig around for clues about why you act the way you do. They don't care about your childhood. All they care about is the solution to the problem at hand.

Marriage therapist Michele Weiner-Davis was initially trained as a classical psychoanalyst. Like all psychoanalysts, she believed that childhood experiences created unresolved traumas that fed current problems, and she tried to help her clients understand how their upbringing had shaped their behavior in relationships. But she was often unhappy with the outcomes her clients achieved through psychoanalysis. In her book *Divorce Busting*, she explained why: "My clients would frequently plead, 'Now I see that we are reenacting our parents' marriages, but what do we do about it? We can't stop fighting.'" She learned that understanding a problem doesn't necessarily solve it—that knowing is not enough.

Weiner-Davis was initially skeptical about solutions-focused brief therapy: "It seemed too simple. . . . Most people, including most therapists, believe the change process has to be complicated

and arduous. 'No pain, no gain' is the general rule of thumb." To describe how her thinking about solutions-focused therapy changed, she used an analogy from golf.

At one point, her golf swing started misfiring, so she went to a golf pro, thinking her technique needed a major overhaul. She noted that the golf pro didn't do any archaeology. He never said, "You obviously have a fear of winning. Did your father intimidate you as a little girl?" Instead, all he did was suggest a minor modification: relaxing her tight grip on the club. At first, she was a little peeved by this advice. It didn't seem profound enough to justify his fee. But later, on the course, her balls were going straighter and farther. *Maybe small adjustments can work after all,* she thought.

5.

Solutions-focused therapists use a common set of techniques for discovering potential solutions. Early in the first session, after hearing the patient explain his or her problem, the therapist poses the Miracle Question: "Can I ask you a sort of strange question? Suppose that you go to bed tonight and sleep well. Sometime, in the middle of the night, while you are sleeping, a miracle happens and all the troubles that brought you here are resolved. When you wake up in the morning, what's the *first small sign* you'd see that would make you think, 'Well, something must have happened—the problem is gone!'?"

Here's how one couple in marital therapy answered the Miracle Question posed by their therapist, Brian Cade of Sydney, Australia:

WIFE: I'd be happy, feeling at ease at last. I'd be more pleasant to Bob, not jumping down his throat all the time.

CADE: T7eg rSTt 2mnsEHgheh.

WIFE: Th tt.g7h4lmTth5hin4h TEhh4HgeEhSEA 5hgrhhEH2h 8htSHgglgEr7eg hemg7h4 reHHe2SAF.

HUSBAND: ShH7g g7hinihEgE rh hnE84ghe.t2sHgIgEh he17ng7h4h. KmTHgreSgEtghgT4hrE BnSEgE7

CADE: Pnr 1nTth2nTghtg7eg7hng7hr4eH4heTt2 tSHghESEA.

WIFE: AEg7heh.M g7SEBBh47eBAsPln4h h2HnEge1gB*auses, then laughs.) ,a!r enr ee iha csghi weodac.*

HUSBAND: ShHith 8h5ng74hHBnEgnr7eg g7hng7h4 reHHe2SA 4egg7h4Kmegge1PSEAsA*a* En4SEA Sg*A*

ngS1hg7eg.ehhB4nhg7h/nTBTh4HBh1S.1H/.7eg rstt 2nThnSEHgh D/Pnr 1nTth2nTghtg7hng7h4h4HmEH4hett2 tSHghEsEAhDCs4e1th 1hHgShEhHEeg2nTgrhhH14s5g7h iS4e1.hSgHHSgHP2nTgnShhEgsg7h geEAS5tg7egg7AEH iS4e1theBBhEhh7

Ph4haEng7lh%eiBtHi eg7h4eBSHgBHSg7 e ieE rSg7e h4SEBs4n5thi*Ia miracle solved your drinking problem, what would you be doing differently the next morning?* "I laoRn ooaru r rsor' iwsii oei, b . Deuvsuuwb ,nieole lnioo Wa risn la batedyernwe nla7A*I know it's not easy, but think about it. O, aeellhaca oca oencic nt ihsegcvv Name one.)ioika losnter gn iiha eskcoci o-r ennb oi iha eascwowacc vvHow would your day be different if you went to the library?*

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they want to avoid answers that are overly grand and unattainable: "My bank account is full, I love my job, and my marriage is great."

Once they've helped patients identify specific and vivid signs of progress, they pivot to a second question, which is perhaps even more important. It's the Exception Question: "When was the last time you saw a little bit of the miracle, even just for a short time?"

An alcoholic would be asked: "When was the last time you stayed sober for an hour or two?" Or the wife in the dialogue quoted above would be asked: "When was the last time you felt like your husband was truly listening to you?"

It's an ingenious tactic. What the therapist is trying to demonstrate, in a subtle way, is that the client is capable of solving her own problem. As a matter of fact, the client is offering up proof that she's *already solved it,* at least in some circumstances. For instance, Brian Cade worked with a mother whose children were out of control. He asked her the Exception Question: "What was different about the last time your kids obeyed you? In what circumstances do they seem to behave better?"

IOIA. (*after a pause*) I guess it's when they realize they have pushed me too far.

CADE: How could they tell that?

IOIS. You know, it's funny. I think it's when I stop ranting and raving at them and my voice goes very, very calm. . . . I think I'm able to do that when I feel generally less harassed, when I feel I've got things done rather than spent the whole day worrying about getting things done. When I feel I've not been able to get on top of the housework, I tend to panic.

Cade asks her what the kids might notice on good days.

lblef I think I just look calmer.

CADE: What else?

iois. Probably greet them more enthusiastically and smile more.

Solutions-focused therapists believe that there are exceptions to every problem and that those exceptions, once identified, can be carefully analyzed, like the game film of a sporting event. *Let's replay that scene, where things were working for you. What was happening? How did you behave? Were you smiling? Did you make eye contact?* And that analysis can point directly toward a solution that is, by definition, workable. After all, it worked before.

These "exceptions" are just like Jerry Sternin's bright spots. Just as there were some kids in the Vietnamese village who managed to stay healthy despite the poverty, there are some moments in an alcoholic's life when he is sober despite the cravings. Those bright spots are gold to be mined. (Notice again that bright spots provide not only direction for the Rider but hope and motivation for the Elephant.)

What does this mean for you? You may not fight malnutrition, and you may not need therapy. But if you're trying to change things, there are going to be bright spots in your field of view, and if you learn to recognize them and understand them, you will solve one of the fundamental mysteries of change: What, exactly, needs to be done differently?

Suppose you're a human relations manager, and you've been encouraging line managers to give feedback to their employees more frequently, rather than storing it up for their once-a-year performance reviews. You hosted an offsite training program for ten managers so they could practice the recommended new style

of in-the-moment feedback, and they all left the program pledging to experiment with it.

After four weeks, you start to hear back from some of the managers, and their results have been mixed. Two of the managers seem genuinely transformed—excited about the way the faster feedback has improved their relationships with team members. Five of the managers are weakly positive, saying they tried it a few times. Two of the managers say, regretfully, that they've been too busy to try. One is an outright skeptic and thinks the whole initiative is hogwash.

What now? The bright spots give you an action plan: Go investigate the two successful managers. First, see if either situation is an anomaly. For instance, in your follow-up, you might discover that one of the successful managers had not been giving any more feedback to his team—he'd simply been approaching individuals more often to make small talk. The extra social contact made him feel good but annoyed team members (who were constantly interrupted). That manager is not a real bright spot.

The other success might be legitimate. Maybe the manager, Debbie, devised a tracking sheet that reminds her to provide feedback to every employee every week. Maybe she set a goal for herself that her "quick feedback" will never last longer than two minutes and will apply only to a specific project—it won't be a referendum on an employee's overall performance. Maybe she set up open-door "office hours" so that employees can drop by for quick feedback on ongoing projects.

Now that you've defined your bright spot, you can try to clone it. Have the other managers spend an hour or two shadowing Debbie, seeing firsthand how she incorporated the new style into her workday. Get Debbie to attend your next offsite training program so she can coach other managers on the mechanics of quick

feedback. Talk to IT and see if there's a way to roll out a more polished version of Debbie's impromptu tracking sheet.

Bottom line: You are spending 80 percent of your time exploring Debbie's success and finding ways to replicate it. You aren't obsessing about the manager who was skeptical. You aren't planning another training program with the same managers to review the material. You are simply asking yourself, "What's working and how can we do more of it?" That's the bright-spot philosophy in a single question.

6.

Focusing on bright spots can be counterintuitive for businesses. Richard Pascale, one of Jerry Sternin's collaborators, discovered this in 2003 when he accepted a consulting assignment with Genentech. The company had recently launched a drug called Xolair, which had been regarded as a "miracle drug" for asthma. It had proved effective in preventing asthma attacks for many patients. Yet six months after launch, sales of Xolair remained well below expectations.

Pascale and his team were asked to help figure out why Xolair was underperforming. They immediately started looking for bright spots and soon found one: Two saleswomen who worked the Dallas–Fort Worth area were selling twenty times more Xolair than their peers. Further investigation revealed that the women were using a fundamentally different kind of sales pitch. Rather than selling the health benefits of the drug—which doctors largely understood—they were helping doctors understand how to *administer* the drug. Xolair was not a pill or an inhaler; it required infusion via an intravenous drip. This technique was unfamiliar (and therefore Elephant-spooking) to the allergists and pediatricians who would be prescribing the drug.

Here was a classic bright-spot situation. Like the Vietnamese mothers who mixed sweet-potato greens into their kids' rice, these saleswomen were achieving radically different results with the same set of resources everyone else had. Having discovered the bright spot, Genentech's managers could help spread the innovation across their entire sales force.

But that didn't happen. And here is where a cautionary tale intrudes on our success story. What actually happened was this: The superior results of the Dallas–Fort Worth reps were viewed with suspicion! Managers speculated that the saleswomen had an unfair advantage, and their initial assumption was that the pair's sales territories or quotas needed to be revisited. (Later investigation established that the two women had the same type of client base as the other reps.)

To be fair to the Genentech managers, let's acknowledge that there was indeed a chance that those two reps were simply an anomaly. But the managers' *first reaction* to the good news was that it must be bad news! That reaction is a good reminder that the Rider's capacity for analysis is endless. Even successes can look like problems to an overactive Rider.

7.

Let's circle back to Bobby, the troubled student, because now we can start to understand his rather abrupt transformation. Here's a brief exchange from one of Bobby's counseling sessions. Notice how Murphy, the school counselor, starts by popping the Exception Question:

isl kpih. Tell me about the times at school when you don't get in trouble as much.

BOBBY: I never get in trouble, well, not a lot, in Ms. Smith's class.

ism kpit. What's different about Ms. Smith's class?

BOBBY: I don't know, she's nicer. We get along great.

if lapin. What exactly does she do that's nicer?

Murphy wasn't content with Bobby's vague conclusion that Ms. Smith is "nicer." He kept probing until Bobby identified several things about Ms. Smith and her class that seemed to help him behave well. For instance, Ms. Smith always greeted him as soon as he walked into class. (Other teachers, understandably, avoided him.) She gave him easier work, which she knew he could complete (Bobby has a learning disability). And whenever the class started working on an assignment, she checked with Bobby to make sure he understood the instructions.

Ms. Smith's class was a bright spot, and as we've seen, anytime you have a bright spot, your mission is to clone it. Using Ms. Smith's class as a model, Murphy gave Bobby's other teachers very practical tips about how to deal with him: Greet Bobby at the door. Make sure he's assigned work he can do. Check to make sure he understands the instructions.

What Murphy had avoided, of course, was archaeology. He didn't dig into Bobby's troubled childhood, and he didn't try to excavate the sources of his anger and willfulness. For Murphy, all that information would have been TBU, as Sternin would say: true but useless. The other thing Murphy avoided was Genentech's knee-jerk skepticism. The mental quibbles could have come so easily: *Ms. Smith is just a nicer person than the other teachers* or *Her class is easier* or *Teachers shouldn't have to adapt their approach to a problem student.* Instead, Murphy found a bright spot, and he trusted it.

Bobby's teachers were pleased when Murphy approached them with such specific guidance, and they promised to give his recommendations a try. Murphy asked the teachers to help him track whether the solutions were working by recording Bobby's performance on three metrics: (1) arriving to class on time, (2) completing assignments in class, and (3) behaving acceptably in class. Over the next three months, as reported earlier, Bobby's rate of being sent to the principal's office for a major infraction decreased by 80 percent. Bobby also made striking progress on day-to-day behavior as measured by the three metrics. Before solutions-focused therapy, his teachers typically rated his performance as acceptable in only 1 or 2 out of 6 class periods per day. After solutions-focused therapy, he was rated as acceptable in 4 or 5 of the 6 periods. Bobby is still not a model student. But he's a lot better.

8.

Notice something remarkable about both the Vietnam and the Bobby case studies. In each one, relatively small changes—cooking with sweet-potato greens, greeting Bobby at the door—had a big impact on a big problem. There is a clear asymmetry between the scale of the problem and the scale of the solution. Big problem, small solution.

This is a theme you will see again and again. Big problems are rarely solved with commensurately big solutions. Instead, they are most often solved by a sequence of small solutions, sometimes over weeks, sometimes over decades. And this asymmetry is why the Rider's predilection for analysis can backfire so easily.

When the Rider analyzes a problem, he seeks a solution that befits the scale of it. If the Rider spots a hole, he wants to fill it, and if he's got a round hole with a 24-inch diameter, he's gonna

go looking for a 24-inch peg. But that mental model is wrong. For instance, in analyzing malnutrition in Vietnam, the experts had exhaustively analyzed all the big systemic forces that were responsible for it: lack of sanitation, poverty, ignorance, lack of water. No doubt they also concocted big systemic plans to address those forces. But that was fantasy. No one, other than Sternin, thought to ask, "What's working right now?"

In reviewing Bobby's situation at high school, the teachers and administrators whispered about all the things that were broken: broken home, learning disability, uncontrollable impulses. Any normal person, analyzing Bobby's situation, would have craved an intensive, complex solution to match the intensive, complex problem. But no one, other than the counselor Murphy, thought to ask, "What's working right now?"

To pursue bright spots is to ask the question "What's working, and how can we do more of it?" Sounds simple, doesn't it? Yet, in the real world, this obvious question is almost never asked. Instead, the question we ask is more problem focused: "What's broken, and how do we fix it?"

This problem-seeking mindset is a shortcoming of the Rider in each of us. Psychologists who have studied this phenomenon—our predilection for the negative—have reached some fascinating conclusions. As an illustration of what they've found, take a look at the following words taken from a "Learn English at home" website. They're all words for emotions. We've excerpted the first twenty-four of them from an alphabetical list. See if you notice any patterns:

ANGRY	DELIGHTED
ANNOYED	DISAPPOINTED
APPALLED	ECSTATIC
APPREHENSIVE	EXCITED

ASHAMED	EMOTIONAL
BEWILDERED	ENVIOUS
BETRAYED	EMBARRASSED
CONFUSED	FURIOUS
CONFIDENT	FRIGHTENED
CHEATED	GREAT
CROSS	HAPPY
DEPRESSED	HORRIFIED

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think much about them. But when things break, he snaps to attention and starts applying his problem-solving skills. So when your kids are making A's and B's, you don't think much about their grades. But when they make a D or an F, you spring into action. It's weird when you think about, isn't it?

What if the Rider had a more positive orientation? Imagine a world in which you experienced a rush of gratitude every single time you flipped a light switch and the room lit up. Imagine a world in which after a husband forgot his wife's birthday, she gave him a big kiss and said, "For thirteen of the last fourteen years you remembered my birthday! That's wonderful!"

This is not our world.

But in times of change, it needs to be. Our Rider has a problem focus when he needs a *solution focus.* If you are a manager, ask yourself: "What is the ratio of the time I spend solving problems to the time I spend scaling successes?"

We need to switch from archaeological problem solving to bright-spot evangelizing. There's no question that it's possible to do. Take Jerry Sternin. He came into an environment riddled with failure. The opportunities for analysis were endless. He could have stayed in Vietnam for twenty years, writing position papers on the malnutrition problem. But what he knew was this: Even in failure there is success.

An alcoholic goes an hour without a drink. Three sales reps out of fifty sell like crazy. c' few Vietnamese mothers, with no more money than any others, manage to raise healthy kids.

These flashes of success—these bright spots—can illuminate the road map for action and spark the hope that change is possible.

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used it to study the way doctors make decisions. When doctors were presented with this case history, 47 percent of them chose to try the medication, in hopes of saving the patient from going under the knife.

In a variation on the dilemma, another group of doctors were presented with almost exactly the same set of case facts—except this time, the patient's pharmacy discovered *two* untried medications. If you were the patient with the arthritic hip, you'd be thrilled—certainly two nonsurgical options are better than one. But when the doctors were presented with two medications, *only 28 percent chose to try either one.*

This doesn't make sense. The doctors were acting as though having more medication options somehow made medication a worse bet than surgery. But if 47 percent of doctors thought medication was preferable to surgery, the mere *existence* of a second medication shouldn't have tipped them toward surgery.

What happened here is *decision paralysis.* More options, even good ones, can freeze us and make us retreat to the default plan, which in this case was a painful and invasive hip-replacement surgery. This behavior clearly is not rational, but it is human.

Decisions are the Rider's turf, and because they require careful supervision and self-control, they tax the Rider's strength. (Remember the radish/chocolate-chip cookie study from Chapter 1.) The more choices the Rider is offered, the more exhausted the Rider gets. Have you ever noticed that shopping is a lot more tiring than other kinds of light activity? Now you know why—it's all those choices. This is important, because we encounter excess choice all around us. Consider three real examples of decision paralysis:

Scene 1: A gourmet food store. The store managers have set up a table where customers can sample imported jams for free. One day, the table showcases 6 different jams. Another day,

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translation of ambiguous goals into concrete behaviors. In short, to make a switch, you need to *script the critical moves.*

3.

In 1995, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso decided to privatize Brazil's railroads. He split the system into seven different branches (shades of Ma Bell) and auctioned off the rights to run them. Previous administrations had not invested much in the rail system, and at the time of the auction, it was a deteriorating mess. A study concluded that 50 percent of the network's bridges needed repair and 20 percent of them were on the verge of collapse. The technologies used in Brazil were far behind those in other developed countries. In fact, the rail system was still using twenty locomotives powered by *steam engines.*

A private firm, GP Investimentos Limited, decided to bid for the branch known as the "southern line," which ran through Brazil's three southernmost states. GP was high bidder in the auction in December 1996. After an interim period of management, the firm put one of its own executives, Alexandre Behring, in charge of the company, which was later renamed America Latina Logistica (ALL). When Behring took charge, he was in his early 30s—just four years out of business school.

Behring didn't have much to work with. ALL had only 30 million Brazilian reals in cash on its balance sheet. At one of Behring's first meetings, a mid-level manager beseeched him for 5 million reals to repair a single bridge. Though sympathetic, Behring knew that fixing everything that was broken would require hundreds of millions of reals. The needs were profound, but he faced an unyielding constraint: ALL's depleted bank account.

The railroad purchased by GP was in chaos, and when Behring and his team took charge, with new personnel and new priorities, more chaos was whipped into the preexisting chaos. The resulting decision paralysis should have been inescapable. And it likely would have been if Behring hadn't made clear exactly what needed to be done.

His top priority was to lift ALL out of its precarious, cash-strapped financial state. To accomplish this, he and his 35-year-old CFO, Duilio Calciolari, developed four rules to govern the company's investments:

> Rule 1: Money would be invested only in projects that would allow ALL to earn more revenue in the short term.
>
> Rule 2: The best solution to any problem was the one that would cost the least money up front—even if it ended up costing more in the long term, and even if it was a lower-quality solution.
>
> Rule 3: Options that would fix a problem quickly were preferred to slower options that would provide superior long-term fixes.
>
> Rule vI'Reusing or recycling existing materials was better than acquiring new materials.

The four rules were clear: (1) Unblock revenue. (2) Minimize up-front cash. (3) Faster is better than best. !v0'Use what you've got. These rules, taken together, ensured that cash wouldn't be consumed unless it was being used as bait for more cash. Spend a little, make a little more.

This is what we mean by "scripting" the critical moves.

Change begins at the level of individual decisions and behaviors, but that's a hard place to start because that's where the friction is. Inertia and decision paralysis will conspire to keep people doing things the old way. To spark movement in a new direction, you need to provide crystal-clear guidance. That's why scripting is important—you've got to think about the specific behavior that you'd want to see in a tough moment, whether the tough moment takes place in a Brazilian railroad system or late at night in your own snack-loaded pantry.

You can't script every move—that would be like trying to foresee the seventeenth move in a chess game. It's the *critical* moves that count. Recall that, in West Virginia, the researchers decided to focus their campaign on milk because it was the source of the most saturated fat in the average diet. The researchers didn't offer suggestions about bread or soda or butter or potato chips. They scripted the *critical* move: Switch to b'y' milk.

Similarly, Behring's four rules were focused on financial triage. He didn't have the luxury of long-term planning. He needed his people to move, immediately, in a new direction, in hopes that they could buy ALL enough time to make a fuller transformation. (Notice that he didn't say a word about other important issues such as employee morale or marketing or R&D.) By staying focused on the *critical* moves, he made it easier for his people to change direction.

In err,s' for instance, the company had to turn down business hauling grain because it didn't have enough locomotives. While its competitors were negotiating for new locomotives, ALL's engineers worked around the clock repairing old locomotives. *(Faster is better than best. Minimize up-front cash.)*

Also, ALL's engineers figured out a way to boost the locomotives' fuel capacity so they could operate longer without refueling. This reduced downtime, allowing more routes per locomotive,

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how to apply what you've read. We hope you find this a useful way to practice applying the framework. The Clinics are written to be sidebars—if you prefer to plow through the prose uninterrupted, you can return to them later.

CLINIC

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HOW DO WE MAKE THE SWITCH?

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5.

The Food Pyramid, which specifies the types and quantities of food that make up a healthy diet, is the perfect example of how *not* to change people's behavior. It's worth considering for a moment, because what dooms the Pyramid could doom your efforts to create change in your life, as well.

Let's start with the pyramid shape. A pyramid signifies hierarchy, yet no hierarchy is evident in the Food Pyramid. The first version of it displayed rows of food, one row on top of the next, with grains at the bottom and oils at the top. Some people interpreted this arrangement to mean that oils were the most important food group. (Whoops.) The revised version, shown here, abandoned that construct for vertical-ish streaks of color intended to eliminate any implied ranking. What this means is that the pyramid structure itself *has no meaning whatsoever.* The Food Pyramid might as well be a Food Rhombus or a Food Rooster.

Look at it again—its meaning is almost completely opaque. What do the streaks mean? The only meaning that can be gleaned quickly comes from the stick figure dashing up the side. The meaning is clear enough: "You should exercise." The answers to more meaningful questions—How much? How often? What kind?—aren't as easy to infer, which of course adds more ambiguity.

To learn what the Food Pyramid has to say about food, you must be willing to decipher the Pyramid's markings. If you make the effort, you'll find that each streak of color represents a class of food. For instance, the yellow streak (the tiny one near the middle) is "oils," and the orange streak (on the far left) is "grains." If you dig even further, you'll find that with every color streak comes a recommendation. For instance, the USDA advises that adults consume about .' to 7 teaspoons of oil each day.

Quick, how many teaspoons of oil did you consume today?

Quick, how many "ounce equivalents" of grain did you have today?

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.n' t'mienaaginl'uonrwet'egltniytuients'hstnlas' rauhipbar'in' usa'beei' *The Critical Path to Corporate Renewal, pasaopruapsNwM MwhaNuo!saNagnldesNgai,hNsechhahNutrneNupaasNpnCtssNuaNnseN scrrassg beNyeuaNntNeuwldhNuaNocaposalNeuaNwhheaNeuwphCNruaN eaoseNorras soctNyeuaNneendNeuwph.yNuaiNoncthNeuoeCNpnssNuaN starepcdCNednseNaMpintaNsaeNnlesuN b,NaldrateNgNaNntNeuwldhN othNbrNaldrateNoNuaNneendNeuwphCNowmihtdets'* dplso' aa'oe' idmgefa'infanoegwoignubw50 maghandfio'usa'dega' uihhauuWs' hstnla' ogtnuegdtoienu'iaga' dega' siiaswue'uau*Behavioral snoCsuN b,NtaldrateNgNeuaNtNuwldhNapsbnNeiN*33 maihanoet'osa'beoued'

third. For instance, a behavioral goal might be that project teams would meet once a week and each team would include at least one representative of every functional area.

Until you can ladder your way down from a change idea to a specific behavior, you're not ready to lead a switch. To create movement, you've got to be specific and be concrete. You've got to emulate e'y' milk and flee from the Food Pyramid.

6.

How far does this theory go? How much difference can specific instructions make? Let's subject the idea to the toughest possible test: Can you change child abusers by scripting some critical parenting moves for them?

In 2004, a study was conducted of 110 parents who had abused their children. Seventy-three percent of them had assaulted their kids—hitting or punching them with their fists. Twenty percent had engaged in even more violent assaults, resulting in broken bones or severe lacerations.

The parents tended to blame their abusive behavior on their kids. "They'll say, 'I had to discipline my child this way because he's so rotten and he won't listen,'" said Beverly Funderburk, a research professor at the University of Oklahoma's Health Sciences Center. The parents believed that they'd gotten a "bad kid," or a stubborn one, and that violence was the only way they could get their kids to obey.

The mission of Funderburk's team was to change these parents, to stop their abuse. If you think that sounds naive and even hopeless, you're in good company. That's also what Funderburk worried about when she first began the work.

She practices what's called parent-child interaction therapy (PCIT), which tries to disrupt the escalating cycles of coercion

and frustration that characterize abusive situations. In the first step of PCIT, parents are given an assignment: "We want you to play with your child for five minutes a day. Here are the rules: You're going to devote every of your attention to them, you're not going to answer the phone, you are not going to teach them their ABCs. You're just going to enjoy them." The parents are incredulous that five minutes will accomplish anything. "For goodness' sake," said one parent, "I spend every minute of every day on this child."

At first, these five-minute play periods take place in a laboratory setting. The parent and child sit in an empty room with only a table and chairs. Three or four toys are put on the tabletop. The parents are instructed to let the child lead the play session, and they're forbidden to give commands, to criticize, even to ask questions. Letting their child direct the action is incredibly difficult for them.

During the play session, a therapist watches the parents through a one-way mirror and gives real-time coaching by means of an earpiece. Funderburk describes a typical interaction:

> The parent and child might start coloring, and the parent tries to play along by coloring on the child's paper. The child objects. So we tell the parent, "Okay, get a separate piece of paper and imitate what your child is doing."
>
> If the child is coloring a rainbow, the parent colors a rainbow too, saying, "I'm coloring a rainbow just like you. You're using green, I'm going to use green."
>
> And some kids, if they're particularly oppositional, might reach over and grab the parent's green crayon yelling, "I want that." And we teach the parents to say, "Okay, I'd be *happy* to share that crayon with you . . . in

fact let me put all the crayons over by you so you can reach them all."

Or perhaps the parent says, "I'm going to color my rainbow with pink now." And the child says, "Pink is ugly, don't do pink!" If the child has been particularly nasty we may just ask the parents to ignore the comment, but otherwise we coach the parents to agree with their child, "You're right! Pink is not a good color for the rainbow! I think I'll do red."

We try to get the parents to bend like a reed. Whatever the child is doing, the parent offers no resistance, so the child has nothing to fight against.

An abusive parent typically finds the five-minute exercise utterly exhausting. (And you understand why—the parent's Rider has to supervise every single moment.) Funderburk and her colleagues demand that the parents practice the same set of behaviors (called "child-directed interaction") every day, whether in the lab or at home, so that the behaviors gradually become instinctive. The more instinctive a behavior becomes, the less self-control from the Rider it requires, and thus the more sustainable it becomes.

Parents are taught skills that feel unnatural at first. They are taught to look for opportunities to praise their kids' behavior. ("I like how hard you're working." "Good job. You're being very kind to that doll.") They are taught to simply *describe* their child's behavior, so that the child feels noticed. ("Oh, look, now you're putting the car in the garage.")

Later in the program, after parents have become better at having short positive interactions with their kids, they are taught how to give commands so that their kids will listen and obey. They are taught a very specific formula for a command—

combining a command with a reason so the command doesn't feel arbitrary. ("Johnny, it's almost time for the bus to come, so please put your shoes on now.")

Funderburk and her team at the University of Oklahoma studied 110 parents who had abused their children. Half of them were randomly assigned to take 12 sessions of y0 ynpCand the other half were assigned to take 12 sessions of a form of anger-management therapy, focused on helping them control their emotions—the standard treatment for abusive parents. After the therapy sessions concluded, the parents were tracked for 3 years. Across 3 years, 60 percent of the anger-management-therapy group committed another act of child abuse. In contrast, only 20 percent of the PCIT parents re-offended.

PCIT did not eliminate the problem: One in five parents abused his or her kids again. But, from the perspective of behavior change, the results are staggering. Most of us believe in our hearts that child abusers are irredeemably flawed. Who could hit a child other than someone who is disturbed in some basic way? It simply boggles the mind to think that the behavior of child abusers could be altered by only twelve sessions of therapy concentrating on such simple instructions.

Funderburk said, "In my experience, the physically abusive parent has the same goals as a normal parent; it's their method and their ideas that are wrong. They think that their child is woeful, because they told their 3-year-old to just play in the front yard, and then he wandered off into the street. And they don't understand that a 3-year-old might forget an instruction, or might not have that kind of impulse control, so they think they have to punish the child *for his own good* because he was disobedient and dangerous."

Earlier, we said that what looks like stubbornness or opposition may actually be a lack of clarity. n he PCIT intervention sug-

gests that child abuse, too, may be partly the result of a lack of understanding, a lack of clear instruction or guidance on what to do. This is not to excuse the parents' behavior, of course. It is simply to point out that simple scripting has power beyond what any of us could have predicted. Even child abusers become pliable in its presence.

7.

In 1995, the same year Brazil's president Cardoso announced the privatization of the railroads, a group of high school students in Howard, South Dakota, started plotting a revival. They wanted to do something, anything, that might revive their dying community.

Howard and surrounding Miner County had been shrinking for decades. Farm and industrial jobs had slowly dried up, and nothing replaced them. The median price of houses in Howard was only $26,500. The population was about 3,000 and shrinking. The county had the highest elderly population per capita in South Dakota, and it also had the highest rate of youth outmigration in South Dakota, meaning that when young people got old enough, they left and didn't return.

"We'd been in decline for ninety years," said Randy Parry, a longtime resident who taught a business class at the local high school, coached the varsity basketball team, and ran an ice cream parlor on the side.

At Howard High School, the students had just finished reading a book about the death of rural communities in Iowa. The students said, "That's us, it's just seventy years from now," according to Parry. "So in class they started asking, 'How could we change this?'"

Imagine the decision paralysis in this situation. Think of how

many factors influence a town's health: its history, its demographics, its location, its economic base, its weather, among countless others. The problem was simply too complex for anyone to solve. And it wasn't for lack of motivation—there wasn't one person in Miner County who wouldn't have jumped at the chance to help rejuvenate the community. The Elephant herd was ready to move. But where? What can a few people do to restore an entire *county*?

The students started investigating the situation, designing a survey and distributing it to a sample of Miner County's 1,000 registered voters. One finding in particular disturbed them: They discovered that half of the residents were shopping outside the county, driving an hour to Sioux Falls to shop in larger stores.

If Miner County was going to be reborn, its economy would need a boost. Most of the things that would boost an economy—investment, entrepreneurship, immigration—were out of the students' control. But they had uncovered one thing that was very much in their control: spending money locally. They had found their first rallying cry: Let's keep Miner dollars in Miner County.

Parry urged the students to present their findings to the community. The students accepted the challenge and began to put together a presentation.

The students' newfound interest in revitalization dovetailed with the efforts of others in the community. A group of other Miner County citizens had been hosting a series of meetings intended to get county residents talking about the future. They held five gatherings, some in the high school and some in people's homes, and they invited a cross section of residents: farmers and businesspeople and ministers and retirees. They challenged each other: What can we do to energize Miner County?

The issues raised were all over the map: *Why does our town look so shabby, with rusty cars on the street? Why should a farmer get*

a subsidy when a businessperson doesn't get a subsidy? Why don't we have a more thriving Main Street? 'otiN toNgaNivaiNSapaNlepIN vtitecoceaN "iNegaNddvt mriPoNN paóvmeahNtcaiedateCNveN SsegNoNmdmeahNeNtoN"NhteeoeiNetNheoSNoptdDNeSit(eNreaoeN SgapaNgaihNbsthNegaNtai vlNveNegaeaSNpaNNaSNegmtsiNgaiN btaSNegaiNtcehNeobaNntetNgaspaSt N gothiWN

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her refrigerator at home, Phyllis had posted a cross-stitch that said "Screw the Golden Years."

When the high school students were ready to unveil their recommendations, eighty-five residents gathered in the high school gym to hear the presentation. Among them were the top leaders of the towns in Miner County: the school boards, the city councils, and the county commissioners.

The crowd listened attentively to the high school students. Parry said, "You could hear a pin drop. . . . People said, 'I can't say no because .' want to make this a place where these kids can come home someday.' Because the other option is we sit here and keep watching things decline, so pretty soon all that will be left is the dust."

The students had prepared an impressive array of spreadsheets and charts and graphs. But they'd also simplified the complex data into one simple, surprising fact: They'd calculated that if Howard residents spent just e.' percent more of their disposable income at home, they would boost the local economy by $7 million.

The audience was impressed, and the presentation worked better than anyone expected. The students had scripted the first critical move for Miner County, and the locals responded immediately, consciously spending more of their money in the county. A year later, South Dakota's Department of Revenue released an astonishing number: The amount of money spent in Miner County had increased by $15.6 million, more than twice the increase the kids had expected.

The change began to snowball. Suddenly, because the county was collecting more taxes, money was available to fund the other proposals the local groups had considered. And in the years following the students' presentation, the tax receipts kept climbing, which enabled the community to tackle even more ambitious

problems. Later, Howard and Miner County received $6 million in grants from various foundations to fuel the transformation. Randy Parry left his teaching job and became a full-time revitalizer-in-chief. The town of Howard became the host to twenty-first-century businesses such as an organic beef producer and a wind-turbine repair shop.

"It all started small," said Parry. "It's like when I took over the basketball team at the high school. They were just coming off of a losing season and you couldn't get people to come into the gym. But then you start to win and a few people come, and then more people come. And then we started winning a lot." To date, Parry has discussed the rebirth of Miner County with community leaders from thirty-three different states.

8.

A railroad and a South Dakota small town. Both crumbling. Both with a dense thicket of problems and no real resources to use in untangling them. In each situation, an unlikely leader emerged—a young man fresh out of business school and a high school basketball coach. And both succeeded by formulating solutions that were strikingly smaller than the problems they were intended to solve. (We've seen this asymmetry before, in the stories of Jerry Sternin in Vietnam and Bobby the troubled teenager.)

The challenges facing Miner County were big and sprawling: the decline of an industrial base, the aging of a population. The citizens understood these challenges well, but the knowledge was TBU—true but useless. It was paralyzing knowledge.

To the Rider, a big problem calls for a big solution. But if you seek out a solution that's as complex as the problem, you'll get the Food Pyramid and nothing will change. (The Rider will just spin his wheels trying to make sense of it.) The Rider has to be

jarred out of introspection, out of analysis. He needs a script that explains how to act, and that's why the successes we've seen have involved such crisp direction. *Buy 1% milk. Don't spend cash unless it makes cash. Shop a little more in Miner County.*

We all hear a lot of "common sense" wisdom about change: People don't like to change; people resist change; people are set in their ways; people are stubborn. But here we've seen something else entirely: railroads made profitable, towns reborn, diets changed, and child abusers reformed.

Clarity dissolves resistance.

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the critical moves). But to what end? How do you show a roomful of first graders where they're headed and why going there is worth the effort—in terms they can understand?

Well, here's a way *not* to do that, from another Teach For America teacher, who reported her goals for the year as follows:

> With respect to reading for the school year, I administered three diagnostics: CWT, Assessment of Comprehension, and Monster Test. Using the CWT, I identified my classes' average as grade level 1.5 in September. My goal is to increase my students' word identification so as to ensure a class average of l-k JNpon analyzing the results of the Assessment of Comprehension, I identified my classes' average as a 41% in September. My goal is to increase my students' comprehension so as to ensure a class average of YklaNUsing the Monster Test, I identified my classes' average score as Semiphonetic/Phonetic. My goal is to increase my students' phonics and spelling skills to Transitional.

That ambitious and specific set of goals was probably quite useful to the teacher in her planning. But it obviously won't be useful in lighting a fire in the hearts of first graders.

Crystal Jones, in contrast, knew that if she wanted to motivate the kids, she had to speak their language. At the beginning of the school year, she announced a goal for her class that she knew would captivate every student: By the end of this school year, you're going to be *third graders.* (Not literally, of course, but in the sense that they would be at third-grade skill levels.)

That goal was tailor-made for the first-grade psyche. First graders know very well what third graders look like—they are

bigger, smarter, and cooler. You know the feeling you get when you're admiring the grace and power of an Olympic athlete? That's the feeling first graders get about third graders.

Jones chose the goal carefully. She knew exactly what the third-grade standards in Georgia required, and she knew where her kids were starting. She genuinely thought she could close the gap.

One of her first efforts was to cultivate a culture of learning in her classroom, calling her students "scholars" and asking them to address one another that way. When people visited her classroom, she introduced her class as a group of scholars and asked them to define the term for the guest. They would shout, "A scholar is someone who lives to learn and is good at it." The scholars were encouraged to go home and share what they learned with their families.

One day, a scholar was called out of the classroom for administrative reasons, and some of the others in the room started groaning. In most classrooms it would have been a groan of jealousy—*Get me out of here, too.* Jones realized, to her surprise, that it was a groan of pity—*That kid is going to miss some "scholar work."* At that moment, Jones said, xdknew dhad them."

By springtime, the kids' test scores had reached second-grade level. So Jones threw a graduation ceremony right before spring break. For the rest of the year, the kids took great pleasure in referring to themselves as "second graders." And by the end of the year, over 90 percent of the kids were reading at or above a third-grade level.

These were some of the same kids who, nine months earlier, didn't know the alphabet.

Crystal Jones's challenge is reminiscent of what Jim Collins and Jerry Porras, in *Built to Last,* their great study of long-lived business organizations, memorably called a BHAG: a Big, Hairy,

Audacious Goal. Henry Ford's BHAG early in the twentieth century was to "democratize the automobile"; Wal-Mart, in 1990, set the goal of quadrupling in size to be a $125 billion company by the year 2000. Collins and Porras defined a BHAG as "an audacious 10-to-30-year goal to progress towards an envisioned future," and their research showed that setting these big, motivating goals was a practice that distinguished lasting companies from less successful ones.

In creating change, though, we're interested in goals that are closer at hand—the kinds of things that can be tackled by parents or middle managers or social activists. We want a goal that can be tackled in months or years, not decades.

We want what we might call a *destination postcard*—a vivid picture from the near-term future that shows what could be possible. That's the missing piece of what we've discussed so far. We've seen the importance of pursuing bright spots, and we've discussed ways of instructing the Rider *how* to behave, but we haven't answered a very basic question: Where are we headed in the end? What's the destination?

Crystal Jones provided a great destination postcard: *You'll be third graders soon!* Notice that the goal she set for her students didn't only direct the Rider; it also motivated the Elephant. It was inspirational. It tapped into feeling. Collins and Porras knew that goals should have an emotional component—a BHAG shouldn't just be big and compelling; it should "hit you in the gut." To a first grader, becoming a third grader in nine months is a gut-smacking goal.

2.

Women with breast cancer flew to San Francisco to be treated by Laura Esserman, a surgeon and an associate professor of surgery

at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF). Patients loved Esserman for her warmth and empathy. She gave out her personal cell phone number to her patients, and she sometimes sang patients to sleep in the operating room as their anesthesia took effect.

Esserman's human touch was in sharp contrast to the usual treatment afforded women diagnosed with breast cancer. As if the diagnosis itself weren't frightening enough, women were often bounced around from place to place during the treatment cycle, adding stress. In a typical progression, described by a Stanford case study, a woman first notices a lump on her breast during a monthly self-exam. Anxious, she calls a doctor and waits a few days (or weeks) for an appointment. The doctor confirms that the lump should be examined, so the patient is referred to a radiologist at another facility to get a mammogram. Getting the results of the scan takes another agonizing few days.

The mammogram shows something suspicious, so she is referred to a surgeon, who meets her and again verifies that the lump is present. Unfortunately, the mammogram images didn't arrive at the surgeon's office before the visit, so there's another delay while radiology is contacted. The surgeon conducts a biopsy, which is sent to the pathology department to determine whether the growth contains cancerous cells. The woman is sent home to wait by the phone for the answer.

If cancer is detected, she undergoes surgery, and then the surgeon refers her to a radiation therapist for radiation treatment and to a medical oncologist for chemotherapy. Radiation and chemotherapy are conducted at different sites with different booking procedures and delays. In an attempt to smooth the process, a patient might have to collect her own records, films, and pathology slides and carry them around herself, sometimes even within the same hospital. The sequence might take weeks to

unfold, and all while the woman is wondering, *Am I going to live through this?*

This anxiety-filled process appalled Laura Esserman, and she had a vision of how it could be different. What if there were a breast care clinic where a woman worried about a lump in her breast could walk in at the beginning of the day and walk out at the end of the day with an answer—either knowing that the lump was no problem, or if it was a problem, having a treatment plan already in hand?

The main barrier to this vision was the lack of coordination among medical departments. If they could be integrated more tightly, then weeks of agonizing waiting could be eliminated, the patient would not have to leave the building, and the experience would be designed around the patient's needs, not the departments'. That was Esserman's destination postcard, and it was an admirable one.

But as an associate professor at a large university medical center, Esserman was far down the totem pole, with few resources at her disposal. Even if she could start a breast care clinic, she would never be able to hire or fire the people who might work for it, and she couldn't even set their salaries. The medical departments, such as radiology and pathology, controlled the purse strings and the resources. The two most commonly used descriptions of the medical school at UCSF were "bureaucratic" and "political." "The departments have money, and the departments have turf, and you can't bring them together," said Meredithe Mendelsohn, who became Esserman's chief administrative director.

Esserman said, "The radiation oncologists report to radiation oncology. The surgeons report to the School of Medicine. The medical oncologists report to medical oncology. The nurses and staff report to the medical center. The psychologists and social workers report someplace else. So it's an organizational challenge

to make people feel like they belong to something." Because Esserman wielded so little institutional power, her best assets for creating change were her own tenacity and her ability to sell a vision of what breast cancer care could be.

Esserman and Mendelsohn started small. They set up the Breast Care Center to operate for four hours one day per week. They cajoled the medical departments to start working together in more integrated ways. It took practice, and it took persistence. "Radiology, which does the mammographies, works like a train station," says Mendelsohn. "If your appointment's at 12:15, you're seen at 1,1.1a and that's how they operate." But Esserman's goal was to build treatment around the patients' needs, and those needs weren't always predictable enough to conform to radiology's schedule. Esserman worked with the radiologists to figure out how to create some flexibility in their traditionally rigid processes.

"We couldn't take up too much of radiology's time," said Mendelsohn, so they figured out how to improvise. "Dr. Esserman would see the patient in the morning, and she was the only doctor that would do it—she was the guinea pig—and then she would send them off, say 'Go have lunch. Go shopping. Come back at 1:00.' And during lunch time she would go to radiology, where she and the radiologist would sit and look through all of the images and decide what needed to happen next."

For the first year, the Center stuck with the one-day-per-week model. Then, once the work was going smoothly, Esserman expanded to two days per week. More surgeons started to get involved, and then nurses, and counselors, and support staff, and the snowball began.

Eventually, the Breast Care Center achieved enough success that it was offered an entire floor in a new cancer center being constructed by UCSF. "Where's radiology?" asked Esserman

when she saw the layout. The cancer center master plan assumed that the radiology department would remain in its old building. But that would have made Esserman's "everything under one roof" vision impossible. So she agreed to give up one-third of the Breast Care Center's space to make room for a mammography unit on the same floor. (Onlookers were shocked—academic departments usually fought hard to secure space, and Esserman was giving up some of hers!)

Now Esserman had two powerful assets: a proper home for the Center and a staff who increasingly embraced her vision for a new kind of care. Patients flocked to the Breast Cancer Center. From 1997 to 2003, the number of patients seen per month skyrocketed from 175 to 1,300. In time, the Center became a major source of revenue for UCSF and a recognized national leader in breast cancer care and research. The Center evolved to be the place that Esserman described in her destination postcard.

Here's how Esserman describes the way the patient's experience looks today:

> When a patient comes into the Breast Care Center, I can walk around the corner and look at her films that day. While she's in the room, we can do a biopsy and get the diagnosis in five minutes. We have a gynecologist on staff that specializes in fertility issues for women with breast cancer, and I have a psychologist and genetic counselor on staff that is one of the nurse practitioners. The patient stays in the same place and doesn't need to go anywhere.

The Breast Care Center also has a relaxing healing garden and a café that serves coffee. The boutique sells not only the usual

flowers and gifts but also wigs and scarves for patients undergoing chemo.

"For the first time," said Esserman, "we put the woman at the center."

3.

When you describe a compelling destination, you're helping to correct one of the Rider's great weaknesses—the tendency to get lost in analysis. Our first instinct, in most change situations, is to offer up data to people's Riders: *Here's why we need to change. Here are the tables and graphs and charts that prove it.* The Rider loves this. He'll start poring over the data, analyzing it and poking holes in it, and he'll be inclined to debate with you about the conclusions you've drawn. To the Rider, the "analyzing" phase is often more satisfying than the "doing" phase, and that's dangerous for your switch.

Notice what happens, though, when you point to an attractive destination: The Rider starts applying his strengths to figuring out *how to get there.* For instance, after Esserman announced her "under one roof" vision, her team could start thinking through the implications of that: *Let's see, we'll never pull that off unless we have access to radiology, so we'll need to give up square footage to them . . .*

You have a choice about how to use the Rider's energy: By default, he'll obsess about which way to move, or whether it's necessary to move at all. But you can redirect that energy to helping you navigate toward the destination. For that to happen, you need a gut-smacking goal, one that appeals to both Rider and Elephant. Think of Esserman's "under one roof" vision or of Crystal Jones's challenge to her kids to become third graders.

Goals in most organizations, however, lack emotional resonance. Instead, SMART goals—goals that are Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Relevant, and Timely—have become the norm. A typical SMART goal might be "My marketing campaign will generate 4,500 qualified sales leads for the sales group by the end of Q3'09."

The specificity of SMART goals is a great cure for the worst sins of goal setting—ambiguity and irrelevance ("We are going to *delight* our customers every day in every way!"). But SMART goals are better for steady-state situations than for change situations, because the assumptions underlying them are that the goals are worthwhile. If you accept that generating 4,500 leads for the sales force is a great use of your time, the SMART goal will be effective. But if a new boss, pushing a new direction, assigns you the 4,500-leads goal even though you've never handled lead generation before, then there might be trouble. SMART goals *presume* the emotion; they don't generate it.

In looking for a goal that reaches the Elephant—that hits people in the gut—you can't bank on SMART goals. (There are some people whose hearts are set aflutter by goals such as "improving the liquidity ratio by 30 percent over the next 18 months." They're called accountants.) In the 1980s, a major study of corporate change efforts found that financial goals inspired successful change less well than did more emotional goals, such as the goal to provide better service to customers or to make more useful products. According to the researchers, "Effective visions expressed values that allow employees to identify with the organization. . . . One manager at a glass company suggested, 'it's hard to get excited about 15% return on equity.'"

Destination postcards do double duty: They show the Rider where you're headed, and they show the Elephant why the journey is worthwhile.

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4.

Well, we did eat that salad last Thursday. And for Pete's sake, we bought 1% milk at the grocery store! We

don't want to go overboard on this diet. A few Cheetos is a reasonable reward for good behavior. And presto! We eat the Cheetos! Even more impressive than that, we'll still be convinced, in our heart of hearts, that we're being healthier.

A big-picture goal like "Be healthier" is necessarily imprecise, and that ambiguity creates wiggle room for the Elephant. It makes it easy to rationalize failure. One response to this dilemma is to set super-prescriptive goals. Your firm might announce, "We will boost revenue by 14.2 percent this year." Certainly, that's much better than just urging employees to do their best. But although numbers themselves are wiggle-proof, the way we deal with numbers isn't. For instance, if your firm achieved a 12.3 percent increase in revenue, do you really think anyone would get fired? Or is it more likely that a compelling rationalization would smooth over the discrepancy? *Team, in this economic climate, we should consider 12.3 percent a huge victory!*

The danger is present in our personal lives, too. Imagine that, in hopes of reining in your alcohol consumption, you set a goal of drinking no more than one glass of wine per night. Well, let's face it, there will come a night when your Elephant is going to crave more than one, and that's when the boundaries are going to get fuzzy. You'll "honor" your one-glass rule—by filling your glass all the way to the brim. Or you'll mentally trade an extra drink now for a zero-drink night in the (speculative) future. We're all loophole-exploiting lawyers when it comes to our own self-control.

If you're worried about the possibility of rationalization at home or at work, you need to squeeze out the ambiguity from your goal. You need a black-and-white (B&W) goal. A B&W goal is an all-or-nothing goal, and it's useful in times when you worry about backsliding. Maybe your B&W goal for your alcohol consumption could be "No wine ever." No wiggle room

there. And what if we changed our New Year's resolution from "Be healthier" to "Gym every day" or even "No more Cheetos"? Those goals leave nowhere to hide. Either you've got damning orange Cheeto dust on your fingers or you don't.

Note that B&W goals—"No more Cheetos," "No wine ever"—are not inspiring at all. They're 100 percent restrictive. Furthermore, they are scripting critical behaviors rather than painting a picture of a destination. Is it possible to combine the emotional power of a destination postcard with the rationalization-squashing strength of a B&W goal? Yes, and to see how, consider the case of British Petroleum (BP). In 1991, BP announced a B&W goal that shocked its employees who had spent years in the oil industry. It was the multibillion-dollar equivalent of "No more Cheetos."

5.

For most of the twentieth century, oil explorers had trusted their gut, which worked out well, because their gut was pretty smart and oil reserves were largely untapped. In the 1960s, Jim Vanderby, one of the great BP explorers, went to Egypt. The first four or five holes he drilled there were dry. His superiors at BP sent him a telegram and told him to stop trying. He didn't get the telegram, or so he claimed. Regardless, he drilled again, and on his next try in the Gulf of Suez, he tapped into the world's first multibillion-barrel oil field.

BP's good fortune continued in the 1960s and 1970s, with huge discoveries such as Prudhoe Bay in Alaska (1968) and Montrose in the North Sea (1971), among others. Toward the late eighties, though, the mega-hits slowed down. "What was changing was that fields were getting more difficult to find," said Pete Callagher, a senior leader at Amoco, which merged with BP in the late 1990s. "The older fields were *huge,* visible on Cul, seismic

technology. Targets became smaller and more difficult to see. So the skill sets changed."

As the landscape changed, BP's strategy evolved. In 1989, its leaders locked onto the exploration doctrine that would guide them for the next fifteen years. They would focus only on *big* fields and stop competing for the smaller ones, thereby avoiding competition with hundreds of smaller competitors. They also decided to attack costs. At that time, BP was considered by many to be the world's most effective exploration company. Even so, BP's leaders believed it was spending far too much on exploration. They committed to slash exploration costs from $5 per barrel to $1. People inside the company thought this goal was outrageous.

To reduce costs so drastically, BP needed to minimize the number of "dry holes" it drilled. The historical success rate for drilling a new well was roughly 1 out of 8. BP's rate was much better: 1 out of 5. To cut exploration costs from $5 to $1 per barrel, though, it would have to go from "good" performance to unprecedented performance. (Some said *impossible* performance.)

Researchers at BP began to investigate past explorations. One thing they studied was whether explorers were good at predicting the success of their wells. They reviewed wells that had been drilled over a 10-year period and found that, on average, explorers' predictions were extraordinarily accurate. Their average prediction was that a well had a 20 percent chance of hitting, and on average, 20 percent of wells actually hit.

But the averages concealed some fascinating biases. For instance, when the explorers gave the well a 20 to 70 percent probability of hitting, their predictions were pretty accurate. But when the explorers predicted a greater than 75 percent chance of success, the wells hit nearly all the time. Also, wells that had been given a 10 percent chance of success actually had more like a 1 percent chance. So the explorers' instincts about the wells were

correct—they knew the good ones from the bad ones. But there was information, especially for high- and low-probability wells, that they weren't using.

Traditionally, the explorers had been salesmen for their wells, pressing top management for the green light to drill. In the 1980s, they had learned that the way to sell management was to use the tools of risk economics—in particular, the concept of *expected value.*

Expected-value calculations are bulletproof in situations where the risks and returns are well understood. If I flip a coin, you can feel confident that you have a 50 percent probability of winning. But what are the odds of hitting a gusher? And if you hit one, what's the payoff? Those are subjective estimates. When you feed subjective estimates into an expected-value calculation, a precise number pops out, giving the illusion of scientific certainty. ("Our expected value for this well is $112.8 million. It's a no-brainer—let's drill it.")

It didn't go unnoticed among explorers that if they really wanted to drill a well, they could simply tinker around with the math in a spreadsheet. If they jacked up the hit rate or the payoff, the expected value obediently inflated. (This tinkering probably wasn't malicious or even *conscious.* Remember, when the Elephant really wants something, the Rider can be trusted to find rationalizations for it.)

More subtly, the use of expected value made people think about drilling as a numbers game. As Jim Farnsworth, a top leader in BP's exploration unit, said, "Explorers think in terms of risk probabilities. People get so caught up in the numbers that they think, 'Well, if we drill ten of these 1-in-10 wells, we'll hit at least one of them and we'll all make a lot of money. But when you do the analysis, you realize that something that is 1 in 10 *never* works, so it's a false sense of statistical clarity."

The odds-playing gave everyone a false sense of comfort. *Hey, if we drill some dry holes, one of the other holes will hit and make up for it.* Explorers were like venture capitalists, hoping for an eBay or a Google to bail them out of an otherwise lousy portfolio.

If you were an executive at BP, hoping to cut your exploration costs by 80 percent, your first mission would be to remove this false sense of comfort. The ambiguity in the goal is allowing rationalization to creep in. So how could you change your team's behavior so that every single drilling operation is taken seriously? How could you leave your team's Riders with nowhere to hide?

Consider the alternatives for your new strategic rallying cry: "We'll double our strikes!" "No more dumb holes!" "Let's maximize expected value!" Some of them sound promising, but notice the fudge room in all of them. "No more dumb holes" would be easy for any competent Rider to dodge. Would any self-respecting explorer think he was drilling a *dumb* hole? "Doubling strikes" is better, but there's still room to rationalize a lot of dry holes. And as for "maximize expected value," well, let's just move on.

Ian Vann, BP's head of exploration at the time, figured out a way to eliminate the fudge room. He announced his new vision: "No dry holes."

None.

Explorers were irate. They thought the goal was preposterous. Their leaders were asking the impossible. Dry holes had always been a normal and acceptable part of doing business. Remember, the number of dry holes outnumbered successes by a factor of 4. Now Vann was defining them as failure.

"No dry holes" was a painful B&W goal. Probabilistic predictions had always provided a cover for failure. As Jim Farnsworth said, "We wanted to get away from the language of probability, from people hiding behind a notion that if a 1-in-5 well didn't work, 'I told you it was 1 in 5 so I was right.' 'No dry

holes' was an attempt to make people go to the absolute extreme limit, to make sure they'd looked at every piece of data and done the right analysis."

As explorers began talking about "No dry holes," they started taking off their explorer hats and putting on their geologist hats. Lots of things had to go right to create a productive oil field, and geologists had previously devised different tests to evaluate every geologic feature: Was the right carbon-rich substrate available to form oil? Was there a harder, impermeable base layer underneath the oil to capture and contain it if it formed? Even if the oil had formed at some point in geologic history, could subsequent underground pressures or temperatures have degraded the oil?

The idea of eliminating dry holes prompted geologists to become more systematic about mapping and aggregating the information they had. They color-coded maps—green for aspects that might support an oil field, amber for areas where information was missing, and red for clear counter indications. Then they overlaid the color-coded maps on top of one another, each layer representing a different geologic test. They decided to drill only in regions that were green on every conceivable dimension.

"No dry holes" was effective in stamping out two kinds of rationalizations for poorly conceived drilling operations. One was "learning"—the convenient notion that even if a particular well doesn't hit, the team will learn so much from the process that future operations will be more successful. Vann said, "I can give you a hundred examples where people made a mistake because they didn't use knowledge they already had, for every one example where we learn something that is valuable for next time." The other common rationalization was that certain wells had "strategic value." Callagher said, "The last defense of the charlatan is always that something is 'strategic.' 'This is a strategic well, so we

have to drill it.'" "No dry holes" removed the fudge room. A well might be strategic, or it might not be, but either way, it better not be dry.

David Bamford, BP's chief geophysicist during much of this period, said, "I can think of several examples of where technical teams knew a proposed well would be dry and yet senior management wanted to drill it because of pressure from government or business partners." Previously it was hard for frontline people to object to these decisions. When your manager is the only one who knows what the "partner pressure" consists of, how can you possibly raise a credible objection?

The "No dry holes" goal boosted the confidence of the frontline employees. The Exploration Forum—the peer group accountable for exploration decisions—became more outspoken and pushed back on "strategic reasons" to engage in low-probability explorations. After all, the strategy was "No dry holes," not "No dry holes unless drilling helps to placate an important partner." The strategy had changed in a way that gave lower-level employees an equally credible voice in the decision.

The B&W goal worked exactly as the management team had intended. When BP left nowhere for people to hide, its people stopped trying to hide. They tightened up their analyses, and they made fewer "play-the-odds" decisions. They got serious about using every available scrap of data in their decisions. And they toughened up their resistance to governmental and partner pressure.

By 2000, BP's hit rate was an industry-leading xGn 3. That's *triple* the success rate of 1989. BP was still hitting dry holes, but the goal had stirred improvements that many had considered impossible. BP transformed itself when it eliminated its own wiggle room. *When we drill a hole, it better not be dry.*

Note that the leaders at BP didn't say, "Two out of three—

that's close enough. Let's celebrate!" Every dry hole was a failure, and there was no dodging it. Because they couldn't easily excuse failure—*It was strategic! It was a learning opportunity!*—they were left with only one choice: Drill smarter next time.

6.

If you worry about the potential for inaction on your team, or if you worry that silent resistance may slow or sabotage your change initiative, B&W goals may be the solution. But, to be clear, you won't always need a goal that's so unyielding. Crystal Jones's call to become a third grader was not a B&W goal. Let's face it, if kids got third-grade-level scores on math and science but not on vocabulary, we'd all let them "graduate." Laura Esserman's vision for the Breast Care Center wasn't B&W, and it didn't need to be.

What is essential, though, is to marry your long-term goal with short-term critical moves. Esserman's vision was compelling, but it would have been empty talk without lots of behavior-level execution.

You have to back up your destination postcard with a good behavioral script. That's a recipe for success. What you *don't* need to do is anticipate every turn in the road between today and the destination. It's not that plotting the whole journey is undesirable; it's that it's impossible. To think that you can plot a turn-by-turn map to the end, like a leader's version of Mapquest, is almost certainly hubris.

When you're at the beginning, don't obsess about the middle, because the middle is going to look different once you get there. Just look for a strong beginning and a strong ending and get moving.

7.

The average investor might make stock-picking decisions by listening to Jim Cramer or reading news reports or compulsively watching CNBC. But big institutional investors, such as philanthropic foundations or teachers' retirement funds, get special attention from Wall Street. Historically, investment banks sponsored research departments as a free service to institutional investors. The exchange was clear: The bank hoped that if it made good recommendations, then the investors would use the bank's traders to buy and sell stocks, bringing in revenue for the bank.

Because research is, in essence, a lure for big investment dollars, it is taken very seriously on Wall Street. Every year, *Institutional Investor* magazine asks big investors to assess the research they've received. Based on those responses, the magazine ranks the research analysts in each industry and also provides an overall ranking for the research departments on Wall Street. These *Institutional Investor* rankings are treated like holy writ. They drive (huge) bonuses to individual analysts, and they attract customers to the banks with the best research departments.

In 1986, Shearson Lehman's research department ranked a humiliating fifteenth. Top executives at Shearson wanted a new leader, so they recruited Jack Rivkin, who had built Paine Webber's research department into a powerhouse. The execs' expectations for Rivkin were clear: Get us into the Top 5.

Rivkin's first impressions of the department were not promising. "When I got to Lehman, the research department was a mess. It got no respect." One of Shearson's top analysts, Elaine Garzarelli, said, "The department wasn't disciplined. . . . People did whatever they wanted to do. They didn't have to talk at regular meetings; they didn't have to submit reports at certain times. Absolutely no mention was ever made of the *Institutional Investor* All-America team."

Rivkin made many formal changes to the department: He hired a number two, Fred Fraenkel. He successfully petitioned Shearson for a much larger staff and budget. He fired deadwood on the team. He changed the compensation system for the team.

These changes were vital, but ultimately, Rivkin had to influence the day-to-day behavior of the analysts on his team. As an analogy, consider a general manager (GM) running a baseball team. If you have more money at your disposal, you can sign more talented players. You can trade underperformers. You can offer your team a bonus for making the playoffs. These changes are important, but they don't directly influence the way players play. To do that, you need a coach.

Rivkin was both GM and coach. As a coach, he knew he needed members of his team to improve their work dramatically, and that meant he needed to script some of their early moves. He started by announcing that he expected analysts to initiate at least 125 client conversations per month. He required them to take notes on their conversations and post them to the internal network. Both the quantity and the quality of analysts' contacts became a matter of public record. One newly hired analyst said, "Once the report card on analyst contacts was electronically pinned up on a board, all the analysts began trying to get to the front section of the rankings; no one wanted to be near the end. . . . The analysts started asking one another: 'How do you make so many calls? Where do you find the time?' "

The 125-call benchmark jolted the department, snapped it out of its lackadaisical attitude. Most of the analysts began working 12 to 15 hours per day, nearly every day of the year. (Note the clarity of the instructions—this is Rivkin's 1h, milk campaign.)

Rivkin also sought to build a team mentality in the department, fighting against the traditional culture of self-interested

cowboys. He demanded that, when analysts were making presentations to clients, they cite their colleagues' work at least twice. "I don't want to hear 'I—I—I' in the presentation. I want to hear 'we,' and I want to hear other people's names." The forced (at first) sharing of ideas and credit made the team as a whole better, but it also benefited the individual analysts by exposing them to information they otherwise wouldn't have encountered.

Rivkin didn't just script the critical moves—*Make 125 calls, and cite your colleagues' work*—he also pointed to the destination: *We're going to crack the* I.I. *(*Institutional Investor*) Top 5.* That was something everyone in his department understood and aspired to.

In fact, there was a joke that circulated in the department: "*I.I.* or Die." But the aspiration was serious. Within eighteen months of the turnaround, a full 95 percent of one group of newly minted analysts broke onto the individual *I.I.* analyst rankings for their industry. Customers were noticing the extra attention they got from Shearson analysts, and for the first time, Shearson analysts were top-of-mind when *Institutional Investor* magazine called investors to ask who they relied on most.

The direction set by Rivkin prepared the department for a contrarian bet that left the department alone on Wall Street. It was a bet that would cement Shearson's place in the *I.I.* rankings.

In 1988, a Shearson analyst began investigating a drug called Epogen, made by Amgen and distributed by Johnson & Johnson. Epogen is a synthetic version of a hormone called erythropoietin, which increases the body's production of red blood cells. Red blood cells are responsible for ferrying oxygen to all the cells of the body. Epogen would give them a boost, making the drug the perfect treatment for various types of serious anemia—for

example, in patients whose blood cells were damaged by chemotherapy. At the time, the drug was winding its way through the drug approval process. With its release imminent, stock investors began to make their bets on how the drug would sell, which would in turn drive Amgen's stock price.

Other research departments had identified one major market for the drug, but Shearson analysts thought there might be others. Surely, they reasoned, there'd be other uses for a drug that increased red blood cell production. So they dived into the research process. Fred Fraenkel said, "Every analyst and every assistant made calls. They called about 100 hospitals and pharmacies around the world, estimating the market potential for the drug. Once they had the data together, they knew Amgen had a multibillion-dollar drug on its hands. No research department could have possibly made this estimation with just one analyst and an assistant."

Shearson's analysts defied the conventional wisdom by predicting that Amgen had a blockbuster on its hands. Shearson's team was so confident, in fact, that it published ads touting its findings in the *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*.

They were right. Epogen became Amgen's first blockbuster drug and, at that time, was the most successful drug of the whole biotech industry. In 1990, Shearson was ranked at the top of the *Institutional Investor* All-America Research Team. In just three years, Shearson had leapfrogged from fifteenth to first.

The call on Amgen was something that Rivkin never could have anticipated, and it would have been pointless to try. He focused on what he could control: He provided a destination postcard ("*I.I.* or Die"), and he scripted some moves that would give his people a head start. He had the beginning right and the ending right, and when the Amgen situation popped up in the middle, the team was ready.

8.

So far we've learned a great deal about the Rider and his many strengths and weaknesses. On the plus side of the ledger, the Rider is a visionary. He's willing to make short-term sacrifices for long-term payoffs (which is why he fights so often with the Elephant, who generally prefers immediate gratification). He's a clever tactician, too—give him a map and he'll follow it perfectly. But we've also seen plenty of evidence of the Rider's flaws—his limited reserves of strength, his paralysis in the face of ambiguity and choice, and his relentless focus on problems rather than solutions.

Here's the good news: The Rider's strengths are substantial, and his flaws can be mitigated. When you appeal to the Rider inside yourself or inside others you are trying to influence, your game plan should be simple.

First, *follow the bright spots.* Think of the Vietnamese children who stayed well nourished against the odds, or the Genentech sales reps who racked up sales against the odds. As you analyze your situation, you're sure to find some things that are working better than others. Don't obsess about the failures. Instead, investigate and clone the successes.

Next, *give direction to the Rider*—both a start and a finish. Send him a destination postcard ("You'll be a third grader soon!"), and script his critical moves ("Buy Ih, milk").

When you do these things, you'll prepare the Rider to lead a switch. And you'll arm him for the ongoing struggles with his reluctant and formidable partner, the Elephant.

MOTIVATE
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ELEPHANT

5

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I see all these great ads, but when I come to the store, you've got the same boring stuff as Wal-Mart.

The beginning and end points of the Target tale are pretty well known. But we suspect you don't know much about the middle, and that's a shame, because what happened in the middle was *the change*. It didn't happen in the boardroom. It happened because of people like Robyn Waters.

Waters had no intention of working for Target. She was a self-described fashion snob, and she'd vowed not to come back to Minnesota, where she was raised, and where winter takes over much of fall and spring. She certainly had no intention of working for a *discounter*. She had an enviable job at the posh Jordan Marsh department store and was living in high style: "I was going to Italy and attending meetings with Armani and Versace and rubbing shoulders with all the fashionistas, and that was really cool when you're in your mid-thirties. But then one day we all got laid off. So that's how I came to be open-minded."

She joined Target in 1992 as the "ready-to-wear" trend manager, which made her responsible for black stirrup pants, sweats, and Looney Tunes T-shirts. She'd wondered how she'd managed to slip from Versace to Tweety Bird.

The company was at an important inflection point when she joined. Bob Ulrich had just retired as CEO, and he'd become chairman of the board. He had a very clear vision of Target as an "upscale discounter" that would differentiate itself through design. He dreamed that Target's bull's-eye would become a "lovemark," as respected and well loved as Coca-Cola or the Beatles or Lego. He wanted the bull's-eye to be as ubiquitous as McDonald's golden arches.

At the time, though, Target was a long way from realizing that vision. The merchants at Target—the people who select the merchandise that will show up for sale in various departments—had traditionally been copycats. Waters said the mindset among the clothing merchants had been to "find the best seller this year, take

it to Asia, knock it off, and sell it next year at half the price." For Target to become a design powerhouse, the company had to stop lagging the trends and start riding the trends. That was Waters's mandate in the trend department.

The problem was that Waters had almost no power to advance this "trend-right" vision. The merchants didn't have to deal with her. "I had to win them over. I could never mandate, 'We have to have purple this year because that's the trend,'" she recalled.

Waters slowly built up believers. An early convert was the merchant responsible for turtlenecks. She was fed up with using the same tired patterns each year—you know, the cutesy snowflake-and-reindeer prints used by every discount retailer. So, at Waters's urging, she hired a designer to create some fresh patterns, and as they both predicted, sales improved dramatically.

These early-adopter experiments gave Waters much-needed success stories. Since Target had an analytical, numbers-driven culture, publicizing the early results was critical. Waters could point to "heroes" in the organization who'd taken a risk and succeeded. ("Check out what the turtleneck merchant did.")

For a time in retail, trendy clothing was neutral in color. Everything was gray, white, khaki, tan, or black. Then, one season, color exploded at the fabric shows and in the retailers in London and Paris. It wasn't an obscure trend; it was a big wave. So, as the design champion at Target, Waters needed to get her merchants excited about color. But the merchants, being numbers driven, would review the past few years' sales and see that color hadn't sold. (In this situation, a Rider appeal couldn't possibly succeed because the data contradicted Waters's position.)

Waters had to get creative. She went to the candy store at FAO Schwarz, where you could buy M&Ms in whatever color you wanted, and brought huge bags full of bright-colored M&Ms

to her internal meetings. She poured the candy into a glass bowl, creating cascades of turquoise and hot pink and lime green. "People would go 'Wow,' and I'd say, 'See, look at your reaction to color.'"

She brought in samples of Apple's recently released iMac computers—in lime, strawberry, grape, and tangerine—which had been a sensation. For the first time, consumers were choosing the color of their computers with the same seriousness they used to choose the color of their cars. And she constantly brought in photographs from boutiques around the world. She'd show a merchant the photo of a polo assortment and say, "See how they have three neutrals, and a mild yellow, and then they add the bright blue for a pop." Then she'd create a mock-up display with actual clothing samples so the merchants could see for themselves, *Yup, that blue color pops.* And, soon after, that blue polo shirt would show up on the floor of Target, for one clothing line, for one season.

This is how organizational change happens.

When Waters talks about this period, she is emphatic that she's not the "hero" of the Target story. She says she was one person among many who managed to transform the company. However you assess her contribution, the remarkable thing is that her successes came despite a lack of authority and resources. Waters said, "I had no head count at the time. I was always borrowing people, and my budgets never balanced. But I kept getting support from merchants who would say, 'Oh, I've got an extra head count over here. And you can hire this designer, but she's only going to work on our stuff.' And in the next division they'd say, 'Wow, I want one, too.'"

Not only did Waters lack control over the merchants, she didn't even speak their language. Indeed, the biggest mystery of Waters's success might well be this: In the analytical culture of

Target, where numbers were the lingua franca, why did a bunch of demonstrations seem to make the difference?

2.

In *The Heart of Change,* John Kotter and Dan Cohen report on a study they conducted with the help of a team at Deloitte Consulting. The project team interviewed over 400 people across more than 130 companies in the United States, Europe, Australia, and South Africa, in hopes of understanding why change happens in large organizations. Summarizing the data, Kotter and Cohen said that in most change situations, managers initially focus on strategy, structure, culture, or systems, which leads them to miss the most important issue:

> . . . the core of the matter is always about changing the behavior of people, and behavior change happens in highly successful situations mostly by speaking to people's feelings. This is true even in organizations that are very focused on analysis and quantitative measurement, even among people who think of themselves as smart in an MBA sense. In highly successful change efforts, people find ways to help others see the problems or solutions in ways that influence emotions, not just thought.

In other words, when change works, it's because leaders are speaking to the Elephant as well as to the Rider.

Most of us, in Robyn Waters's shoes, would create a "business case" for the power of design. We'd compile a PowerPoint presentation with charts and graphs and strategically selected quotes from the chairman who'd embraced the design-forward vision.

When we finished our presentation, everyone in the room would understand what we meant. They might even agree! But would they change their behavior? Kotter's research suggests no.

Kotter and Cohen say that most people think change happens in this order: ANALYZE-THINK-CHANGE. You analyze, then you think, and then you change. In a normal environment, that might work pretty well. If you need to reduce duplication costs in your print shop by 6 percent, or if you need to shave off 5 minutes from your daily commute, then that process will serve you well. Kotter and Cohen note that analytical tools work best when "parameters are known, assumptions are minimal, and the future is not fuzzy."

But big change situations don't look like that. In most change situations, the parameters aren't well understood, and the future is fuzzy. Because of the uncertainty that change brings, the Elephant is reluctant to move, and analytical arguments will not overcome that reluctance. (If someone is unsure about whether to marry her significant other, you're not going to tip her by talking up tax advantages and rent savings.)

Kotter and Cohen observed that, in almost all successful change efforts, the sequence of change is not ANALYZE-THINK-CHANGE, but rather SEE-FEEL-CHANGE. You're presented with evidence that makes you feel something. It might be a disturbing look at the problem, or a hopeful glimpse of the solution, or a sobering reflection of your current habits, but regardless, it's something that hits you at the emotional level. It's something that speaks to the Elephant.

In staging demos for her colleagues at Target, Robyn Waters was honoring the SEE-FEEL-CHANGE philosophy. She set up displays that let the merchants see what was possible: *See how that blue polo shirt pops? See how it catches your attention and draws your attention?* She brought in iMacs and M&Ms and let people

ooh and aah over them—"See, look at your reaction to color." *(And, by the way, wouldn't it be nice to be part of the same movement as Steve Jobs and Apple?)*

Waters thought carefully about what her colleagues would *see* because she knew what she wanted them to *feel*: energized, hopeful, creative, competitive. They took the bait.

Let's remember, too, the story about Jon Stegner from Chapter I-,the man who created the Glove Shrine. He knew his colleagues weren't enthused about his idea for centralized purchasing, so he didn't bother talking about the numbers. Instead, he showed them something that made them feel something. *(We really buy all these different kinds of gloves?)* SEE-FEEL-CHANGE.

Trying to fight inertia and indifference with analytical arguments is like tossing a fire extinguisher to someone who's drowning. The solution doesn't match the problem.

It can sometimes be challenging, though, to distinguish why people don't support your change. Is it because they don't understand or because they're not enthused? Do you need an Elephant appeal or a Rider appeal? The answer isn't always obvious, even to experts.

3.

Pam Omidyar, the founder of HopeLab, knew the struggles of teenagers with cancer. They endured weeks of brutal chemotherapy in the hospital and went home a mess—sapped of energy, their hair falling out, their throats raw and tender, their immune system wrecked. But when they finally walked out of the hospital to return home, there was one silver lining: The worst was likely over. Going forward, their obligations would be relatively simple: They'd need to immediately report any symptoms they developed, such as a fever, and take their medicine faithfully,

which might include a regimen of antibiotics and low-dosage chemotherapy pills for two years.

But many teens simply failed to comply, partly because following the medication regimen wasn't easy. The side effects of chemotherapy, even at low doses, were rough—nausea, skin breakouts, tiredness, irritability. The side effects of the home regimen, though, were nothing compared to the horror of intensive chemotherapy, and by missing their doses, kids were risking a recurrence of their cancer. Steve Cole, the research director for HopeLab, says, "If you skip 20 percent of your doses, you don't just have a 20 percent higher chance of getting cancer again. Your odds go up 200 percent."

How could teens take such a terrible risk? Omidyar was convinced that teens simply weren't getting the message. She sought a new way of influencing their behavior—something unconventional, something that spoke in their language. Her inspiration: We'll make a video game.

After months of effort, HopeLab developed a game called Re-Mission. In the game, teens became Roxxi, a silver-suited nanobot who charged through the bloodstream zapping tumor cells with electric-green chemo-rays. In between rounds of gameplay, teens watched short "briefing" videos featuring Smitty, a mentor robot, who provided additional information about chemotherapy and recovery.

Re-Mission featured twenty levels of play, each lasting an hour and packed with information. The team at HopeLab was convinced that if it could get kids to play the whole game, any misunderstandings that could lead to noncompliance would be wiped out.

Eventually the team launched the first clinical trial for Re-Mission. In 2008, the results were announced in the medical journal *Pediatrics*. To the team's delight, the game had increased

kids' adherence to their medication plans. The amount of chemotherapy drugs circulating in the blood of kids who played the game went up by -.o percent. That may not sound like much, but small differences in adherence make a big difference in health. The odds of surviving cancer double if you can bump up chemotherapy adherence by -.o percent.

But there was a surprise buried in the evidence of success. A lot of the kids didn't actually play the game all that much, attempting only one or two levels instead of the twenty that had been designed into the game. Yet even those early quitters ended up taking their medications more regularly. In fact, the teens who played only two levels were changing their behavior as much as the kids who played all twenty.

At first glance, that finding seemed as absurd as if you'd discovered that students got comparable scores on their algebra finals whether they took only one week of classes or a whole semester. Research director Cole acknowledged, "Clearly, in one or two levels we're not teaching them a whole lot, since the bulk of that time is spent flying around the body blowing things up." Why had the underutilized game been so effective at changing the kids' behavior?

Cole started asking around, trying to understand the puzzling result. One of his friends, a marketing professor at Stanford, said, "Think about this from a marketing perspective. We can change behavior in a short television ad. We don't do it with information. We do it with identity: 'If I buy a BMW, I'm going to be this kind of person. If I take that kind of vacation, I'm that kind of eco-friendly person.'"

And it dawned on Cole: When teens didn't comply with their drug regimen, the problem wasn't knowledge, it was emotion. He said, "It boils down to an identity thing. After you have gone through intensive chemo, you've had your life stolen from you

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to act. But when it comes time to change the behavior of other people, our first instinct is to teach them something. *Smoking is really unhealthy! Your chemotherapy medicine is really important!* We speak to the Rider when we should be speaking to the Elephant.

This realization—that we can make an impeccably rational case for change and people still won't change—is pretty frustrating. Why did Robyn Waters need to go through all the trouble of staging demos for her colleagues at Target? Shouldn't the logic of design innovation have been compelling enough on its own?

Why can't we simply think our way into new behavior? The answer is that, in some cases, we really can't trust our own thinking.

5.

As you watch, a stranger walks into a room and sits down behind a table. He picks up a piece of paper and reads aloud a generic-sounding weather report: "Tomorrow, we'll see highs in the upper 80s with an overnight low of 53. . . ." He completes his "report" in about 90 seconds and walks out of the room.

Next, you're asked to guess his IQ.

You're part of a psychology experiment, and you object to the absurdity of the request. *I don't know anything about that guy. He just came into a room and read a report. It wasn't even* his *report—you gave it to him to read! How am I supposed to know his IQ!?*

Reluctantly, you make a wild guess. Separately, Fake Weatherman is asked to guess his own IQ. Who made a better guess?

Amazingly, you did, even though you know nothing about Fake Weatherman. Two psychologists, Peter Borkenau and Anette Liebler, from Universität Bielefeld in Germany, conducted this experiment, and they found that the strangers' IQ predictions

were better than the predictions of those whose IQ was being predicted—about 66 percent more accurate.

To be clear, it's not so much that you're a brilliant predictor; it's that he's a lousy self-evaluator. We're all lousy self-evaluators. College students do a superior job predicting the longevity of their *roommates'* romantic relationships than their own.

Savor, for a moment, the preposterousness of these findings. Fake Weatherman has all the information, and you've got none. He's got decades of data—years' worth of grades, college entrance exam scores, job evaluations, and more. Fake Weatherman should be the world's foremost expert on Fake Weatherman!

If self-evaluation hinged on information alone, the findings of these studies would have been impossible. It'd be like discovering that you could beat randomly selected mothers on a trivia question about how many kids they have.

But self-evaluation involves *interpretation,* and that's where the Elephant intrudes. The Elephant tends to take the rosiest possible interpretation of the facts. ("My 2.1 GPA is a sign of my intelligence—it shows that my intellect simply isn't being challenged enough to keep me engaged.")

We've all heard the studies showing that the vast majority of us consider ourselves above-average drivers. In the psychology literature, this belief is known as a *positive illusion.* Our brains are positive illusion factories: Only 2 percent of high school seniors believe their leadership skills are below average. A full 25 percent of people believe they're in the top 1 percent in their ability to get along with others. Ninety-four percent of college professors report doing above-average work. People think they're at lower risk than their peers for heart attacks, cancer, and even food-related illnesses such as salmonella. Most deliciously self-deceptive of all, people say they are more likely than their peers to provide accurate self-assessments.

Positive illusions pose an enormous problem with regard to change. Before people can change, before they can move in a new direction, they've got to have their bearings. But positive illusions make it hard for us to orient ourselves—to get a clear picture of where we are and how we're doing. How can we dispel people's positive illusions without raining down negativity on them?

6.

One way of cutting through positive illusions is suggested by an example from Massachusetts in a state agency called the Department of Youth Services. DYS dealt with delinquent kids—it was both a corrections agency and a social service organization. In the late 1970s, Massachusetts led a pioneering effort to overhaul its juvenile justice system, scaling back its youth prisons in favor of a network of nonprofits—halfway houses, group homes, outpatient counseling centers, job centers, and more. The goal of these nonprofits was to rehabilitate young offenders and keep them in their home communities.

As Massachusetts embraced this network model, DYS had to change substantially. The agency started working primarily through vendors—such as halfway houses and counseling centers—rather than delivering services to kids directly. As a result, agency staffers had to adapt the way they worked, and most of them handled the transition well.

Except for the accounting department.

The head of accounting was an authoritarian manager who ruled his department with an iron fist. He was known as a yeller; some colleagues called him Attila the Accountant. Attila was meticulous about following the rules, to a fault. If you submitted an expense report to his team and left off a single detail—a date, a subtotal—the accountants would bounce the report right back

at you rather than simply filling in the detail themselves. Because of this perceived pettiness, Attila was "pretty much hated throughout the organization," recalled Sim Sitkin, who at that time was the director of planning and research for DYS. Attila's accounting group saw itself more as a watchdog than as an internal service provider.

When DYS shifted to the network model, the focus of the accounting department shifted, too. Now it was outside vendors who were submitting the reimbursement requests, not employees. And we can say one thing for Attila: He was consistent. He treated the new vendors with the same dictatorial style that he had used with his in-house colleagues. If vendors submitted reports that weren't perfect, he rejected them. This created big problems, though. As Sitkin said, "These nonprofits didn't have a lot of slack. They were living on a shoestring, and so delays in payments really jeopardized their ability to serve kids."

Sitkin and Gail Anne Healy, the deputy commissioner of DYS, began to field desperate calls from these nonprofits. In some cases, they couldn't make payroll unless Attila cut their checks quickly. Sitkin and Healy tried to reason with Attila; they tried to explain why it was important to cut the vendors some slack. But, as we've seen repeatedly, the knowledge wasn't enough to trigger a change. Attila stayed Attila.

Frustrated, Sitkin and Healy asked Attila to join them on a road trip. The three of them drove out to visit several of DYS's key service providers. Often, these providers were operating from old houses in run-down neighborhoods. Their offices looked dilapidated and chaotic. And in the midst of this environment, the staffers were earnestly trying to work small miracles. "The typical staffer," said Sitkin, "was like a combination of a beat cop and a social worker. Sometimes they struck you as people who might have once been in the same position as the kids they were trying

to reach. They were working hard and obviously not making a lot of money."

During the visits, Attila saw firsthand how busy they were and how distracting the workplace was. They didn't have closed-door offices as he did. It was noisy, thanks to the kids who were living in the homes—they were constantly coming and going, or cooking meals, or just hanging around and talking. Social workers were rushing around, trying to keep tabs on the kids, and shuttling them to doctors' offices or job interviews.

Attila saw and felt the precarious financial situation of these nonprofits. They were hanging by a thread. When he held up one of their checks, it meant that they couldn't pay for something. They might have to delay payroll, or skimp on food, or postpone a doctor's visit for a kid who needed it. For the first time, Attila got a gut-check about the harm he was causing with his nitpicking. He came back to the office a transformed man.

Mind you, he was still Attila. He was still authoritarian, and he still yelled. But he changed what he was yelling about. "Before, he'd yell at his staff, 'Why did you give me this form when it's got something missing?!' " said Sitkin. "Afterwards, he switched to, 'Don't you realize what happens when we don't get this check out on time?! People have to make payroll!' "

Attila's transformation represented a victory over positive illusions. Before the field trip, if Attila had been asked to assess his performance as an accountant, he almost certainly would have put himself in the top -1-percent. In his mind, accounting was about paying attention to details, maintaining rigorous standards, and resisting political pressure.

He would have been right to score himself highly on those measures—but also self-serving. One reason we're able to believe that we're better-than-average leaders and drivers and spouses and team players is that we're defining those terms in ways that flatter

us. *(I am really a good team player. I constantly give my coworkers useful tips on how to improve themselves!)* The ambiguity in terms like "leader" or "team player" enables our illusions—that's why it's so much harder for us to fancy ourselves better-than-average pole vaulters.

The ambiguity in being a "good accountant" dissolved when Attila met the social service workers. When he saw how hard they were working, and the raucous conditions they were working in, he couldn't help but empathize with them, and that feeling of empathy gave the lie to his positive illusions. *I thought being a good accountant was about rigor, but now I see that it's also about service.* Having been forced to experience the inadequacy of his old approach, he became a zealot for the new one: *Team, you better get those paychecks out ASAP—people are waiting on us!*

That may not be a heartwarming tale, but it's a big switch. Attila the Accountant was a hard case. Healy and Sitkin managed to break through his prickly exterior and make him feel something. And once he felt something, he changed. That outcome should give all of us hope that we can reach the Attilas in our own life (Attila the Dad, Attila the Boss, or Attila the Teenager).

7.

It's emotion that motivates the Elephant. In fighting for change, we've got to find the feeling. But *which* feeling? Anger, hope, dismay, enthusiasm, fear, happiness, surprise?

HopeLab built a video game for teenagers with cancer that gave them a feeling of control and power. Jon Stegner's Glove Shrine shocked the execs and gave them a determination to fix the matter. The Microsoft usability lab made developers feel empathy for their customers. Will connecting with any old feeling do?

We often hear that people change only when a crisis compels

them to, which implies that we need to create a sense of fear or anxiety or doom. Two professors at Harvard Business School, writing about organizational change, say that change is hard because people are reluctant to alter habits that have been successful in the past. "In the absence of a dire threat, employees will keep doing what they've always done." As a result, the professors emphasize the importance of crisis: "Turnaround leaders must convince people that the organization is truly on its deathbed—or, at the very least, that radical changes are required if the organization is to survive and thrive." In other words, if necessary, we need to *create* a crisis to convince people they're facing a catastrophe and have no choice but to move.

Similar beliefs about the importance of crisis once prevailed among therapists, most of whom believed that alcoholics or drug addicts couldn't be helped until they hit rock bottom. Back in the 1980s, at a professional conference, the therapist Ruth Maxwell gave a presentation suggesting to fellow therapists that the now-familiar technique of family "intervention" could be used to convince addicts to enter a treatment program even if they hadn't yet hit rock bottom. In her book *Breakthrough,* Maxwell wrote she was "nearly booed out of the room. . . . Coming from backgrounds deeply steeped in traditional psychiatric wisdom, they firmly believe that people cannot be treated unless they are motivated for treatment." And being "motivated" required a rock-bottom crisis.

Speaking of the perceived need for crisis, let's talk about the "burning platform," a familiar phrase in the organizational change literature. It refers to a horrific accident that happened in 1988 on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North Sea. A gas leak triggered an explosion that ripped the rig in two. As a reporter wrote, "Those who survived had a nightmarish choice: to jump as far as 150 ft. down into a fiery sea or face certain death on the

disintegrating rig." Andy Mochan, a superintendent on the rig, said, "It was fry or jump, so I jumped." He was eventually saved by a rescue mission involving NATO and the Royal Air Force.

Out of this human tragedy has emerged a rather ridiculous business cliché. When executives talk about the need for a "burning platform," they mean, basically, that they need a way to scare their employees into changing. To create a burning platform is to paint such a gloomy picture of the current state of things that employees can't help but jump into the fiery sea. (And by "jump into the fiery sea," what we mean is that they change their organizational practices. Which suggests that this use of "burning platform" might well be the dictionary definition of *hyperbole.*)

In short, the "burning platform" is a great, uplifting tale for your people: "Team, let's choose a dangerous plunge into the ocean over getting burned to death! Now get back to work!"

Leaving aside the silliness of the burning-platform metaphor, fear can indeed be a powerful motivator. Think of LBJ's famous "Daisy" campaign ad in 1964, in which a young girl holds a flower while a mushroom cloud rises behind her. If you vote for Goldwater, the ad suggested, you might as well nuke your child. Or consider the sleazy real-estate-sales boss in *Glengarry Glen Ross,* David Mamet's Pulitzer Prize–winning play: "First prize is a Cadillac Eldorado. . . . Second price is a set of steak knives. Third prize is you're fired."

Health educators, too, have gotten in on the act. Remember the ads showing photos of smokers' black, gnarled lungs, or the famous "This is your brain on drugs" commercial, which analogized drug users' brains to frying eggs (those visuals, in turn, made pot smokers very hungry).

There's no question that negative emotions are motivating. No one wants to see a kid nuked. But what, exactly, are these emotions motivating?

"If you have a stone in your shoe, it hurts and you'll fix the problem," said Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania. In a sense, removing the stone from your shoe is what negative emotions are designed to do—to motivate specific actions. When you're angry, your eyes narrow and your fists clinch and you get ready for a confrontation. When you're disgusted, your nose wrinkles and you avoid whatever has grossed you out. When you're afraid, your eyes grow wide and your body tenses up and prepares to flee. On a daily basis, then, negative emotions help us avoid risks and confront problems.

Bottom line: If you need quick and specific action, then negative emotions might help. But most of the time when change is needed, it's not a stone-in-the-shoe situation. The quest to reduce greenhouse gases is not a stone-in-the-shoe situation, and neither is Target's mission to become the "upscale retailer," or someone's desire to improve his or her marriage. These situations require creativity and flexibility and ingenuity. And, unfortunately, a burning platform won't get you that.

So what will?

8.

In 1998, after psychologists had spent decades studying negative emotions, the psychologist Barbara Fredrickson wrote a provocative paper called "What Good Are Positive Emotions?" The paper became a classic. It eventually would be cited over a hundred times more often than a typical psychology paper, and it helped to fuel the rise of the discipline of positive psychology, which has yielded many popular books on happiness over the past few years.

As Fredrickson suggested in her title, positive emotions are a bit of a puzzle. Unlike negative emotions, they don't seem engineered to produce particular actions, such as punching or

fleeing or avoiding. They don't even have their own signature facial expressions. In fact, the emotions of joy, contentment, pride, love, and interest all tend to produce the same generic "I'm pleased" expression, which is known as the *Duchenne smile* (lips curled up at the corners along with a crinkling in the muscles around the eyes—or the way your spouse looks when you ask, "Have you lost weight?"). Most of our positive emotions are funneled through this same Duchenne mask, like a symphony pumped through a tuba. Worse, we can't even distinguish readily between a genuine Duchenne smile and a fake Duchenne smile, as generations of beauty pageant winners have illustrated. (Hint: A genuine Duchenne has the eye-crinkling that is hard to fake.)

Negative emotions tend to have a "narrowing effect" on our thoughts. If your body is tensing up as you walk through a dark alley, your mind isn't likely to wander over to tomorrow's to-do lists. Fear and anger and disgust give us sharp focus—which is the same thing as putting on blinders. Police detectives, for instance, frequently are frustrated by the testimony of gun-crime victims, who often can provide a rich description of the gun held by the perpetrator but can't recall whether the perpetrator had a beard.

Fredrickson argues that, in contrast with the narrowing effects of the negative emotions, positive emotions are designed to "*broaden* and *build*" our repertoire of thoughts and actions. Joy, for example, makes us want to play. Play doesn't have a script, it *broadens* the kinds of things we consider doing. We become willing to fool around, to explore or invent new activities. And because joy encourages us to play, we are *building* resources and skills. For instance, kids learn physical skills through rough-and-tumble play; they learn to work with objects by playing with toys and blocks and crayons; they learn to get along with others by pretending to be animals or superheroes.

The positive emotion of interest broadens what we want to investigate. When we're interested, we want to get involved, to learn new things, to tackle new experiences. We become more open to new ideas. The positive emotion of pride, experienced when we achieve a personal goal, broadens the kinds of tasks we contemplate for the future, encouraging us to pursue even bigger goals.

Most of the big problems we encounter in organizations or society are ambiguous and evolving. They don't look like burning-platform situations, where we need people to buckle down and execute a hard but well-understood game plan. To solve bigger, more ambiguous problems, we need to encourage open minds, creativity, and hope.

This brings us back to Robyn Waters, who was a master of positive emotions. She didn't try to create a burning platform: "Wal-Mart is eating our lunch! Target is on its deathbed! Come with me into the fiery seas!" Instead, she found a way to engage the fresh thinking and enthusiasm of her colleagues. *What if we had colors that "popped" like these iMacs? And look at this Paris boutique's display—what if we could arrange our sweaters like that?*

Waters helped shift an entrenched culture, product by product, because she found a way to instill hope and optimism and excitement in her coworkers. She found the feeling.

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card, you're still going to feel hopeless. But if you completely pay off a $185 overdue utility bill, you can cross it off your list. You've won a victory over debt.

Ramsey is using the same strategy as the Fly Lady with her 5-Minute Room Rescue—if people are facing a daunting task, and their instinct is to avoid it, you've got to break down the task. Shrink the change. Make the change small enough that they can't help but score a victory. Once people clean a single room, or pay off a single debt, their dread starts to dissipate, and their progress begins to snowball.

CLINIC

How Can You Cut the Budget Without Creating a Political Mess?

SITUATION Mary Carr is the CFO of a university that is experiencing significant drops in enrollment. With fewer students, the university's tuition revenue is declining, leading to a budget shortfall. Carr's job is to oversee meaningful budget cuts across about thirty different departments. [This was a real situation.]

WHAT'S THE SWITCH AND WHAT'S HOLDING IT BACK? Carr needs the heads of the university's departments to cut departmental budgets without lots of resistance or political infighting. She has already made some progress on clarifying the goal: Her analysis reveals that department heads will need to cut budgets by 5 percent. Most of them understand and agree with the need to cut back, but Carr thinks there is a danger of people dragging their heels. She needs to make some quick progress on the budget cuts, and that depends primarily on her ability to motivate the department heads' Elephants.

HOW DO WE MAKE THE SWITCH?

• *Direct the Rider.* **1. Follow the bright spots.** Can Carr find some success stories about department heads who figured out how to save money in creative

ways (for example, by installing sensor-controlled lighting/heating or by outsourcing administrative functions)? If so, she should help to clone the success across departments.

• *Motivate the Elephant.* **1. Shrink the change.** The need to cut 5 percent is clear, but cutting is the kind of task that inspires dread. "People tend to panic a little when you say, 'We have to cut our budget by five percent,' " says Carr. How can she break down the task? Well, as it turns out, Mary Carr is a Fly Lady fan, and she takes inspiration from the 5-Minute Room Rescue. So she picks two or three budget lines every week—say, office supplies, training, and travel—and asks the department heads whether they can cut 5 percent out of those line items. Carr reports, "Picking out tiny chunks of work at a time stays the panic." Carr is shrinking the change, making it less likely to engage the Elephant's resistance. **2. Grow your people.** Once the department heads have tackled the first three budget lines, Carr wants to keep the momentum going. She tells them, "We're already one third of the way there!" She is putting two stamps on their car-wash cards—letting them know that they've already made great progress toward the goal.

• *Shape the Path.* **1. Build habits.** Every Monday, like clockwork, Carr sends out budget updates. She requests updates and gives simple action items, such as, "If you don't think you'll be able to meet the 5 percent cut in travel, call me today." By using a very consistent and predictable process, Carr tries to make the cycle of budget cuts more routine, more automatic. **2. Rally the herd.** At one point in the budget cutting, all the department heads attend their yearly planning retreat. On the first day, everyone sees what cuts all the departments made in the initial round. Then each department head spends some time, overnight, planning a round of deeper cuts. The next morning, they share their proposed cuts with one another. Carr says, "Everyone got to see what each person was already cutting and the implications of future cuts. And knowing that, the whole body made decisions, not just individual department heads. Everyone was looking at the university as a whole." In essence, the department heads are exercising positive peer

pressure on one another. It becomes the social norm to think of cuts from the perspective of the university as a whole (a strong, shared identity), rather than from the perspective of individual departments.

6.

One way to shrink change, then, is to limit the investment you're asking for—only 5 minutes of housecleaning, only one small debt. Another way to shrink change is to think of *small wins*—milestones that are within reach. (Our dad, Fred Heath, who worked over thirty years for IBM, would tell his teams that when "milestones" seemed too distant, they should look for "inch pebbles." Nice one, Dad.)

Say that you're trying to motivate your teenager to do some housecleaning. You might embrace the 5-Minute Room Rescue to overcome his initial resistance. But what if you also put a bit of strategic thought into which room he starts with? You might ask him to start his work in the tiny guest bathroom, because you're confident that after 5 minutes of work, he'll have it gleaming. The overall goal—cleaning the whole house—is too distant to be motivating, but if you can engineer a small win in the first 5 minutes, it might buy you enough enthusiasm to pursue the next milestone. (Then again, we're talking teenagers, so don't count on it.)

If you've ever faced a really long drive, no doubt you used this technique on yourself. Maybe you thought about your journey one town at a time, or an hour at a time, or maybe you promised yourself a coffee stop after the next 75 miles. It's a lot easier to think "75 miles to coffee" than to think "8.5 more hours of sitting here until I'm at Grandma's."

You can't count on these milestones to occur naturally. To motivate change, you've got to plan for them.

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step, the Elephant feels less scared and less reluctant, because things are working. With each step, the Elephant starts *feeling* the change. Wjourney that started with dread is evolving, slowly, toward a feeling of confidence and pride. And at the same time the change is shrinking, the Elephant is *growing*.

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the face," said Butler—he received a letter from the head of St. Lucia's forestry department. To Butler's astonishment, he was offered a job. Impressed with Butler's recommendations, the head of forestry asked if Butler was interested in returning for six months as the department's conservation adviser. The job paid $200 a month, and Butler could stay in a government "rest hut." Butler could barely believe his luck. He was 21 years old, and the government of a beautiful Caribbean island was asking for his help in saving an endangered species.

Butler's recommendations to the government had been straightforward: (1) Beef up the punishment for capturing or killing the parrot, from a trivial fine to an enormous fine plus a jail term. (2) Establish within an existing forestry reserve a "parrot sanctuary" that would protect the parrot's habitat. (3) Raise money for the operation of the reserve by licensing "rain-forest tours," which would offer tourists the chance to see the reserve and its star attraction.

A quick time-out: Notice that these recommendations—changing laws, enforcing new penalties—are exactly the sorts of things that we shy away from in this book, because most of us don't have those tools in our kit. But here's the thing: Butler didn't have those tools, either. And neither did the forestry service. For Butler's recommendations to be put into practice, the island's laws would need to change, which meant, in turn, that the public would have to get behind the initiative. So Butler, fresh out of college, working with the forestry department, and armed with a budget in the hundreds of dollars, had to figure out a way to rally the people of St. Lucia behind a parrot that most of them took for granted (and some of them ate).

There was no clear economic case for saving the parrot. It wasn't the linchpin of an ecosystem, and the sad truth was that most St. Lucians probably wouldn't notice if it disappeared

completely. Butler knew he couldn't make a n analytical case for protecting the bird. He'd have to make an emotional case.

In essence, Butler's goal was to convince St. Lucians that *they were the kind of people who protected their own.* In public events, Butler stressed, "This parrot is ours. Nobody has this but us. We need to cherish it and look after it." He did everything in his power to make the public more familiar with the bird. He hosted St. Lucia Parrot puppet shows, distributed T-shirts, cajoled a local band to record songs about the bird, convinced local hotels to print up bumper stickers, recruited volunteers to dress up in parrot costumes and visit local schools, and asked local ministers to cite relevant Bible verses (for instance, verses that instructed believers to be good stewards of the things that were in their trust). He even talked a telecom company into printing up St. Lucia Parrot calling cards. On one card, the parrot was displayed next to the bald eagle, which was like putting Selma Hayek next to Dick Cheney. It was clear who had the better-looking national bird.

The St. Lucians began to embrace their parrot, as though it had always been a part of their national identity. Polls commissioned by Butler showed a dramatic rise in public support for the bird. The wave of public support made it possible to pass into law the recommendations that Butler and the forestry department, headed up by Gabriel Charles, had proposed.

As the years passed, the species came back from the brink. At last count, there were between six hundred and seven hundred parrots—an astonishing increase for a species that had been written off. Poaching stopped completely. "No St. Lucian has been caught shooting a parrot for fifteen years," said Butler in 2008.

In 1988, the government gave Butler full citizenship and later awarded him the St. Lucia Medal of Merit, one of the country's

highest honors. He had shown St. Lucians what it meant to take pride in their identity, and in the process, he'd become a St. Lucian himself.

2.

Other people noticed what Butler accomplished. In the mid-1980s, a board member from Rare, a conservation organization, asked Butler if he would come to St. Vincent and do what he had done in St. Lucia. Intrigued, Butler joined Rare, working alongside St. Vincent's forestry division and its chief forest officer. Within a year, the island passed laws to protect its own native parrot.

Butler and the other leaders of Rare realized they had cracked one of the most pressing problems of conservation. It's very difficult to protect the precious areas of the world without the support of the residents of those areas, but Rare had proved it could inspire those residents to care about their environment. So Rare conservationists resolved to launch similar projects, which they began to call "Pride campaigns," all around the world. By 2009, Rare had successfully launched 120 Pride campaigns in 50 different countries from Panama to Indonesia. (Full disclosure: Inspired by this work, Dan Heath joined Rare's board of trustees in 2009.) Pride campaigns focused on animals ranging from the loggerhead turtle to the Napoleon wrasse, a brilliant blue fish whose habitat is coral reefs.

We've seen that one way to motivate a switch is to shrink the change, which makes people feel "big" relative to the challenge. But here we're seeing something different. Paul Butler didn't shrink the change. Instead, he grew the people. He made the St. Lucians swell with pride over their parrot—a species that exists nowhere else. He inspired them to feel more determined, more

ready, more motivated. And when you build people up in this way, they develop the strength to act.

3.

Rare's success in motivating people in fifty countries suggests that something universal is at work here. Confirmation of that comes from the research of James March, a professor of political science at Stanford University. March says that when people make choices, they tend to rely on one of two basic models of decision making: the *consequences* model or the *identity* model. The consequences model is familiar to students of economics. It assumes that when we have a decision to make, we weigh the costs and benefits of our options and make the choice that maximizes our satisfaction. It's a rational, analytical approach. This is the approach that Paul Butler knew would fail with St. Lucians, because there simply wasn't a strong cost/benefit case for the parrot.

In the identity model of decision making, we essentially ask ourselves three questions when we have a decision to make: *Who am I? What kind of situation is this? What would someone like me do in this situation?* Notice what's missing: any calculation of costs and benefits. The identity model explains the way most people vote, which contradicts our notion of the "self-interested voter." It helps to shed light on why an auto mechanic in Oklahoma would vote against a Democrat who'd give him health insurance, and why a Silicon Valley millionaire would vote against a Republican who'd cut her taxes.

Generally, when we use the word *identity,* we're talking about an immutable trait of some kind—such as a racial, ethic, or regional identity. But that's a relatively narrow use of the term. We're not just born with an identity; we *adopt* identities throughout

our lives. We aspire to be good mothers or fathers, devout Catholics or Muslims, patriotic citizens, and so on.

Or consider a professional identity, such as being a "scientist." Clearly, you're not born a scientist. It's an identity you seek out and one that others, such as your professors and mentors, consciously cultivate in you. As you develop and grow in that identity, it becomes an increasingly important part of your self-image and triggers the kind of decision making that March describes. For instance, imagine that as a science professor teaching chemistry, you had a lucrative opportunity to consult on the toxicity study of a new drug for a big pharmaceutical company. From a consequences point of view, the decision to accept the job would be a no-brainer—the work might pay far more than your university salary. But from an identity point of view, the decision to accept the job would seem less clear-cut. You'd wonder what strings were attached, what subtle compromises you'd have to make to please the client. You'd wonder, "What would a scientist like me do in this situation?"

Because identities are central to the way people make decisions, any change effort that violates someone's identity is likely doomed to failure. (That's why it's so clumsy when people instinctively reach for "incentives" to change other people's behavior.) So the question is this: How can you make your change a matter of identity rather than a matter of consequences?

4.

Lovelace Hospital Systems in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was concerned about the rapid turnover among its nurses. Its turnover rate wasn't any worse than the national average (between 18 and 30 percent per year), but that was small comfort. When nurses

left, replacing them cost a lot of money, morale suffered, and patient care was put at risk during the transition period.

Kathleen Davis, a registered nurse and vice president of hospital operations, decided to try an unconventional approach to analyzing the turnover problem. She hired Susan Wood, a consultant who specialized in Appreciative Inquiry, a process for changing organizations by studying what's working rather than what's not (this is another example of the bright-spots focus that we discussed in Chapter 2).

Wood and Davis decided not to investigate why so many nurses were leaving. Instead, they began to explore why other nurses were *staying*. In a hospital with three hundred nurses, the team interviewed more than one hundred. Wood asked nurses what made their jobs satisfying. She recalled, "These nurses were beaten down and overworked, but as soon as we started them in a conversation about what they were good at, the tone changed."

Davis and Wood found that the nurses who stayed at the hospital were fiercely loyal to the profession of nursing. In other words, their satisfaction was an identity thing—the nobility of the nursing profession gave meaning to their work. Once the hospital administrators realized this, they knew they'd have to do more to help the nurses cultivate their identity. For instance, they began to find ways to recognize people for extraordinary nursing performance. They developed a new orientation program that stressed the inherently admirable nature of nursing work. They created mentorship programs to help nurses improve their knowledge and skills.

The first hint that something had changed was evident on the annual employee satisfaction survey. Nursing satisfaction scores increased markedly in multiple categories, particularly "communication"—all those interviews and conversations about identity had an impact. But the impact went beyond the survey:

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ideas for innovation from their employees. In 1987, the founders of Brasilata launched an employee-innovation program modeled on the Japanese forerunners.

A new identity was the core of the program. Employees of Brasilata became known as "inventors," and when new employees joined the firm, they were asked to sign an "innovation contract." This wasn't simply feel-good language. Top management challenged employees to be on the lookout for potential innovations—ideas for how to create better products, improve production processes, and squeeze costs out of the system. Procedures developed within the factory made it easy for inventors to submit their ideas. The program succeeded beyond any reasonable expectations. In 2008, employees submitted 134,846 ideas—an average of 145.2 ideas per inventor! This figure puts Brasilata on par with the Japanese trendsetters that had inspired the program.

Many of the suggestions led to the development of new products. For instance, in late 2008, Brasilata came up with a new approach for steel cans designed to carry dangerous or flammable liquids. To meet United Nations standards, such cans must be able to withstand a drop from 1.2 meters (roughly 4 feet). Traditionally, most manufacturers had reached this standard by thickening the metal layers, which used up more raw material and required new production processes. And the reinforced designs weren't foolproof—the metal seams were prone to split if a can landed on an edge.

Brasilata's inventors suggested a new design, inspired by car bumpers that collapse on impact. Their new steel can deformed slightly on impact, reducing stress on the critical seam. The new design resisted impact better while also reducing the amount of steel in the can.

The inventors have led Brasilata through emergencies. In 2001, a severe energy crisis—the "blackout syndrome"—forced

the government of Brazil to ration energy. Businesses received a strict quota of electricity. The inventors went to work dreaming up power-saving ideas—hundreds of them. Within a few weeks, Brasilata's energy consumption was reduced by 35 percent, falling below the company's quota and allowing the company to resell its extra energy.

Another unexpected idea was jointly suggested by two employees: *Eliminate our jobs; they're not necessary anymore.* The idea was accepted, but the company found a new place for the employees. Brasilata has a no-dismissal policy and also distributes 15 percent of its net profits to employees. It's no surprise that Brasilata consistently appears on "best places to work" lists in Brazil.

Let's remember something: This "inventor" identity, which has fueled business success and employee satisfaction, was made up. None of Brasilata's employees were born "inventors." The identity was introduced to them, and they liked the sound of it. It seemed to be a mantle worth wearing. Being an inventor has become a source of pride and strength.

5.

If cultivating an identity sounds daunting, take heart. A classic study in psychology shows that you can start with small steps. In the 1960s, two psychologists from Stanford University, Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser, asked a researcher to go door-to-door in an upscale neighborhood in Palo Alto, California. When home owners answered the door, the researcher announced himself as a volunteer for "Citizens for Safe Driving" and asked whether they would allow a billboard reading "Drive Carefully" to be installed on their lawns. They were shown a photo of the billboard on the lawn of a different house, and it was a real

eyesore—crudely constructed and so enormous that it obscured much of the front of the house. The home owners were assured that the sign would make "just a small hole in your lawn."

No doubt if this volunteer knocked on your door, you'd have a colorful response. And, indeed, 83 percent of the home owners passed on the "opportunity." But here's the twist: In a different neighborhood, the researchers used a simple technique that more than quadrupled the number of yesses!

The technique was remarkably subtle: Two weeks earlier, the same home owners had been approached by a volunteer claiming to represent a different driver-safety organization. They were asked to put a tiny "Be a Safe Driver" sign—less than half the size of a postcard—in the window of their car or home. The volunteer said the sign was intended to make citizens more aware of the need to drive carefully. This seemed such a trivial commitment that almost all of the home owners said yes. Their little-yes seemed to pave the way for the big-yes. When the researchers came back two weeks later and asked the home owners to install the eyesore billboard, 76 percent accepted it. Freedman and Fraser called this strategy a "foot in the door" technique. Accepting the tiny driver-safety sign greatly increased the likelihood that the home owners would accept the gigantic driver-safety sign.

Then the results got even stranger. Volunteers approached a third group of home owners with a different request. Rather than being presented with the tiny sign about driving safety, home owners in the third group were asked to sign a petition to "Keep California beautiful." Hard to oppose that, so again almost everyone complied. Then two weeks later, those petition-signers were approached about hosting the eyesore billboard, and half of them said yes! That's *three times* the acceptance rate of the home owners who hadn't signed the petition.

This result confused even Freedman and Fraser. They hadn't

expected the "Keep California beautiful" petition to be a "foot in the door" for a commitment to driver's safety. The two domains were completely unrelated. After some reflection, they speculated that the petition signing might have sparked a shift in the home owners' own sense of identity. Freedman and Fraser wrote, "Once [the home owner] has agreed to the request, his attitude may change, he may become, in his own eyes, the kind of person who does this sort of thing, who agrees to requests made by strangers, who takes action on things he believes in, who cooperates with good causes."

In a sense, signing the petition became evidence to the home owners that they were "concerned citizens," and this subtle shift in identity led to a shift in their behavior. Two weeks later, when they were approached with the option to put a billboard on their lawns, they subconsciously asked themselves James March's three identity questions: *Who am I? What kind of situation is this? What would someone like me do in this situation?* If you consider yourself to be a "fit in with the neighbors person," you'll deny the request. If you consider yourself to be an "immaculate lawn person," you might assault the researcher. But if you're a newly hatched "concerned citizen," you'll find it honorable to host the sign.

6.

Now, let's be clear: The Freedman-Fraser study is kind of sleazy. We'll try to separate the sleazy part from the science part.

The sleazy part is the deception. The home owners are being tricked into doing something stupid. None of the other examples we've provided of building identity hinges on this kind of deception. Is it deceptive to persuade people to rally behind a national bird? To cultivate professional pride in nurses? To

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one—we could picture ourselves with our partners, full of passion and artistic flair, drawing envious glances from passersby. No question: This "dancer identity" had appeal.

It did not take us long to realize how deeply misguided our fantasies were. All too quickly, we discovered that salsa is a sadistic style of dancing created for the purpose of making middle-aged men feel ridiculous. Salsa requires an array of sensual hip movements that we found structurally implausible. We managed to perform this beautiful dance with all the seductive force of Al Gore giving a lap dance.

We did not continue with our salsa lessons.

Here's the thing: When you fight to make your switch, especially one that involves a new identity, you and your audience are going to have Salsa Moments. (Don't worry, we're not going to adopt that as a buzz phrase.) Any new quest, even one that is ultimately successful, is going to involve failure. You can't learn to salsa-dance without failing. You can't learn to be an inventor, or a nurse, or a scientist, without failing. Nor can you learn to transform the way products are developed in your firm, or change minds about urban poverty, or restore loving communication with your spouse, without failing. And the Elephant really, really hates to fail.

This presents a difficulty for you when you are trying to change or when you're trying to lead change. You know that you or your audience will fail, and you know that the failure will trigger the "flight" instinct, just as the two of us fled our salsa lessons. How do you keep the Elephant motivated when it faces a long, treacherous road?

The answer may sound strange: You need to create the *expectation* of failure—not the failure of the mission itself, but failure en route. This notion takes us into a fascinating area of research that is likely to change the way you view the world.

8.

Read the following four sentences, and write down whether you agree or disagree with each of them:

1. You are a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change that.
2. No matter what kind of person you are, you can always change substantially.
H'. You can do things differently, but the important parts of who you are can't really be changed.
4. You can always change basic things about the kind of person you are.

If you agreed with items I, and 3, you're someone who has a "fixed mindset." And if you agreed with items 2 and fi-'you tend to have a "growth mindset." (If you agreed with both 1 and 2, you're confused.) As we'll see, which mindset you have can help determine how easy it will be for you to handle failure, and how dogged you'll be in pursuing change. It might even determine how successful you are in your career.

People who have a fixed mindset believe that their abilities are basically static. Maybe you believe you're a pretty good public speaker, an average manager, and a wonderful organizer. With a fixed mindset, you believe that you may get a little bit better or worse at those skills, but basically your abilities reflect the way you're wired. Your behavior, then, is a good representation of your natural ability, just as the swirled-and-sniffed first taste of wine is a good representation of the bottle you've bought.

If you are someone with a fixed mindset, you tend to avoid challenges, because if you fail, you fear that others will see your failure as an indication of your true ability and see you as a loser (just as a bad first taste of wine leads you to reject the bottle). You

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E70 535N073S0 A8A103V12030 73E70713T 5351A1113 3731 20 059E3301 0E01582 010s 33MA1120 8A5 80 71A93051 7 9T 310E 35 1033 3SA11 35 A1033 6333 A1NA3MNA44 A1 3 0TV3 120 0S9E3301 A pnesadG gsfiueaG yetcmttefaG cnnsueuG "'$-G nnadenGdnfGfnahnomGrsut-Gfff-tGnehiG etGdesG dnniGlehG seneeiG efGadnaGnet eya"0GnfG yehmiG aetdeMG tsuaefeiGaeGlehnG yenyd-uGyet" tef auilehG nenmmdGniGlehnG emresG hfienGadeueGthtcG udeauGein l —G xhnGunmun'infysfpGe.censefyeG souGnGymouusyGe.ngcmeGGnGeiG tsfiueaG tn sthnewGenG akltfpGniGhft ntsmsnnGebegefaG te nGnGsbsme,G seG yefyuhieicG ierft asbeulpGadnaGseG seneG e nnsrueGHnuunGnfyenuG nfiGseneG remfGadnaGnlG ifiG seG ihsaGreynhueGmeaasfpGadenGceecmeG ueeGadnaGfnahnnmGanyeGetGnrsusMdGeG huGhfyett enanrteiGHeteefeG ssadGnGpnesadG ttfiueaG febenGsehuiG dnbeGhtceiG aeGadsuGyefymhfi usJflGffGn ya.GadelGfebenGsJhmiGlnbeGe.ceyaeiG aeGbe *03*Ase*1e* *5*As *00a05*As562*e*As5.1As t*1*ne*0*AsA*e3* e *40*IAs *0a2*"1As*eh*. As6Asn.As*rry*

1*1*.1. e*h*.e*360*Asd16et1As*0* *5*n e1*I1e30* *i3*As*0*As*1*en)*5*n 1Ase*12*As I*1*As1 5sD0As*e1*ne*0*AsA*2*As56*A*se*5*ee*1As *5* ,6eIAs1 4*1*ne*0*AsAs

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

math. Dweck proved that the growth mindset can be taught and that it can change lives.

10.

In the business world, we implicitly reject the growth mindset. Businesspeople think in terms of two stages: You plan, and then you execute. There's no "learning stage" or "practice stage" in the middle. From the business perspective, practice looks like poor execution. Results are the thing: *We don't care how ya do it, just get it done!*

But to create and sustain change, you've got to act more like a coach and less like a scorekeeper. You've got to embrace a growth mindset and instill it in your team. Why is that so critical? Because, as Harvard Business School professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter observes in studying large organizations, "Everything can look like a failure in the middle." r: similar sentiment is expressed by marriage therapist Michele Weiner-Davis, who says that "real change, the kind that sticks, is often three steps forward and two steps back."

If failure is a necessary part of change, then the way people understand failure is critical. The leaders at IDEO, the world's preeminent product design firm, have designed products and experiences ranging from the first Apple mouse to a new Red Cross blood donation procedure. They understand the need to prepare their employees—and, more important, their clients—for failure.

Tim Brown, the CEO of IDEO, says that every design process goes through "foggy periods." One of IDEO's designers even sketched out a "project mood chart" that predicts how people will feel at different phases of a project. It's a U-shaped curve with a peak of positive emotion, labeled "hope," at the beginning, and a second peak of positive emotion, labeled "confidence," at the

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This lesson was learned the hard way by several hospitals that were trying to embrace a new kind of heart surgery called "minimally invasive cardiac surgery" (MICS). Amy Edmondson, a professor at Harvard Business School, studied the way that sixteen hospitals implemented MICS.

Traditional open-heart surgery is very invasive: A patient's breastbone is split open, his or her blood is circulated through a heart-lung bypass machine, and the heart is stopped. MICS is much less invasive because it allows the heart to be fixed without the chest being opened. Surgeons sneak up to the heart through a small, 3-inch incision between two ribs. Meanwhile, a tiny catheter with a deflated balloon is threaded through the groin, guided into the aorta, and then inflated, blocking blood flow from the inside. The surgeon proceeds to operate using the small, cramped horizontal space between the ribs.

That cramped operating space changes everything about the surgery. With open-heart surgery, the surgeon blocks off the aorta with external clamps, like putting a Chip Clip on a really precious bag of Doritos. No input is needed from the surgical team. With MICS, the balloon gizmo must act as an internal clamp, inflating to block the flow of blood. The surgeon can't see it or feel it yet has to inflate it in exactly the right place at exactly the right pressure. To accomplish this, the surgeon must rely heavily on the anesthesiologist to monitor the path of the balloon as it moves toward the heart. Once the balloon is finally in place and inflated, the work still isn't done. The balloon's position has to be monitored continuously to make sure blood isn't flowing past it. As one nurse said, "When I read the training manual, I couldn't believe it. It was *so* different from standard cases."

The procedure requires precarious maneuvers, in a life-or-death situation, by a team mostly blinded. Kind of like landing a jet on an aircraft carrier at night. (Not that we know what either

of these things feels like. We just picture both being substantially more dangerous than writing a nonfiction book.) But there's a big payoff for these precarious maneuvers: a lot less suffering for the patients. MICS heart patients go home from the hospital in four days instead of eight, and they recover fully in three weeks instead of two months.

The promise of MICS, then, is that it offers big benefits to the patients of teams that adopt it, but only if the surgery teams are willing to endure the initial learning period. Lots of new technologies require this trade-off: Think of architects who stopped creating drawings by hand and started using computer-aided design or distributors who learned to use PDAs in the field to track their shipments and deliveries. Pain now for a payoff later.

Edmondson studied sixteen hospitals as they adopted the new MICS technology. She found that some hospitals successfully learned and embraced the new technique, but several failed and retreated back to open-heart surgery. What she learned about the successful and unsuccessful teams is powerful testimony to the power of the growth mindset.

11.

The most effective teams tended to adopt what Edmondson called a "learning frame." Members of these teams pictured MICS as something that would be difficult at first but would get easier over time if they were open to changing how they behaved and communicated.

At Mountain Medical Center, Dr. M adopted a learning frame. He often wore a head camera, which allowed the team to see what was going on, and he encouraged questions about what he was doing and why. He also made sure his team practiced diligently: He deliberately scheduled the first six MICS cases in

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mastery would come quickly, and they anticipated that they'd face challenges. In the end, they were the ones who were more likely to get it right.

Failing is often the best way to learn, and because of that, early failure is a kind of necessary investment. A famous story about IBM makes that point well. In the 1960s, an executive at IBM made a decision that ended up losing the company $10 million (about $70 million in 2009 dollars). The CEO of IBM, Tom Watson, summoned the offending executive to his office at corporate headquarters. The journalist Paul B. Carroll described what happened next:

> As the executive cowered, Watson asked, "Do you know why I've asked you here?"
>
> The man replied, "I assume I'm here so you can fire me."
>
> Watson looked surprised.
>
> "Fire you?" he asked. "Of course not. I just spent $10 million educating you."

12.

In 1995, Molly Howard, a longtime special education teacher in Louisville, Georgia, watched as the new Jefferson County High School building was being built.

"Every day I'd drive by the building, and I'd wonder, 'Who's gonna run that school?' And it kept tugging at me, 'Why don't *you* apply?' " Howard said.

She applied and got the job, but with the promotion came a very tough challenge. Eighty percent of the school's students lived in poverty. Only 15 percent of students in the previous high

school had continued on to college. "The kids you'd expect to be successful were successful," said Howard. "But what about the other 85 percent?"

Many teachers had a nearly defeatist attitude. "There was this belief that some children *can* and some children *can't*. That we're here for the ones that can get it, and we've got to accept that we're going to lose some. I knew I'd have to challenge that," said Howard.

Howard acted quickly. First, she had to sell a new identity. Howard believed that every student could aspire to go to college, so she abolished the school's two-track system that had separated "college-bound" students from "vocational" students. In her school, everyone would share the college-bound identity.

She beefed up assessments and tutorial programs. She matched students with teachers who'd be their "on-campus advisers" through all four years. Perhaps her most distinctive change, though, was to the grading system. Under her new system the only grades offered at Jefferson County High School were: A, B, C, and NY.

Not Yet.

In Howard's view, the students at Jefferson had accepted a "culture of failure." In a fixed-mindset way, they acted as though they were failures to the bone. Students often didn't do their homework, or they turned in shoddy work. Getting a D or an F was an easy way out in a way. They might get a poor grade, but at least they would be done.

In the new system, the students couldn't stop until they'd cleared the bar. "We define up front to the kids what's an A, B, and C," said Howard. "If they do substandard work, the teacher will say, 'Not Yet.' . . . That gives them the mindset: *My teacher thinks I can do better.* It changes their expectations."

The school was reborn. Students and teachers became more

engaged, the school's graduation rate increased dramatically, and student test scores went up so much that remedial courses were eliminated. In 2008, the National Association of Secondary School Principals declared Howard the U.S. Principal of the Year, out of 48,000 candidates.

Howard transformed her students. She cultivated a new identity in them. *You're all college-bound students.* Then she flipped Jefferson from a fixed-mindset school to a growth-mindset school. She believed that every student was capable of doing acceptable work, that no student was doomed to failure. There's no "never" at Jefferson anymore, only a "Not Yet."

13.

In times of change, we need to remind ourselves and others, again and again, of certain basic truths: Our brains and our abilities are like muscles. They can be strengthened with practice. We're not born skateboarders or scientists or nurses; we must learn how to skateboard, do science, or care for sick people. And our inspiration to change ourselves comes from our desire to live up to those identities.

In the story of Molly Howard, we see that amazing things can happen when you combine the aspiration of a new identity with the persistence of the growth mindset. That's how you grow your people.

Over the past few chapters, we've seen that the central challenge of change is keeping the Elephant moving forward. Whereas the Rider needs direction, the Elephant needs motivation. And we've seen that motivation comes from feeling—knowledge isn't enough to motivate change. But motivation also comes from confidence. The Elephant has to believe that it's *capable* of conquering the change. And there are two routes to

building people's confidence so that they feel "big" relative to their challenge. You can shrink the change or grow your people (or, preferably, both).

Our picture of change is still incomplete, though, because it's clear that in some situations even a reluctant Elephant and a confused Rider will manage to change their behavior. For instance, consider the fact that even a lost, angry driver who is hopelessly late for an appointment will stop dutifully for a red light.

That's why, to make changes stick, we've got to think about shaping the Path.

SHAPE
THE
PATH

8

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conclude that the big-bucket people were Popcorn-Gorging Gluttons. But of course the surprising part of the study is that, when you give people a giant bucket, they *become* Popcorn-Gorging Gluttons. And when someone behind the wheel of a car is twenty minutes late for a crucial appointment, that person *becomes* a terrible driver. What looks like a person problem is often a situation problem.

The same phenomenon holds true in the business world. W. Edwards Deming, the chief instigator of the Total Quality Management movement that revolutionized manufacturing, told a story about a company that used a variety of flammable products in its production process. Unsurprisingly, fires frequently broke out in its plants. But the president of the company didn't think he had a situation problem; he thought he had a person problem. He sent a letter to every one of the company's 10,500 employees, *pleading with them to set fewer fires.* Ahem. (What looks like a pyromania problem is often a flammable chemical problem.)

We are frequently blind to the power of situations. In a famous article, Stanford psychologist Lee Ross surveyed dozens of studies in psychology and noted that people have a systematic tendency to ignore the situational forces that shape other people's behavior. He called this deep-rooted tendency the "Fundamental Attribution Error." The error lies in our inclination to attribute people's behavior to *the way they are* rather than to *the situation they are in.*

The Fundamental Attribution Error complicates human relationships. Marriage therapist Michele Weiner-Davis said, "Most people attribute their marital problems to some deeply engrained personality characteristics of their spouse." A wife might say, "My husband is a stubborn person." But Weiner-Davis might respond: "You've got to admit that your husband isn't *always* stubborn. He

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2.

To see how a smoother Path can change behavior, consider some research that studied why college students did (or didn't) donate food to a canned-food drive for charity. The researchers knew some students would be more charitable and generous than others and would be more inclined to donate food. The researchers wondered: *Can we alter the situation so that jerks give, too?*

First, to distinguish "saints" from "jerks," they polled all the students in a particular dorm, asking them to assess which of their dorm-mates (out of roughly one hundred) were *most likely* and *least likely* to make a donation. Once they compiled those rankings, they had a pretty good idea of which students were charitable or uncharitable types.

Then they altered the Path. Some students received a basic letter announcing the launch of a food drive the following week and asking them to bring canned food to a booth on Tressider Plaza (a well-known spot on campus). Other students received a more detailed letter, which included a map to the precise spot, a request for a can of beans, and a suggestion that they think about a time when they'd ordinarily be near Tressider Plaza so they wouldn't have to go out of their way to get there.

The two letters were randomly sent to the saints and the jerks. A week later, after the food drive was over, the researchers had a precise list of who had given food and who hadn't.

Students who received the basic letter were not very generous. Only 8 percent of the saints donated and not a single one of the jerks. So far, the jerks were living up to their reputation (but the saints weren't exactly outperforming).

Then came the shock. Students who received the more detailed letter were substantially more charitable: 42 percent of the saints donated, and so did 25 percent of the jerks! This is an

inspiring result. These researchers got 25 percent of the *worst individuals in the dorm* to donate simply by smoothing the Path a bit. (Bottom line: If you're hungry and need a can of food, you're three times better-off relying on a jerk with a map than on a budding young saint without one.)

What's more, the Path wasn't changed in any dramatic way—the letter just gave moderately more concrete instructions. Imagine what would have happened with a more aggressive intervention: What if volunteers had gone door-to-door collecting the canned food?

What looks like a people problem is often a situation problem. And no matter what your role is, you've got some control over the situation.

3.

Today, as you go through your day, notice how many times people have tweaked the environment to shape your behavior. Traffic engineers wanted you to drive in a predictable, orderly way, so they painted lane markers on the roads and installed stoplights and road signs. Grocery store managers wanted you to spend more time in their store, so they positioned the milk coolers all the way at the back. Your boss's boss wanted to encourage more collaboration among employees, so she approved an "open floor plan" layout with no cubicles or dividers. The bank was tired of your leaving your ATM card in the machine, so now the machine forces you to remove it before you can claim your cash.

Tweaking the environment is about making the right behaviors a little bit easier and the wrong behaviors a little bit harder. It's that simple. As an inspiration, think about Amazon's 1-Click ordering. With one-tenth the effort of dialing a phone number, you can buy a new book or DVD. Talk about instant gratification.

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labels inspired by the Fundamental Attribution Error. Bregman persuaded the executives to do a bit more investigation.

The employees who turned in paper time sheets were asked why they weren't using the online tool. Paper was easier, they said. Skeptical, the interviewers asked if they could observe the employees while they filled out the online time sheet. The results were telling.

Lots of employees started grousing as soon as they encountered the "wizard" that was built into the online tool. Ironically, the wizard was intended to help people fill out the form. Think of the annoying paper clip guy in Microsoft Office who wants to help you write a letter. Now imagine that you have no choice but to accept his "help." When the executives killed the wizard, allowing people to skip directly to the form itself, compliance rates rose immediately, and within a few weeks everyone was using the online tool.

"People weren't being defiant," said Bregman. They were just proceeding on the easiest Path.

What's sadly typical about this story is that the executives didn't initially look for a Path solution. Instead, they wanted to spook the Elephant by threatening to withhold a paycheck. Bregman says they were mentally stuck: " 'Well, g,already *asked* them to do it. I *taught them* how to do it. I *told them* they had to do it. I don't know what else to do!' " At that point, the executives felt they'd tried every tool in their toolbox, so they jumped to punishments.

"We're taught to focus on incentives by our business background," says Bregman. "Or even our parents: 'Do this or you won't get your allowance!' " But executives—and parents—often have more tools than they think they have. If you change the path, you'll change the behavior.

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CLINIC

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chicken-scratch prescription, transcribe it so it's legible, then fax the order to the pharmacy. When the medication arrives from the pharmacy, they deliver it in the right dosage by the right method (IV drip, injection, orally) to the right patient at the right time.

Nurses have an impressive accuracy record: On average, they commit approximately 1 error per 1,000 medications administered. Still, given the huge volume of medications delivered at Kaiser South, that error rate led to about 250 errors annually, and a single error can be harmful or even deadly. For instance, if a patient receives too much heparin, a blood thinner, the patient's blood will no longer clot and the patient could hemorrhage. If a patient gets too little heparin, the patient could develop a blood clot that could lead to a stroke.

Richards, who was director of adult clinical services at Kaiser South, and her nursing staff wanted to drive down medication errors. Richards believed that most errors happened when nurses were distracted. It was easy to become distracted, because in most traditional hospitals, the medication administration areas are right in the middle of the nursing units, which tend to be the noisiest places on the floor. From memory, Richards quoted Tess Pape, a professor at the University of Texas who has studied medication errors, saying, "Today we *admire* people for multitasking, we celebrate people who can accomplish many things at once. But when you're giving out medications it is the *last* time you should be multitasking."

Put yourself in Richards's shoes for a moment. Your goal is clear: Change your nurses' behavior so they can focus better, so they're less likely to get distracted. How can you accomplish that? First, you need to identify the core problem.

The nurses understand what's expected of them—the critical moves are clear—so this isn't a Rider problem. Nor do the nurses

have any emotional resistance to better focus. In fact, it annoys them when they're distracted by others, which means that, in this case, we have the luxury of a supportive Elephant. The problem, it seems, is the distractions themselves. No one thinks twice before calling out to a nurse who's walking the halls delivering medication. Worse, nurses feel an obligation to respond when others distract them. No one wants to tell a surgeon, "Sorry, bub, can't help right now. I'm dealing with medication." Yet that's exactly what needs to happen if errors are to be reduced.

What Richards needed to do was make other people aware that they were interrupting the nurses. She needed to make the bad behavior visible. Ideally, when the nurses were administering medication, they would work inside a soundproof bubble, like the "Cone of Silence" from *Get Smart*. With that solution being architecturally infeasible, Richards came up with the idea of using a visual symbol, something that could be worn by nurses, that would signal to other people, *Hey, don't bother me right now. I'm passing out medication.*

After considering armbands and aprons, Richards settled on vests and decided to call them "medication vests." Where do you buy a medication vest? Richards had to make do with what she could find: "The first vest we ordered was off the internet. It was really cheesy. Cheap plastic. *Bright* orange. Be careful what you order off the internet."

Later, with vests in hand, Richards unveiled the idea to her staff: *When you're administering medication, you'll put on a medication vest. It's bright enough that people can see it from down the hall. And all of us, including the doctors, will know that when someone is wearing one of these vests, we should leave that person alone.*

She selected two units at Kaiser South for a six-month pilot study of the medication vests, and in July 2006 it began.

Richards quickly encountered a problem. The nurses hated

the vests. So did the doctors. "Nurses thought the vest was demeaning, and they couldn't find it when they needed it," said Richards. "They didn't like the color. They'd ask, 'How do you clean it?' And physicians hated not being able to talk to their nurses when they passed them in the hall."

The nurses' written feedback was scathing: "Oh, so you want to draw *attention* to the fact we can make a mistake." "You want people to think I have a dunce cap on, that I'm so stupid I can't think on my feet." "Give me a hard hat and a cone and I can go work for Caltrans [the state highway department]."

"They were pretty brutal," said Richards. The reception was so universally poor that Richards was ready to write off the idea and try something else.

Then the data came back.

During the six-month trial period, errors dropped 47 percent from the six months prior to the study. "It took our breath away," said Richards.

Once the data were in, the hatred faded. Impressed by the results, the entire hospital adopted the medication vests, except for one unit that insisted they weren't needed. Errors dropped by 20 percent in the first month of the hospitalwide adoption, except in one unit, which actually saw an increase in errors. (Guess which one.)

You know you've got a smart solution when everyone hates it and it still works—and in fact works so well that people's hate turns to enthusiasm. Becky Richards had found a way to change the Path.

5.

The airline industry has long used a consistent practice. Because most aircraft accidents happen during takeoffs and landings—the

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think we could've made the deadline without it," he said. "This is a new benchmark."

In these disparate environments—airplane cockpits and hospitals and IT work groups—the right behaviors did not evolve naturally. Nurses weren't "naturally" given enough space to work without distraction, and programmers weren't "naturally" left alone to focus on coding. Instead, leaders had to reshape the Path consciously. With some simple tweaks to the environment, suddenly the right behaviors emerged. It wasn't the people who changed; it was the situation. What looks like a people problem is often a situation problem.

6.

We've seen lots of environment tweaking in organizations—offices and airlines and hospitals—but, make no mistake, we can turn these tools on ourselves, too. Many people have discovered that, when it comes to changing their own behavior, environmental tweaks beat self-control every time.

For instance, Brian Wansink, the author of the popcorn-bucket study described in Chapter 1, has a devoted following of dieters who swear by his prime directive: Shrink your dinnerware. Use smaller plates, bowls, and cups.

Wansink knows that if we use big plates, we feel obligated to cover them with food—a half-full plate feels morally wrong somehow. And because we're wired to finish what's on our plate, that's a big problem. Big plates = big portions = overeating. To achieve eating control, according to Wansink, you must start with plate control. Store your dinner plates in a box in your closet, and start eating dinner every night off your salad plates. Use small wineglasses, not huge goblets. Never, ever eat snack food directly out of the bag or box; instead, pour a reasonable portion onto a

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She knew they were right. It was a bad habit. And she also knew that the layout of her office was encouraging the habit. When people came to see her, they sat in chairs across from her desk. When she faced them, she still had the computer monitor in her field of view. So it was easy—too easy—for Tucker to glance back and forth from their faces to the screen.

Tucker simply rearranged her office. She moved the desk so it no longer separated her from her guests, and she added a meeting area with two small couches and a table. Now, when she was facing the people who came to see her, the computer was completely out of sight. No more temptation.

"Just by rearranging the furniture, I was able to connect much better with people who came to see me," she said. Six months later, she solicited more feedback and was pleased that her communication scores had soared.

If you'd seen Tucker's initial performance appraisals, you might have concluded that, despite her stated open-door policy, she was one of those insensitive managers who never listen to their subordinates. And you would have been committing the Fundamental Attribution Error. Simply by rearranging the furniture in her office, Tucker made herself into a different "kind of person." That's the power of shaping the Path.

7.

There is something satisfying about outsmarting ourselves. (By now, you realize what "outsmarting ourselves" means—that our Riders are outsmarting our Elephants.) Tucker's solution was appealing in its elegance—a seemingly messy management problem solved by an afternoon office makeover. Tucker shaped her environment to *disallow* her own bad behavior.

This is a topic that hits home for the two of us (your co-

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HOW TO MAKE A **SWITCH**

For things to change, somebody somewhere has to start acting differently. Maybe it's you, maybe it's your team. Picture that person (or people).

Each has an emotional Elephant side and a rational Rider side. You've got to reach both. And you've also got to clear the way for them to succeed. In short, you must do three things:

DIRECT the Rider

FOLLOW THE BRIGHT SPOTS. Investigate what's working and clone it. [Jerry Sternin in Vietnam, solutions-focused therapy]

SCRIPT THE CRITICAL MOVES. Don't think big picture, think in terms of specific behaviors. [1% milk, four rules at the Brazilian railroad]

POINT TO THE DESTINATION. Change is easier when you know where you're going and why it's worth it. ["You'll be third graders soon," "No dry holes" at BP]

MOTIVATE the Elephant

FIND THE FEELING. Knowing something isn't enough to cause change. Make people feel something. [Piling gloves on the table, the chemotherapy video game, Robyn Waters's demos at Target]

SHRINK THE CHANGE. Break down the change until it no longer spooks the Elephant. [The 5-Minute Room Rescue, procurement reform]

GROW YOUR PEOPLE. Cultivate a sense of identity and instill the growth mindset. [Brasilata's "inventors," junior-high math kids' turnaround]

SHAPE the Path

TWEAK THE ENVIRONMENT. When the situation changes, the behavior changes. So change the situation. [Throwing out the phone system at Rackspace, 1-Click ordering, simplifying the online time sheet]

BUILD HABITS. When behavior is habitual, it's "free"—it doesn't tax the Rider. Look for ways to encourage habits. [Setting "action triggers," eating two bowls of soup while dieting, using checklists]

RALLY THE HERD. Behavior is contagious. Help it spread. ["Fataki" in Tanzania, "free spaces" in hospitals, seeding the tip jar]

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Next Steps

If you've finished *Switch* and are hungry for more, visit the book's website:

www.switchthebook.com/resources

On the site, you can find resources like these:

- **One-page overview.** Download and print the one-page overview (see page 259) and share it with your colleagues. [PDF format]
- **The *Switch* podcast series.** Listen to a series of short, tailored podcasts, in which the authors offer their thoughts about how to apply the book's concepts to different kinds of change.
  - *Switch for Business*
  - *Switch for Marketers*
  - *Switch for the Social Sector*
  - *Switch for Personal Change*
- ***Switch* book club materials.** Get access to a Facilitator's Guide designed to help lead book-club discussions on *Switch*. [PDF format]
- **Switch Your Organization outline**. Use this outline to guide your team's efforts to change your business or nonprofit. [PDF format]

Recommendations for Additional Reading

We read tons of books on change while writing *Switch.* Here are some of our favorites, in no particular order:

- *The Happiness Hypothesis*, by Jonathan Haidt [Psychology, Philosophy, Happiness]. Haidt came up with the Elephant/Rider analogy that we use in *Switch.* If you want to be happier and smarter, you should read his book.
- *Mindset*, by Carol Dweck [Psychology, Individual change]. If you found our discussion of the growth mindset (in Chapter 7) interesting, then please go to the source. Everyone should own this book.
- *The Heart of Change*, by John Kotter and Dan Cohen [Business and organizational change]. Our favorite book of Kotter's, this book will be useful if you are trying to change a big organization.

- *Mindless Eating*, by Brian Wansink [Dieting]. Do you want to lose a few pounds, or are you just curious about why everyone else is getting fatter? This book is filled with clever research like the popcorn study we described in the first chapter.
- *Nudge*, by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein [Decision making and public policy]. The authors argue that people can be "nudged" to make better decisions, and they propose some great Path solutions.
- *One Small Step Can Change Your Life*, by Robert Maurer [Individual and organizational change]. If you liked the chapter on shrinking the change, this is your book. Maurer shows how small steps can lead to great change.
- *Divorce Busting*, by Michele Weiner-Davis [Relationships]. Anyone in a relationship can benefit from this book by a practitioner of solutions-focused therapy.
- *Influencer*, by Kerry Patterson et al. [Societal and organizational change]. The authors behind *Crucial Conversations* wrote this excellent book on behavior change.
- *Unleashing Change*, by Steven Kelman [Government, Organizational change]. Kelman reviews his experience in leading procurement reform in the federal government. If you're looking for a change book that's rigorous and full of data, check out this one.

Notes

Chapter One

1 **Popcorn.** For dozens of clever studies of eating behavior, see Brian Wansink (2006), *Mindless Eating,* New York: Bantam Dell. The popcorn study is on pp. 16–19.

5 **Clocky.** Sales statistics come from this MIT online magazine: http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow/nanda.html (accessed June 20, 2009). Most of the sales came through Nanda's own website. According to the article, Nanda "was somewhat taken by surprise when the device attracted a great deal of attention after its description was posted, along with dozens of other student projects, on the Media Lab website. Several trend-watching blogs and websites such as Engadget took note of the Clocky concept and soon had introduced thousands of potential customers to the device through photos and links online." Gauri Nanda received an Ig Nobel Prize in Economics in 2005 for "theoretically adding many more hours to the workday."

7 **Jonathan Haidt.** See Haidt (2006), *The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom,* New York: Basic

Books, especially pp. 3–5. Haidt reviews metaphors presented by Buddha, Plato (including the quotation we include), and Freud and then presents his own metaphor. We love his Elephant/Rider metaphor—particularly the obvious imbalance in physical power between the two—and we're grateful to him for letting us use it here. In *The Happiness Hypothesis,* Haidt focuses not on change but rather on understanding what we can learn about being happy from the intersection of centuries of wisdom and modern psychology. If you want to be happier and smarter, read his book.

10 **Self-control is an exhaustible resource.** The papers we cite in this section are from an exciting area of research, started in the last fifteen years. The classic first paper, which includes the chocolate-chip cookie study, is Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Mark Muraven, and Dianne M. Tice (1998), "Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 1252–1265. The sad-movie study is part of Mark Muraven, Dianne M. Tice, and Roy Baumeister (1998), "Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 774–789. The experiments that show the self-control problems induced by too many choices are described in Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister et al. (2008), "Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94,* 883–898. In the wedding-registry study, experimental participants spent only twelve minutes setting up a simulated registry, yet that short amount of time was sufficient to sap their self-control. Given that real brides spend months choosing invitations, place settings, reception venues, and music lists, it's no wonder that some turn into Bridezillas.

13 **424 kinds of gloves.** Jon Stegner's story and the quotations are from John P. Kotter and Dan S. Cohen (2002), *The Heart of Change,* Boston: Harvard Business School Press, pp. 29–30.

15 **1% milk.** For the story of the development of this campaign, see Steve Booth-Butterfield and Bill Reger (2004), "The Message Changes Belief and the Rest Is Theory: The '1% or Less' Milk

Campaign and Reasoned Action," *Preventive Medicine, 39,* 581–588. The actual study is described in Bill, Reger, Margo G. Wootan, Steven Booth-Butterfield, and Holli Smith (1998), "1% or Less: A Community-Based Nutrition Campaign," *Public Health Reports, 113,* 410–419.

19 **In 2004, Donald Berwick.** Berwick's 100,000 lives campaign is the subject of a case study prepared by Chip's colleagues at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business. See Hayagreeva Rao and David Hoyt (2008), "Institute for Healthcare Improvement: The Campaign to Save 100,000 Lives," Stanford Graduate School of Business Case Study L-13. For additional insight into this case, check out an article by Rao and Robert Sutton (September 2008), "The Ergonomics of Innovation," *The McKinsey Quarterly,* http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_ergonomics_of_innovation_2197 (accessed May 17, 2009).

Chapter Two

27 **In 1990, Jerry Sternin.** The Vietnam story is compiled from various sources. An article by David Dorsey (December 2000), "Positive Deviant," *Fast Company,* p. 42, first introduced popular audiences to Jerry and Monique Sternin's work on positive deviance. Other details are from Jerry Sternin's presentation at the Boston College Center for Corporate Social Responsibility in April 2008 and from interviews of Jerry Sternin by Chip Heath in March and April 2008 and of Monique Sternin in May 2009.

27 **"We were like orphans."** Most of the direct quotations in this section are from Dorsey, "Positive Deviant."

28 **Bright spots.** Sternin's term for these outliers is *positive deviants,* which is based on a statistical analogy. Picture a statistical bell curve on which most people have outcomes around average. Sternin was looking for people on the positive tail of the bell curve.

Although the positive deviance methodology pioneered by Sternin is very useful, we found that the "deviance" terminology tends to be confusing or off-putting to people who aren't familiar with statistics, so we use the "bright-spots" terminology. Later

in this chapter, we carry the term *bright spots* over to other situations that involve exceptional positive performance.

Jerry Sternin died in November 2008. His work lives on through the work of Monique Sternin and the Positive Deviance Initiative at Tufts University. For an overview of the large number of domains in which positive deviance methods have produced substantial change, see the bibliography of work at http://www.positivedeviance.org/materials/bib_subj.html. Positive deviance was one of the "Ideas of the Year" highlighted by *New York Times Magazine* in 2008.

32 **Emory University's School of Public Health.** See U. Agnes Trinh Mackintosh, David R. Marsh, and Dirk G. Schroeder (2002), "Sustained Positive Deviant Child Care Practices and Their Effects on Child Growth in Viet Nam," *Food and Nutrition Bulletin, 23,* 16–25.

33 **"School stinks," said Bobby.** Bobby's story is from John J. Murphy (1994), "Working with What Works: A Solution-Focused Approach to School Behavior Problems," *School Counselor, 42,* 59–66.

34 **Solutions-focused brief therapy.** A relatively new therapeutic approach, solutions-focused brief therapy (SFBT) was pioneered by therapists at the Palo Alto Mental Research Institute, where Steve de Shazer and Insoo Kim Berg did their training. De Shazer and Berg are known for their emphasis on solutions and on the Miracle Question, which we consider later. SFBT has been applied in many different arenas. Wallace J. Gingerich of Case Western Reserve keeps a list of SFBT studies on his website: http://www.gingerich.net/SFBT/2007_review.htm. For his 2007 review of the literature, Gingerich accumulated a list of 150 studies, most conducted since 1997, that investigated the effect of SFBT on behavior. SFBT has been applied to day-to-day situations such as couples therapy, bullying at school, and how kids perform in math. It also has been used with even more serious problems: domestic violence offenders, prisoners, substance abusers, individuals found guilty of DUI, and suicide prevention programs. See Steve de Shazer, Yvonne Dolan, Harry Korman, Terry Trepper, Eric McCollum, and Insoo Kim Berg (2007), *More*

than Miracles: The State of the Art of Solution-Focused Brief Therapy, New York: Haworth Press, p. 157.

35 **Marriage therapist Michele Weiner-Davis.** The quotations in this section and the golf example are from Weiner-Davis, *Divorce Busting* (1992), New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 15–18. This is one of the most insightful and practical books on change we found in any domain. Even if your relationship is going well, you'll benefit from reading this book.

36 **Miracle Question.** This version of the question is from de Shazer et al., *More than Miracles,* the book that brought de Shazer and Berg, the founders of SFBT, together with four other experienced solutions-focused therapists to talk about current practice. SFBT therapists typically record their counseling sessions, with their clients' permission, for use in training new therapists and refining their own technique, and these authors spent time reviewing videotapes of therapy sessions and asking one another, "Why did you ask that there?" Reading *More than Miracles* is the therapy equivalent of sitting around reviewing game tapes with Super Bowl–winning football coaches. It's a great experience for a therapist or counselor.

36 **Brian Cade.** The two counseling sessions by Brian Cade are described in Kathryn Shine (March 24, 2002), "C'mon, get happy," *Sun Herald,* p. 38. Also see Cade and William Hudson, *A Brief Guide to Brief Therapy* (1993), New York: Norton.

37 **Man with a drinking problem.** The example is from the *Harvard Mental Health Letter* (September 1, 2006), "Solution-focused therapy (methods of psychotherapy)."

41 **Xolair.** The Xolair example is described in Richard Pascale and Jerry Sternin (May 2005), "Your Company's Secret Change Agents," *Harvard Business Reviews,* pp. 73–81.

45 **Learn English at home.** Go to http://www.english-at-home.com/vocabulary/english-word-for-emotions/ (accessed May 17, 2009).

46 **Bad is stronger than good.** This review paper is unusually long, thorough (233 references!), and depressing. See Roy F. Baumeister, Ellen Bratslavsky, Catrin Finkenauer, and Kathleen D. Vohs (2001), "Bad Is Stronger than Good," *Review of General*

Psychology, 5, 323–370. The final summary quotation is on p. 355.

47 **Marcus Buckingham.** Interested readers could start with this book: Buckingham (2007), *Go Put Your Strengths to Work: 6 Powerful Steps to Achieve Outstanding Performance,* New York: Free Press.

48 **A husband forgot his wife's birthday.** For an even freakier world, imagine that the husband had forgotten all but one of his wife's last fourteen birthdays, yet she, being a bright-spot aficionado, was *energized* because she knew success was possible.

48 **Solving problems versus scaling successes.** Another domain in which people have made progress following bright spots is the field called Appreciative Inquiry (AI), which focuses on analyzing successes rather than failures. For instance, an AI practitioner who is investigating customer-service problems wouldn't ask, "What can we do to minimize client anger and complaints?" Instead, she'd ask, "When have customers been most pleased with their service, and what can we apply from those moments of success?" Tom Krattenmaker, a practitioner of AI, says, "Positive stories, unlike data or lists, stir imaginations and generate excitement about the company and what it is capable of accomplishing in the future." See Tom Krattenmaker (2005), "Change Through Appreciative Inquiry," in *Managing Change to Reduce Resistance,* Boston: Harvard Business School Press, pp. 49–58; the quotation is on p. 55.

Chapter Three

49 **Chronic hip pain.** The study that showed physicians were more likely to refer a patient to surgery when confronted with two medication options is Donald A. Redelmeier and Eldar Shafir (1995), "Medical Decision Making in Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives," *Journal of the American Medical Association, 273,* 302–305.

50 **Decision paralysis.** Some of the language in our discussion of decision paralysis first appeared in a column we wrote for *Fast Company* (November 2007), "Analysis of Paralysis," http://www

.fastcompany.com/magazine/120/analysis-of-paralysis.html (accessed May 17, 2009).

50 **Shopping is a lot more tiring.** Researchers have shown that the focused decisions you have to make while you're shopping actually deplete your self-control. What saps your control is not the time you spend shopping; it's the number of choices you have to make. That must be why Decembers are so bad for overindulging in food and drink. See Kathleen D. Vohs, Roy F. Baumeister et al. (2008), "Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94,* 883–898.

50 **Scene 1, 2, 3.** See Sheena S. Iyengar and Mark R. Lepper (2000), "When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,* 995–1006. See Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, G. Huberman, and W. Jiang (2004), "How Much Choice Is Too Much? Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans," in O. S. Mitchell and S. Utkus (eds.), *Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral Finance* (pp. 83–97), Oxford: Oxford University Press. The dating study is Ray Fisman, Sheena S. Iyengar, E. Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson (2006), "Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121*(2), 673–697. Sheena S. Iyengar's book *How We Choose: The Subtext of Life* (New York: Twelve Publishers) is coming out around May 2010, and you should look for it.

52 **Barry Schwartz.** See Schwartz (2003), *The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less,* New York: Ecco, p. 2.

54 **America Latina Logistica (ALL).** The case of the Brazilian railroad is described in Donald N. Sull, Andre Delben Silva, and Fernando Martins (January 14, 2004), *America Latina Logistica,* Harvard Business School Case 9-804-139, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

60 **Food Pyramid.** The Food Pyramid graphic and data are from the site http://mypyramid.gov/pyramid/index.html.

62 ***The Critical Path.*** See Michael Beer, Russell A. Eisenstat, and Bert Spector (1990), *The Critical Path to Corporate Renewal.*

Boston: Harvard Business School Press. The contrast between outcome goals and behavioral goals is on p. 244.

63 **110 parents who had abused their children.** The results of the study are described in Mark Chaffin, Jane F. Silovsky, Beverly Funderburk et al. (2004), "Parent-Child Interaction Therapy with Physically Abusive Parents: Efficacy for Reducing Future Abuse Reports," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72,* 500–510. Most of the quotations are from an interview between Chip Heath and Beverly Funderburk in October 2008.

67 **Miner County.** The story of the revitalization of Miner County is based on two sources: (1) interviews between Chip Heath, Randy Parry, and Kathy Callies in May 2008 and May 2009 and (2) an article by Jonathan Eig (March 27, 2005), "As Farmers Dwindle, Towns Make Best of What's Left," *Wall Street Journal.* Eig's article is especially interesting because his editors originally sent him to write a "turn out the lights" story about the last years of Miner County. But the community didn't know that, and residents shared with him the remarkable changes of the previous few years. Eig was impressed, and the story he wrote was guardedly optimistic, not the bleak tale he'd originally envisioned. His editors were so shocked by his optimistic tone that they rejected his first few drafts because his story was so far from what they had been expecting.

Chapter Four

73 **Crystal Jones.** Jones's story is from a training manual for young teachers who are going to teach in some of the toughest school districts in the country. Jones's story is described on pp. 26, 50–51, and the other goal is quoted on p. 37 of *Teaching as Leadership* (2008), Washington, DC: Teach For America.

75 **BHAG.** See James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras (1994), *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies,* New York: Harper Business. The examples of BHAGs are from James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras (September–October 1996), "Building Your Company's Vision," *Harvard Business Review,* pp. 65–77.

76 **Laura Esserman.** For Esserman's story, see Victoria Chang and Jeffrey Pfeffer (2003), "Laura Esserman (A)," Stanford Graduate

School of Business Case Study OB-42A. Quotations not in the case study are from interviews that Chip Heath conducted with Laura Esserman and Meredithe Mendelsohn in May 2009.

82 **"15% return on equity."** See Michael Beer, Russell A. Eisenstat, and Bert Spector (1990), *The Critical Path to Organizational Renewal.* Boston: Harvard Business School Press, p. 85.

83 **Judy Samuelson.** This Clinic is from an interview between Dan Heath and Judy Samuelson in May 2009.

87 **BP's "No dry holes."** Industry history, quotations, and the description of BP's "No dry holes" goal are from interviews by Chip Heath with Pete Callagher, Jim Farnsworth, and Ian Vann in 2005.

94 **Jack Rivkin.** The turnaround of the Shearson Lehman research department is described in Ashish Nanda, Boris Groysberg, and Lauren Prusiner (January 23, 2006), *Lehman Brothers (A): Rise of the Equity Research Department,* Harvard Business School Case Study 9-906-034, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Chapter Five

102 **Robyn Waters, Target.** Waters's story is from an interview by Chip Heath with Robyn Waters in November 2008.

105 **In *The Heart of Change.*** See John P. Kotter and Dan S. Cohen (2002), *The Heart of Change,* Boston: Harvard Business School Press, p. x. The quote about the advantages of analytical tools is on p. 12.

108 **HopeLab Re-Mission.** The backstory of the Re-Mission game is from an interview by Chip Heath with HopeLab research director Steve Cole in November 2008. The HopeLab clinical test of the Re-Mission game is described in Pamela M. Kato, Steve W. Cole, Andrew S. Bradlyn, and Brad H. Pollock (2008), "A Video Game Improves Behavioral Outcomes in Adolescents and Young Adults with Cancer: A Randomized Trial," *Pediatrics, 122,* e305–e317. The doubling of odds for a 20 percent increase in compliance is indicated by Jean L. Richardson et al. (1990), "The Effect of Compliance with Treatment on Survival Among Patients with Hematologic Malignancies," *Journal of Clinical Oncology, 8*(2), 356–364.

110 **"Where'd you find six dumb people?"** See M. A. Cusumano and R. W. Selby (1995), *Microsoft Secrets,* New York: Free Press. The Microsoft usability test lab is described on p. 379. The problem of programmers having more advanced machines than their customers is discussed on p. 347.

113 **Fake Weatherman.** See Peter Borkenau and Anette Liebler (1993), "Convergence of Stranger Ratings of Personality and Intelligence with Self-Ratings, Partner Ratings, and Measured Intelligence," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65,* 546–553. The correlation between self-ratings and measured IQ was .29, accounting for 8 percent of the variance. The correlation between stranger ratings and IQ was .38, accounting for 14 percent of the variance. Strangers thus did about 66 percent better than people themselves.

114 **We're all lousy self-evaluators.** The research studies on self-evaluation and the examples of positive illusions are summarized in David Dunning, Chip Heath, and Jerry Suls (2004), "Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, and the Workplace," *Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5,* 69–106. David Dunning also has some interesting research on what he calls the "unskilled and unaware" phenomenon. The worst self-evaluators are people who lack skill. For instance, people who don't have a sense of humor are most likely to think their bad jokes are funny, and people who lack skill in grammar are most likely to confidently ignore a useful correction. When the research came out, dozens of newspaper articles appeared illustrating the "unskilled and unaware" phenomenon with a discussion of workplace bosses, a topic not covered in the original research article.

115 **Attila the Accountant.** Sim Sitkin, who is now a professor of management at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business, told this story to Chip Heath in May 2009.

119 **"In the absence of a dire threat."** See David A. Garvin and Michael A. Roberto (February 2005), "Change Through Persuasion," *Harvard Business Review,* pp. 1–8, reprinted in Harvard Business School Press (2006), *Harvard Business Review on Leading Through Change* (pp. 85–104), Boston: Harvard Business School

Press. The "dire threat" quote is on p. 86; the "deathbed" quote is on p. 87.

119 **Rock bottom.** See Ruth Maxwell (1986), *Breakthrough: What to Do When Alcoholism or Chemical Dependency Hits Close to Home,* New York: Ballantine Books; the conference incident is on pp. 4–5.

119 **The burning platform.** See William E. Smith and Helen Gibson (July 18, 1988), "Disaster 'Screaming like a Banshee,' " *Time,* http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,967917,00.html (accessed May 28, 2009).

120 ***Glengarry Glen Ross.*** See David Mamet (1984), *Glengarry Glen Ross: A Play,* New York: Grove Press.

121 **What Good Are Positive Emotions?** See Barbara L. Fredrickson (1998), "What Good Are Positive Emotions?" *Review of General Psychology, 2,* 300–319. Among the studies Frederickson cites: Doctors experiencing positive emotions solve a tricky medical dilemma more flexibly and quickly. Students in a positive mood devise more innovative solutions to a technical challenge. Negotiators in a positive state of mind are more successful and creative negotiators; they find "win-win" solutions more often. Positive emotion also makes it easier for people to make connections among dissimilar ideas, and it makes them less likely to slip into an "us versus them" mentality. All of these tendencies—flexible problem solving, innovative solutions, less political infighting—would be very useful in a change situation.

Chapter Six

124 **A study of hotel maids.** See Alia J. Crum and Ellen J. Langer (2007), "Mind-Set Matters: Exercise and the Placebo Effect," *Psychological Science, 18,* 165–171.

126 **Car-wash loyalty cards.** See J. C. Nunes and X. Dreze (2006), "The Endowed Progress Effect: How Artificial Advancement Increases Effort," *Journal of Consumer Research, 32,* 504–512.

127 **50 percent of the money in the bag.** This practice was discussed in an interview between Chip Heath and Jan Alfieri, of the Association of Fundraising Professionals, in February 2009.

Alfieri says that this money is usually raised in what fund-raising professionals call the "quiet period" before the campaign is announced publicly. Historically the amount was 50 percent, but some recent campaigns raised as much as 70 percent. Alfieri says, "All this is calculated to give donors the assurance the campaign will succeed."

129 **Shrink the change.** Thousands of studies in psychology indicate that people do better when they have high situational self-confidence, or self-efficacy. People with high self-efficacy perform better on sports, academic, and work tasks; they persevere longer; and they rebound better when they encounter a setback.

How do you build this kind of self-efficacy? Most research on self-efficacy is correlational so it can't distinguish (a) self-confidence as a mindset that can be grown from (b) self-confidence that arises for other reasons. Michael Jordan may report high self-efficacy in trying a new sport, but that self-efficacy may be due to his physical abilities, not to his mindset. The literature on self-efficacy suggests a couple of ways to build self-efficacy as a mindset—for example, by experiencing personal success in a difficult situation or by seeing a role model experience success. Those solutions, however, may be less available in a time of change when personal success and role models are in short supply.

Some research suggests that shrinking the change may provide a good game plan for building self-efficacy. Al Bandura and Dale Schunk tried to teach subtraction skills to elementary school kids who had been identified as having "gross deficits in arithmetic." On an initial 25-question subtraction test, two-thirds of their kids got less than one problem correct. The researchers developed seven modules to teach key subtraction skills (such as how to borrow from the next column). Each module outlined a principle, gave two examples, and provided six pages of problems to be worked by the students. All kids were brought in for seven 30-minute, self-paced sessions with no coaching from a teacher. One group was given a big, distant goal of completing the seven modules by the end of the seventh session. Another group was given a close-by, shrink-the-change goal of completing one module during each session. On the final test, the proximal-goals group

solved 81 percent of the problems, and the distal-goals groups solved only 45 percent. Later, after the study sessions were over, kids were given a free play period and two sets of exercises to entertain themselves—some subtraction problems and some "solve the code" puzzles. The kids with distant goals did only one subtraction problem on average. But the kids who built self-efficacy through proximal goals—even though they initially hated math just as much—solved fourteen subtraction problems on average during the free play period. Stretch goals (or BHAGs) may be fine when you already have strong self-efficacy. But Bandura and Shunk's study suggests that when you're building self-efficacy, you might want to shrink the change. See Albert Bandura and Dale H. Schunk (1981), "Cultivating Competence, Self-Efficacy, and Intrinsic Interest Through Proximal Self-Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41,* 586–598.

130 **5-Minute Room Rescue.** Check out http://www.flylady.net/pages/FLYFaq.asp (accessed December 17, 2008).

131 **Personal finance guru Dave Ramsey.** Dave Ramsey describes the Farrars' situation and his debt-fighting techniques in Ramsey (2007), *The Total Money Makeover,* Nashville, Thomas Nelson. The Farrars' story is on pp. 116–117. We've looked at a lot of financial plans by various gurus, and Ramsey's strikes us as the most consistent with the psychological principles of change we review in *Switch.* Ramsey's own experience is on page 3, and the "motivation is more important than math" quote is on p. 114.

137 **Steve Kelman . . . procurement reform.** See Steve Kelman (2005), *Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Kelman disputes the classic assumption in the organizational change literature that people resist change. He argues that in many situations there is a pent-up demand for change that merely needs to be "unleashed" by top leaders; he makes a compelling—and inspiring—argument that this is the case. The chocolate-chip cookie milspecs is on p. 4. The "set other changes in motion" quote is on p. 83. The story of the credit card and past performance pledges is on pp. 82–88. The A grade from the Brookings Institution is on p. 4.

138 **$320 billion in discetionary purchases.** The dollar amount is from Kelman, *Unleashing Change,* p. 3. The comparison is from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2004–2005,* Washington, DC; U.S. Census Bureau. Table 642 reports the 2002 output of "computer and electronic products" as $139.9 billion and the output of "motor vehicles, trailers, & parts" as $119.3 billion. So there's actually room left over.

141 **A *miracle scale* ranging from 0 to 10.** See also the discussion of the miracle scale in Steve de Shazer, Yvonne Dolan, Harry Korman, Terry Trepper, Eric McCollum, and Insoo Kim Berg (2007), *More than Miracles: The State of the Art of Solution-Focused Brief Therapy,* New York: Haworth Press, pp. 61–72. There's a great example of the scaling question in practice in the case study of Lee the dock manager in Scott D. Miller and Insoo Kim Berg (1995), *The Miracle Method: A Radically New Approach to Problem Drinking,* New York: Norton, pp. 39–59.

142 **Track patients' self-reported progress.** Once the 0 to 10 scale is set up, it becomes easier for clients to notice and start talking about even small improvements toward their goal. When a therapist identifies a substantial change on the scale—say, a half-point improvement toward the goal—the therapist will ask, "How did you do it?" Therapists are trained to be persistent in asking the *how* question several times: "It's important to be persistent even if, and oftentimes particularly if, the client seems to be struggling a bit at first to formulate an answer. The question implies the client did something that was helpful; things didn't get better without a reason." Some therapists call this process *positive blaming.* Try it with your kids when they make an improvement. See discussion around p. 63 of de Shazer et al., *More than Miracles.*

143 **NFL coach Bill Parcells.** See Bill Parcells (2001), "The Tough Work of Turning Around a Team," reprinted in *Harvard Business Review on Turnarounds* (pp. 105–114), Boston: Harvard Business School Press; the quotation is on pp. 111–112.

144 **UCLA coach John Wooden.** Quoted in Robert Maurer (2004), *One Small Step Can Change Your Life: The Kaizen Way,* New York: Workman, p. 11.

144 **Small wins.** See Weick (1984), "Small Wins: Redefining the Scale of Social Problems," *American Psychologist, 39*(1), p. 46.

145 **David Allen.** See Allen (2001), *Getting Things Done,* New York: Viking Penguin, p. 239.

146 **Al-Anon.** See Al-Anon Family Groups (1995), *How Al-Anon Works for Families and Friends of Alcoholics,* Virginia Beach, VA: Al-Anon Family Groups; the quotation is on p. 73.

147 **George kissed Paula.** See Michele Weiner-Davis (1992), *Divorce Busting,* New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 92.

Chapter Seven

149 **College student Paul Butler.** The facts of the Butler story are from an interview Dan Heath conducted with Butler in October 2008. For a short version of the story and a photo of Butler, go to http://rareconservation.org/about/page.php?subsection=History (accessed May 28, 2009).

152 **Pride campaigns.** Information about Rare's Pride campaigns is available on Rare's website: http://www.rareconservation.org. Rare now focuses more on protecting precious areas, such as reefs and forests, than on preserving particular species. But Rare conservationists continue to work on precious areas by rallying the public around what they call a "charismatic species" that symbolizes specific areas that need protection. For instance, the Napoleon wrasse fish was the charismatic species in the waters surrounding the Togian Islands of Indonesia, which contain 262 species of coral and countless other species that depend on the coral.

153 **James March . . . identity model.** See March (1994), *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen,* New York: Free Press, especially ch. 2, where March provides a beautiful contrast of consequence-based decision making and decision making through identity. For a longer treatment of this topic, see Chip Heath and Dan Heath, *Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die,* New York: Random House, 2007, pp. 182–199, including the story of the hugely successful "Don't Mess with Texas" antilittering campaign, which was a textbook application of identity.

154 **Concerned about the rapid turnover among its nurses.** For more on this story and on Appreciative Inquiry, see Tom Krattenmaker (2005), "Change Through Appreciative Inquiry," in *Managing Change to Reduce Resistance* (pp. 49–58), Boston: Harvard Business School Press. The Wood quotation is on p. 57. The improvement statistics are from Diana Whitney, Amanda Trosten-Bloom, and David Cooperrider (2003), *The Power of Appreciative Inquiry: A Practical Guide to Positive Change,* New York: Berrett-Koehler, pp. 94–95.

156 **Brasilata.** Background information comes from the Brasilata website (accessed February 13, 2009). Revenue in 2007 was 384,102,000 Brazilian reals, per this page: http://www.brasilata.com.br/en/financas_resultados.php. The number of ideas per inventor is from http://www.brasilata.com.br/en/projeto_historico.php. For the car-bumper inspired can, go to http://www.brasilata.com.br/en/prod_18un_b.php. For the energy-saving idea stories, go to http://www.brasilata.com.br/en/projecto_fatos_relevantes.php. All conversions between U.S. dollars and Brazilian reals were calculated on February 13, 2009.

158 **Citizens for Safe Driving.** See Jonathan L. Freedman and Scott C. Fraser (1966), "Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4,* 195–203. This study started a whole field that investigates "foot-in-the-door" techniques. Most of these techniques seem to work because they form (or re-form) people's identity. For an insightful analysis of these techniques, under the label "commitment and consistency," see Robert Cialdini (2000), *Influence: Science and Practice,* 4th ed., New York: Allyn & Bacon, ch. 3. For the "Once [the home owner] has agreed . . ." quote, see Freedman and Fraser, "Compliance Without Pressure," p. 201.

163 **"Fixed mindset" . . . "growth mindset."** This quiz and all the fixed/growth-mindset material come from Carol S. Dweck (2006), *Mindset: The New Psychology of Success,* New York: Random House. The quiz is on p. 13. Every teacher, coach, manager, and parent should read Dweck's book.

166 **The brain is like a muscle.** See Lisa S. Blackwell, Kali H. Trzesniewski, and Carol S. Dweck (2007), "Implicit Theories

of Intelligence Predict Achievement Across an Adolescent Transition: A Longitudinal Study and an Intervention," *Child Development, 78,* 246–263.

167 **Dramatic transformations.** The quotation is from Dweck, *Mindsets,* p. 59.

168 **"Failure in the middle."** See Rosabeth Moss Kanter (November 23, 2003), *Leadership for Change: Enduring Skills for Change Masters,* Harvard Business School Note 9-304-06, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, p. 11, based on her 2001 book *Evolve! Succeeding in the Digital Culture of Tomorrow,* Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

168 **"Three steps forward and two steps back."** See Michele Weiner-Davis (1992), *Divorce Busting,* New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 212.

170 **Amy Edmondson.** See Edmondson (2003), "Framing for Learning: Lessons in Successful Technology Implementation," *California Management Review, 45,* 34–54. To protect her research participants, Edmondson used pseudonyms for the hospitals and the medical personnel.

171 **Recover fully in three weeks instead of two months.** The MICS recovery statistics are from Barbara Kuhn Timby and Nancy E. Smith (2006), *Introductory Medical-Surgical Nursing,* 9th ed., New York: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, p. 532.

173 **A famous story about IBM.** See Paul B. Carroll (1993), *Big Blues,* New York: Crown; the quotation is on p. 51.

173 **Molly Howard.** Dan Heath interviewed Molly Howard in August 2008. The Principal of the Year award is described in Del Jones (March 16, 2008), "USA's Top Principal Could Teach CEOs a Thing or Two," *USA Today,* http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2008-03-16-principal-advice_N.htm (accessed February 6, 2009). Howard told Heath, "Companies can pick and choose the raw materials. Public education accepts all. We are a zero-reject business. That's a big, big difference."

Chapter Eight

180 **W. Edwards Deming.** See Deming (1982), *Out of the Crisis.* Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Advanced Engineering Study. The fires story is on p. 325.

180 **Fundamental Attribution Error.** See Lee Ross (1977), "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process," in L. Berkowitz (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 10), New York: Academic Press. Echoes of the Fundamental Attribution Error are found in the conventional wisdom of many fields. Marketers talk about finding the right psychographic for a consumer good. Health psychologists talk about the importance of targeting people who are "ready" to stop smoking. Human resources people talk about getting the right people on the bus. Change experts talk about classifying the three types of people in any change effort: Believers, Fence Sitters, and Resisters. But social psychology is filled with examples that show situations trump personal attributes. For example, the food-drive study discussed in section 2 of this chapter says that you're three times better-off with a food-drive Resister with a map than with a true Believer without one.

180 **Marriage therapist Michele Weiner-Davis.** See Weiner-Davis (1992), *Divorce Busting,* New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 42. The kind of thinking fostered by the Fundamental Attribution Error has been shown to hurt marriages. Research has shown that couples experience more distress when they insist on attributing their relationship problems to traitlike characteristics of their partner that are global and stable. These attributions lead to more negative conversations and serious fights when couples try to work through their problems. See Norman Epstein, Donald H. Baucom, and Lynn A. Rankin (1993), "Treatment of Marital Conflict: A Cognitive-Behavioral Approach," *Clinical Psychology Review, 13,* 45–57.

182 **Distinguish "saints" from "jerks."** The food-drive study is described in L. Ross and R. E. Nisbett (1991), *The Person and the*

Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 132–133.

184 **Peter Bregman.** The source of this account is Bregman's blog, "The Easiest Way to Change People's Behavior" (March 11, 2009), http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/bregman/2009/03/the-easiest-way-to.html, and an interview between Chip Heath and Bregman in May 2009.

187 **Becky Richards . . . "medication vests."** This story is based on an interview between Chip Heath and Becky Richards in June 2008 and a conference presentation by Richards at the BEACON collaborative in San Francisco in April 2008.

191 **"Sterile cockpit" rule.** See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sterile_Cockpit_Rule (accessed July 23, 2009). The rule was developed by the FAA in 1981 after investigations showed that some aircraft crashes during the 1970s were caused when flight crews were distracted from their instruments by idle chatter in the cockpit.

191 **The IT group . . . "sterile cockpit."** See Leslie A. Perlow (1997), *Finding Time: How Corporations, Individuals, and Families Can Benefit from New Work Practices,* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. The quotations about the results of the "quiet hours" experiment are on p. 126. Perlow conducted this study for her graduate school dissertation. As an outsider to the company, and only a student at the time (she's now a senior professor at Harvard), Perlow was responsible for a simple intervention that the division vice president declared "a new benchmark"!

193 **Amanda Tucker.** This story is based on an example Tucker recounted in May 2009 in a Stanford Graduate School of Business class on "How to Change Things When Change Is Hard." Used with her permission.

197 **Haddon Matrix.** For an overview of the Haddon Matrix, see a presentation online produced by the San Francisco Department of Health (which in turn draws on work by Carolyn Fowler at Johns Hopkins University's Bloomberg School of Public Health): http://www.ccsf.edu/Resources/Faculty/jeskinne/documents/HAD2Complete.pdf (accessed June 14, 2009). Our thanks to Carolyn Fowler and Eric Tash for their insights on the Haddon Matrix.

199 **Rackspace.** The Rackspace story and quotations are from two interviews between Dan Heath and Graham Weston, conducted October 2007 and February 2009. Revenue growth data from internal company data were supplied to the authors.

Chapter Nine

203 **Mike Romano.** Mike's name and a few irrelevant details were altered to protect his identity. The information comes from an interview between the soldier and research assistant Elaine Bartlett in January 2009.

204 **The White House was so troubled.** The case study of drug use by soldiers before and after the Vietnam War is in Lee N. Robins, John E. Helzer, and Darlene H. Davis (1975), "Narcotic Use in Southeast Asia and Afterward," *Archives of General Psychiatry, 32,* 955–961.

208 **36 percent of the successful changes.** See Todd F. Heatherton and Patricia A. Nichols (1994), "Personal Accounts of Successful Versus Failed attempts at Life Change," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20,* 664–675.

209 **Peter Gollwitzer.** Gollwitzer's summary of his work on triggers—Gollwitzer calls them "implementation intentions"—can be found in Gollwitzer (1999), "Implementation Intentions: Strong Effects of Simple Plans," *American Psychologist, 54,* 493–503. Most of the studies described in this section are referenced in that article. The quotation about "passing control to the environment" is on p. 495.

211 **Recovering from hip- or knee-replacement surgery.** See Sheina Orbell and Paschal Sheeran (2000), "Motivational and Volitional Processes in Action Initiation: A Field Study of the Role of Implementation Intentions," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30,* 780–797.

212 **Recent meta-study.** Peter M. Gollwitzer, Paschal Sheeran, and Thomas L. Webb (2005), "Implementation Intentions and Health Behaviors," in M. Conner and P. Norman (eds.), *Predicting Health Behavior: Research and Practice with Social Cognition Models* (2nd edition). Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

215 **Stand-up meeting.** See William G. Pagonis with Jeffrey L. Cruikshank (1992), *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War,* Boston: Harvard Business School Press; the quotation is on pp. 185–186. For the use of stand-up meetings in software development, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stand-up_meeting (accessed May 27, 2009). Agile programmers disdain the typical IT style of delivering a whole program all at once (and typically late). Instead, they collaborate on a series of quick prototypes, each of which receives customer input, in the hope of catching problems early and preventing costly rework later.

217 **Two cups of soup each day.** See Barbara J. Rolls, Liane S. Roe, Amanda M. Beach, and Panny M. Kris-Etherton (2005), "Provision of Foods Differing in Energy Density Affects Long-Term Weight Loss," *Obesity Research, 13,* 1052–1060.

217 **Natalie Elder.** Dan Heath interviewed Natalie Elder in August 2008.

220 **The humble checklist.** Parts of the section on checklists originally appeared in our *Fast Company* column (March 2008), "The Heroic Checklist," http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/123/heroic-checklist.html.

220 **Holy Grail of checklists.** See Atul Gawande (December 10, 2007), "The Checklist: If Something So Simple Can Transform Intensive Care, What Else Can It Do?" *New Yorker,* pp. 86–101.

221 **Checklists educate people about what's best.** We're not advocating the kind of checklists that are associated with some quality improvement processes—for example, the elaborate procedure manuals compiled for ISO 9000 certification. To educate people about what's best and to help them avoid blind spots, a checklist has to be simple enough that people will actually *use* it. The preflight checklist for a 747 is less than one page long. If your checklist requires more than one sheet of paper, you need to simplify it.

222 **Chronic parking problem.** For the parking study, see C. F. Gettys et al. (1987), "An Evaluation of Human Act Generation Performance," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39,* 23–51.

223 **"Standardize on the mission-critical elements."** Dan Heath interviewed Dr. Pronovost in January 2008.

Chapter Ten

226 **A stream of smoke.** See Latané and Darley (1968), "Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10,* 215–221. Latané and Darley's work on bystander nonintervention is one of the cleverest streams of research in social psychology. Because it's a classic, professors of social psychology teach it often, and they recommend to their students a simple technique to overcome nonintervention: Point to someone and give that person a specific instruction such as "*You* call 911." It's not that people aren't willing to help. It's just that the Rider is caught in an infinite loop, trying to look at everyone else for cues about how to behave, and those cues aren't coming.

227 **Obesity is contagious.** See Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler (2007). "The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years," *New England Journal of Medicine, 357,* 370–379. The quotation is from Gina Kolata (June 25, 2007), "Study Says Obesity Can Be Contagious," *New York Times.* Be on the lookout for Christakis and Fowler's book *Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives,* New York: Little, Brown and Company (2009).

227 **Drinking is contagious.** See Michael Kremer and Dan Levy (2005), "Peer Effects and Alcohol Use Among College Students," Working paper, Harvard University.

229 **Guests at the hotel reuse their towels.** See Noah J. Goldstein, Steve J. Martin, and Robert B. Cialdini (2008), *Yes! 50 Scientifically Proven Ways to Be Persuasive,* New York: Free Press, ch. 1.

229 **Gerard Cachon.** Chip Heath interviewed Gerard Cachon in August 2008 and May 2009.

233 **Designated driver.** Statistics are from Harvard University's School of Public Health, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/chc/harvard-alcohol-project/ (accessed June 14, 2009). The Grant Tinker quotations are from Nikki Finke (December 29,

1988), "A TV Crusade on Drunken Driving," *Los Angeles Times,* p. 5E.

234 **"Sugar-daddy" relationships.** Statistics about cross-generational relationships are from Population Reference Bureau (2007), *Addressing Cross-Generational Sex: A Desk Review of Research and Programs.* The American teens statistic is on p. 16; the statistic for sub-Saharan Africa is on p. 9.

237 **Fataki.** We led the workshop that developed the Fataki idea and the first three radio commercials. A video of Chip Heath talking about the work on the day the first radio spots were recorded is on *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* website: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/july-dec07/aids_11-30.html. Dan Heath was, at that moment, Photoshopping a prototype of the first Fataki billboards.

242 **Lou Gerstner . . . "Culture . . . *is* the game."** See Louis V. Gerstner (2002), *Who Says Elephants Can't Dance?,* New York: HarperBusiness, p. 182.

242 **Katherine Kellogg.** Thanks to Kellogg's careful work, this is one of the most closely observed change efforts in the entire organizational behavior literature. See Katherine C. Kellogg (2008), "Not Faking It: Making Real Change in Response to Regulation at Two Surgical Teaching Hospitals," Working paper, MIT.

Chapter Eleven

251 **Skateboarding monkey.** Parts of the section on Amy Sutherland and exotic-animal training originally appeared in our *Fast Company* column (April 2008), "Your Boss Is a Monkey," http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/124/your-boss-is-a-monkey.html (accessed June 14, 2009).

251 **"What Shamu Taught Me."** The *New York Times* article is from June 25, 2006, and can be found at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/fashion/25love.html (accessed May 17, 2009). Also see Amy Sutherland (2008), *What Shamu Taught Me About Life, Love, and Marriage: Lessons for People from Animals and Their Trainers,* New York: Random House. The "verbal grooming"

quotation and other details are from an interview between Dan Heath and Amy Sutherland in January 2008.

253 **Psychologist Alan Kazdin.** See Kazdin (2008), *The Kazdin Method for Parenting the Defiant Child: With No Pills, No Therapy, No Contest of Wills,* New York: Houghton Mifflin. The quotations are from p. 34.

253 **Change isn't an event; it's a process.** Chip Heath thanks Bo Brockman for teaching this idea.

254 **Steven Kelman.** On pp. 22–24, Kelman explains why mere exposure and cognitive dissonance may cause people to resist change. Then, in an insightful analysis on pp. 123–127, he shows how the same factors make change hard to stop once they get going. See Kelman (2005), *Unleashing Change: A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government,* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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
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